First Section (प्रथमः परिच्छेदः)
I always bow to Nārāyaṇa, who is knowable through true scripture alone, completely transcends the perishable and the imperishable, is free from defects, and possesses every good quality.
For the understanding of good people, I shall establish in sequence those very attributes that have been stated herein through true statements.
“The Vedas beginning with the Ṛgveda, the Bhārata, the entire Pañcarātra, the original Rāmāyaṇa, and the Purāṇa of this same nature—and as for those that follow these, they too are all true scriptures. Those that are other than these are false scriptures; Janārdana is not to be known through them. He is to be known through these by those who are ever engaged, endowed with devotion, and firmly established—not by mere reasoning, not by sense-born cognition, nor by anything whatsoever. He is knowable solely through scripture, by devotees alone, and not otherwise.”
Thus in the Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa.
“One who does not know the Veda does not contemplate, in the hereafter, this great Self, the experiencer of all.” — Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 3/12/9/17
Thus says the Taittirīya revelation.
“This insight is not to be attained through reasoning; taught by another alone, it is readily understood, O dearest one.” — Kāṭhakopaniṣad 1/2/9
Thus says the Kaṭha Śruti.
Neither the senses nor inference make him known; for the Vedas alone make him known. Therefore they call them “Vedas.”
Thus says the Pippalāda Śruti.
Nor are these statements themselves invalid, because the Veda is unauthored.
“Itihāsa and Purāṇa are the fifth Veda among the Vedas.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 7/1/2
and because it is thus included by that statement.
Nor is it to be said, “No statement not authored by a person exists at all,” since, in its absence, dharma and the like, accepted by all traditions, would not be established.
He who does not accept those two is not a proponent of a doctrinal system, because a doctrinal system has no purpose. Nor does the world receive any benefit from him, since, when the absence of dharma and the like is known, only harm to one another through violence and the like results. Nor does benefiting serve any purpose for him, since there is no unseen result. Therefore, one who asserts the absence of dharma and the like has indeed admitted the pointlessness of his own doctrinal system; on that account, he is not a proponent of a doctrinal system.
Nor is that established by a person-authored statement, since ignorance and deception would then be possible. Nor should an omniscient being be postulated for that purpose, since an undue burden of suppositions would result: the supposition of omniscience not observed elsewhere, the supposition of his non-deceptiveness, and the supposition that it was composed by him.
When a statement not authored by a person is accepted, nothing is to be postulated.
And the Veda’s not being authored by a person is established of itself, because an author of the Veda is not established. When an author is not established, positing such an author entails a burden of postulation; if one is not posited, its authorlessness is indeed established. Nor does the Veda have an author as an ordinary statement does, because the latter is not established as authorless. Nor is something that someone has made and called “Veda” equal to the Veda, because it lacks a tradition of transmission. Nor is what is seen by those to whom the Veda has manifested of itself a non-Vedic statement, because it conforms to the Vedic statement established by tradition and because those seers of the Veda possess the specified qualities. And it is said in the Brahmāṇḍa:
Whatever an ascetic who is not deficient in the twenty characteristics and knows many Vedas should see precisely as Veda—that is Veda, on account of his knowledge and vision.
Thus.
Validity, moreover, is intrinsic, since otherwise there would be an infinite regress. Nor is validity dependent on the aforementioned reasoning, for reasonings serve solely to remove defects of intellect, and validity is established of itself for those whose intellect is free from defect. Nor should it be said, “There is no infinite regress, since dependence on another means of knowledge occurs only when there is expectancy.” For expectancy itself consists in a defect of intellect. Only those whose intellect is defective have a suspicion of invalidity; thus invalidity is extrinsic. And validity is established of itself alone.
Nor should it be asserted that the phonemes originate only at the time of utterance, because this conflicts with the recognition, “This utterance is that very one.”
Nor should it be said that recognition is erroneous because of similarity, for then even such recognition as “This is that Devadatta” would thereby be erroneous. A Buddhist who asserts universal momentariness should not say that recognition such as “This is that direction” is erroneous, because direction is distinct from the five aggregates.
Nor are the directions themselves imagined through error, since the case is the same even for cognition and emptiness. Nor is the conception of direction based solely on sunrise and the like, since direction as such is cognized even in darkness. Only an occasional error is dispelled by seeing sunrise and the like. According to their view, that error also occurs with respect to cognition and emptiness, because disputants disagree. Thus, the directions are established to be stable indeed, just like emptiness itself.
Therefore, the permanence of the Veda also is established in the same way, because of the recognition, “This is that very sentence.”
Nor do inference and the other means have validity concerning dharma and the like without scriptural testimony, because these lie beyond their scope. Therefore, because dharma and the like are established only through an unauthored statement, even proponents of every doctrine must accept that.
Moreover, that validity is established from itself alone. If invalidity’s being from another were not accepted, even a defective sense faculty and the like would not be causes of invalidity. And if that is not accepted, there is conflict with experience. Therefore, it is established that validity is from itself and invalidity from another.
“With eternal speech, O Virūpa.” — Ṛgveda-saṃhitā 8/75/6
“With eternal speech and with non-eternal speech, I praise Brahman, that supreme abode.” Śruti is indeed eternal; the Smṛti texts and whatever other utterances there are are indeed non-eternal.
Thus says the Paiṅgi revelation.
“The supreme Brahman is to be known; the supreme Śruti makes it known. It is beginningless and eternal, and that Brahman is not apprehended without it.”
Thus says the Kātyāyana Śruti.
“The manifestations of greatness are in a thousand forms, a thousand in number. As far as brahman is extended, so extensive is speech. What discerning sage has fully known the yoking of the metres? Who has attained inspired speech?” — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 10/114/8-9
And other passages to this effect.
“All the Vedas are eternal and everlasting, abiding in Viṣṇu’s intellect. At each creation, these are uttered forth by him alone in exactly the same way: in precisely that sequence, with those phonemes and precisely those accents, not otherwise.
Therefore, these have the status of Śruti, because they have only been heard by all. But those heard in a previous birth become manifest to the sages, through Vāsudeva’s grace, only in part and not in their entirety. Because they were seen by Hari but only heard by other people, they are for that reason called “Śrutis” and “Dṛṣṭis” by the ancients.
The statement concerning their origination, too, would, however, be with reference to manifestation, just as the birth of a conscious being is spoken of by all ordinary people. The Purāṇas, which convey their meaning, however, are composed quite differently in each creation; for that reason they are non-eternal, while their meanings are as in the preceding creation.
Statements concerning the creation of the Vedas would be with reference to manifestation, or with reference to the subordinate presiding deities, not because of non-eternality. How could those whose nature is immutable be non-eternal?
Thus, in the Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa.
Nor, under the supposition of non-eternality, is a distinctive designation such as “Śruti,” “Veda,” and the like tenable.
They are the Vedas because they are eternally known, and the Śrutis because they are heard by all; they are the Āmnāya because of their unaltered recitation, always abiding in the Lord’s cognition.
Thus in the Mahāvarāha.
Without eternality, the usage of speaking of the Vedas as “seen” is not tenable. Nor is it proper to assert the non-eternality of letters, words, and the like, because, owing to the Lord’s omniscience, they are always manifest in his cognition. Nor is it proper to assert that their presence there is merely a residual impression, as with a pot and the like, since the incompatibility with recognition has already been stated. Even for the Purāṇas, their non-eternality consists solely in a different verbal formulation.
Thus, it is established that the phonemes and the rest, which are manifested in sound, a quality of ether, and the Veda, which consists in their sequence, are indeed eternal.
Nor is there invalidity with regard to an object that is merely established, on account of an alleged absence of language acquisition there, since linguistic usage is apprehended precisely in connection with an established entity. In such examples as “This is mother” and “This is father,” one indeed comes to know that solely through indication preceded by extending a finger and the like. For one who maintains that language acquisition occurs only in connection with what is to be done, there is cumbersomeness of postulation, since what is to be done is not itself connected with what is to be done.
Because, in statements such as “This is the mother,” “This is the father,” and “You are handsome,” the sentence is complete upon conveying only what is already established.
And because its validity is experienced in that case. Nor is any purpose of a sentence other than making an established fact known observed anywhere. For one acts only after knowing something to be a means to a desired end, and refrains upon knowing the opposite. Thus, it is established that the validity of all sentences pertains only to an established fact.
And it is well established among proponents of all positions that grammar, Nirukta, and the like have validity as sources of knowledge with regard only to what is already established. And if that is not accepted, all verbal usage fails to be established.
It is also stated in the Nāradiya: …
They make known Nārāyaṇa as omniscient, the doer of all, free from defect, and highest of all. For here, indeed, this is the principal purport of all the Vedas without exception, of Itihāsa and Purāṇa, and of all sources of valid knowledge; and anything else is stated for that purpose.
Thus.
Nor is non-difference between the jīva and Īśvara alone the purport of scripture, since there is no valid means of knowledge for that.
Nor do the statements of difference have the status of reiteration on the ground that the difference between the individual self and Īśvara is established, since Īśvara himself is unestablished apart from scripture. Nor is Īśvara established by inference, since the opposite can also be inferred. When it is stated, “The disputed subject possesses a maker, because it is an effect, like a pot,” this is opposed by the inference, “The disputed subject is makerless, because it lacks a maker accepted by us, like the self.” If it is said, “‘Not being an effect’ is an upādhi,” the reply is, “‘Being produced by an embodied agent’ is also an upādhi in the other inference.”
And when difference is established by perception and inference, the scriptural testimony of non-difference lacks validity precisely because it contradicts that. Accordingly, if the scriptural testimony of non-difference is not invalid, statements of difference do not have reiterative status. For what possesses force does not have reiterative status, because it produces firmness.
Even though scriptural testimony is stronger than perception and the like, it has no validity when it conflicts with a source of knowledge on which it depends, because in the absence of an object its own invalidity would follow. For even on that view, the object of scriptural testimony is established by that very inference and the like. On the view that scriptural testimony is reiterative, Īśvara is to be known by inference and scriptural testimony by perception. Thus, if it conflicts with those two, it would have no validity. And the jīva’s difference from Īśvara, who is established by inference, is established for the experiencing jīva itself, because it experiences itself as not the agent of everything.
Nor does scripture have validity when it conflicts with experience, since it would follow that even the experience of scripture’s validity is invalid.
And corroboration by many valid sources of knowledge is indeed a cause of firmness, since firmness itself is observed when many state something and that very thing is perceived. Only in a case uncontested by anyone is there somehow a reiterative status. But there is no universal absence of dispute here, since dispute is observed precisely on the part of the proponents of oneness.
And when one conflicts with many pramāṇas, the invalidity of that one is observed, as in the case of silver in mother-of-pearl and the like. Nor is there the objection, “Weakness is due solely to being produced by a defect,” because those contradicted by many pramāṇas are invariably produced by a defect. And being produced by a defect is known precisely from conflict with a strong pramāṇa.
Sense perception, however, is a non-defective sense faculty; inference is likewise non-defective reasoning. Verbal testimony is a non-defective statement, and direct self-awareness is held to be experience. Defects are to be ascertained only on the basis of a stronger means of valid knowledge, and not otherwise. Greater strength is of two kinds: from multiplicity and from intrinsic nature. Of these two, that based on intrinsic nature is stronger, and it consists in being depended upon and the like.
Validity is conformity to reality alone; that is primary in cognition and verbal statement. Cognition is twofold: external and of the nature of experience. Among these, experience alone has greater force, while faultless cognition arising from the senses and the like…
Likewise, the triad beginning with perception thereby attains the status of a subsidiary source of valid knowledge. Among those three, scriptural testimony specifically is held to possess superior force by virtue of its class; but this too has no validity when it conflicts with that on which it depends.
The inference that some call one consisting of three or more members is pointless; for without rational justification, even it does not attain the status of a means of knowledge. Therefore, reasoning alone is the single means of knowledge having the nature of inference. Reasoning is in the form of a proposition, in the forms of a reason and an example, and likewise in the form of application; another is in the form of a conclusion. Each separately attains the status of a means of knowledge precisely by being reasoning. The proposition itself, containing the reason, will separately attain validity. Through the proposition’s being established, the reason would be a distinct means of knowledge. The example, however, independently attains the status of a means of knowledge because it is a member of the proposition; the application does so solely by relying upon pervasion. Even pervasion alone may be a means of knowledge because it rests upon invariability. Likewise, the conclusion attains validity because its nature is solely summation. Experience makes known their cogency as rational justification.
Contradiction, excess, deficiency, and incoherence are likewise to be recognized as defects of reasoning; and contradiction is intrinsic or derives from another. (जनकस्यात्ययो जातिः स्वस्य वाऽन्यस्य वा भवेत्। जनकं प्रमाणमुद्दिष्टं स्वस्यार्थस्य प्रकाशनात्॥निग्रहा एत एव स्युः संवादानुक्तिसंयुताः)
Presumption is said to be precisely ascertainment from a fact. When an object has previously been seen, however, upon seeing another that is indeed similar, the cognition of its similarity to this object is declared to be comparison. (अभावस्य परिज्ञानं द्विविधं समुदाहृतम्। एकं तत्रानुभवतो योग्यस्यानुपलब्धितः। द्वितीयमपि विज्ञेयं सुखाद्ये च घटादिके॥एकं प्रत्यक्षरूपं स्याद् द्वितीयमनुमात्मकम्। क्वचिद् घटाद्यभावोऽपि प्रत्यक्षेणावगम्यते। झटित्येव परिज्ञानान्न लिङ्गोद्भवता मता॥अर्थापत्तिश्चोपमा च ह्यनुमाभेद एव तु)
Authoritative testimony is to be understood as being of two kinds: eternal and, likewise, non-eternal.
Direct perception is to be understood as threefold: the Lord’s, yogic, and non-yogic; likewise, all of it is held to be constituted by an akṣa. The akṣas of Viṣṇu and Śrī are said to be their essential natures and to consist of eternal cognition. Those of others, however, are twofold: intrinsic and separate; the separate ones are in turn threefold—divine, demonic, and intermediate. Thus direct perception has been described. For an akṣa directed toward objects is termed “direct perception.” A person’s akṣa in the essential nature is imperishable and indeed primary; its application elsewhere is figurative, because there is accretion at creation.
Sambhava and the like constitute inference, because they have the nature of reasoning.
“By virtue of the authority of perception and āgama, inference attains the status of a valid means of knowledge; otherwise, its invariability could not obtain anywhere at all,” and so forth. — Brahmatarka
Here too, because of its greater strength as a means of knowledge by virtue of being epistemically prerequisite, it is warranted that difference alone be the purport.
How, then, can there be reiterative status when difference has not been established by a valid means of knowledge? And if it is established, how can the statement of non-difference remain unsublated? Nor does a valid means of knowledge acquire reiterative status through what is established by an invalid means of knowledge. And if the means of knowledge establishing difference is weak, then, because it is merely apparent, the statements of difference do not have reiterative status. For this reason, it is precisely the statements of difference that have superior force.
If superior authority is accepted only for statements contrary to every valid means of knowledge…
“In the beginning, this indeed was not anything whatsoever.” — Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 2/2/9/1
“Being arose from non-being.” — Rigveda Samhita 10/72/2
Because the meaning apprehended without examination from precisely such passages conflicts with every valid means of knowledge, it would follow that all scriptural texts have their principal purport in that meaning. Nor may it be said, “There is no conflict with reasoning in that case.” On that position, its being non-reiterative because it conflicts with reasoning would indeed be an advantage. For if it were established by reasoning, it would be reiterative. Thus, statements asserting difference are not weak: if difference is established by a valid means of knowledge, denying it is unreasonable; and if it is not established by a valid means of knowledge, the pramāṇa establishing difference is not reiterative.
Nor is there weakness when means of valid knowledge are numerous. Indeed, firmness alone is observed when many statements concur. If that were so, repetition and the like would be grounds for invalidity. And it is accepted by all that repetition is an indicator of purport. If that is not accepted, then even on that position the ninefold repetition, “You are that,” would be invalid on account of being a restatement. If it is said, “A further statement is for one for whom it was not established by the very first statement,” the reply is: “A statement is for one by whom difference has not been ascertained through perception and the like.” Therefore, when there is concordance with many means of valid knowledge, there is strength alone.
Therefore, because non-difference is opposed to every valid means of knowledge, the sentence does not have non-difference as its purport. Rather, the principal purport of all the Āgamas lies exclusively in Viṣṇu’s being highest of all.
And likewise, it has been stated by the Lord:
“There are these two Puruṣas in the world, namely, the perishable and the imperishable. All beings are the perishable; the one abiding unchanged is called the imperishable. But the supreme Puruṣa is another, designated the Paramātman—the imperishable Lord who, having entered the three worlds, sustains them. Because I transcend the perishable and am higher even than the imperishable, I am thus celebrated as Puruṣottama in the world and in the Veda. Whoever, being undeluded, knows me thus as Puruṣottama is the knower of all and worships me with his whole being, O Bhārata. Thus has this most secret teaching been declared by me, O sinless one. Having understood this, one would become wise and one who has accomplished what was to be accomplished, O Bhārata.” — Bhagavad Gītā 15/16-20
Thus.
Truly, the principal purport of all scriptures lies in the supremacy over all of Viṣṇu, the God of gods, and certainly nowhere else. Any purport other than that is subsidiary. Therefore, the human goal comes from Him.
Thus says the Paiṅgi Śruti.
The principal and supreme purport of all the Vedas concerns the supremacy of Śrīpati; but their purport concerning supremacy in anything other than him would be subordinate.
Thus, in the Mahāvarāha.
And it is reasonable that the principal purport of all scriptures lies exclusively in Viṣṇu’s being supreme over all.
For liberation is indeed the highest of all human ends—
Dharma, artha, and kāma are all non-eternal; liberation alone is indeed eternal. Therefore, an intelligent person should strive for that end.
Thus says the Bhāllaveya revelation.
Because they are impermanent and attended by suffering, dharma and the rest are not the supreme happiness. Liberation alone is the supreme bliss for those who transmigrate in saṃsāra.
Thus, in the Mahābhārata.
And liberation is not attained without the grace of Viṣṇu:
“That supreme Nārāyaṇa, by whose grace one is released from this saṃsāra, which is of the nature of utmost affliction—and not by another—is to be contemplated by those desiring liberation from that bond of karma.”
Thus says the Nārāyaṇa Śruti.
“This Self is not attainable through exposition, nor through intelligence, nor through much hearing. It is attainable by the very person whom this Self chooses; to that person this Self reveals its own form.” — Kāṭhakopaniṣad 1/2/23
Thus says the Kaṭha Śruti.
“For those whose minds are fixed on me, I become the deliverer from the ocean of death and saṃsāra before long, O Pārtha.” — Bhagavad Gītā 12/7
Thus is the Lord’s statement.
Hari is the sole sovereign—the Person from whom creation, maintenance, dissolution, governance, knowledge, concealment, bondage, and liberation arise.
Thus, in the Skānda.
“Viṣṇu is the giver of knowledge to the ignorant; he is also the giver of liberation to those who possess knowledge and the giver of bliss to the liberated. He alone is the one Janārdana.”
And thus:
Viṣṇu alone binds with the fetter of transmigratory existence and releases from that fetter; he is the bestower of liberation and the supreme Brahman. There is no doubt.
And thus.
No love could be like that of the praiseworthy Viṣṇu toward one who knows the excellence of his qualities. By pleasing him, everyone attains liberation; therefore all the Vedas indeed have him as their purport.
Thus says the Sauparṇa Śruti.
“Whoever, being free from delusion, knows me thus as the Supreme Person—he is a knower of all and worships me with his whole being, O Bhārata.” — Bhagavadgītā 15/19
Thus, supreme love has been declared by the Lord himself to arise solely from knowledge of the excellence of the qualities.
Therefore, the supremacy of Viṣṇu’s qualities alone is the principal purport of all Śruti and Smṛti texts.
Nor is there any valid means of knowledge for the claim that the purport lies in non-difference.
Nor is difference established through the relation of qualifier and qualificand: the qualifier–qualificand relation depends on difference; difference is established in dependence on a substratum and a counterpositive; and being the substratum and the counterpositive depends on difference. Thus, difference would be untenable because of mutual dependence. But it is not, because difference is the intrinsic nature of an entity.
Nor does difference fail to be the intrinsic nature because of its dependence on the bearer and the counterpositive; for, as in the case of identity, the intrinsic nature itself is dependent in that way.
Even when intrinsic nature is established, its non-establishment is indeed also established for one who asserts the identity of the individual self and the Lord. Difference, however, is established in the very apprehension of intrinsic nature. For the intrinsic nature of an entity is generally observed to be distinct from everything else.
But the expression “its difference” is like “the intrinsic nature of the entity.”
If difference were not the thing’s own nature, then, when an entity is perceived, its distinctness from almost everything would not be known. And if its distinctness were unknown, there would even be doubt regarding the self: “Is it a pot?” For no one entertains such a doubt.
Only after knowing its distinctness from almost everything does one entertain doubt regarding some particular similar thing. For no one has the doubt regarding himself, “Am I Devadatta or not?” Knowledge of potness and the like occurs only when distinctness from everything is known in a general way.
Therefore, there is no mutual dependence.
Nor is the failure of cognition to arise simultaneously a defect. Just as, when a thousand lamps are seen at the very same time, all of them are indeed cognized in a general way, so too it may be here.
Particularity in one and the same entity is indeed accepted even by them, because in the statement “not this, not this” they accept dissimilarity from everything, and because, if particularity were not accepted, repetition would result. Nor is dissimilarity from a pot identical with dissimilarity from a cloth, since that conflicts with experience.
Therefore, the perception of difference is indeed justified.
And the supposition of unreality even regarding entities apprehended through a valid means of knowledge is, precisely because it contradicts a valid means of knowledge, daylight robbery.
What is established by a valid means of knowledge is certainly not sublatable by reasoning, since reasonings opposed to perception and the like are invariably fallacious. Even the cognition of silverhood and the like in shell and the like is erroneous precisely because it is opposed to a stronger perception, not because of mere reasoning. If perception were sublated by mere reasoning, then, because earthhood is not observed in the tetrad of elements beginning with water, even earth’s earthhood would not exist. Therefore, what is observed should not be supposed to be erroneous on the basis of mere reasoning alone.
Thus, because the reasoning that negates every difference conflicts with all Śruti, Smṛti, perception, and inference, it is utterly specious.
Nor should it be said, “Ultimately there is an absence of difference, but conventionally it exists,” because there is no valid means of knowledge for its distinctness from the existent and the nonexistent.
Did an appearance of the unreal arise for one who says, “Because an appearance of the unreal is impossible,” or not? If it did not arise, there is no refutation of the appearance of it. If it did arise, even then... Nor is the distinctness of the unreal known without cognition of it.
Being silver in nacre is not distinct from both the existent and the nonexistent, for the experience is that precisely nonexistent silver appeared. Nor is there an absence of nonexistence merely because it was cognized, since error consists precisely in cognition otherwise: cognition of existence regarding what is nonexistent and cognition of nonexistence regarding what exists. Nor should it be said, “Even in error, there is no cognition of what is nonexistent,” for cognition of the ultimate reality of the indeterminable—which is itself nonexistent—is admitted. Nor is that too indeterminable, because of infinite regress. Through the nonestablishment of the first indeterminable, every indeterminable is unestablished; this is damage at the root. If the silver were indeterminable, the sublating cognition “This silver is indeterminable” would arise. But the word mithyā denotes absence. And there is no valid means of knowledge whatsoever for the claim that there exists something called distinctness from both the existent and the nonexistent.
There is also conflict with experience on that position, since both the existent and the nonexistent are indeed experienced by everyone.
Thus, because the indefinable is absent, because cognition of what is unreal is not admitted, and because difference is cognized, reality follows for difference; nonduality is not tenable.
Moreover, how can the distinction between the individual self and the Supreme Self, established by Śruti, be denied? And if Śruti speaks falsely, how can oneness be true? Moreover, how can those who speak thus be adherents of the Veda? For even the Buddhists and others are non-adherents of the Veda precisely because they accept as false what the Veda states.
Therefore, the principal purport of all scriptures lies solely in Viṣṇu’s supremacy over all.
Moreover, how can it be tenable that the purport of all the śrutis lies in the identity of the individual self and the Supreme Self, since that identity is contradicted by every valid means of knowledge?
For thus there is conflict with experience: no one has any experience such as, “I am omniscient, Lord of all, free from suffering, and free from defect.” And there is experience of the contrary. Nor is this a false experience, because there is no valid means of knowledge that contradicts it.
And there is no scriptural testimony whatsoever in support of non-difference, whereas all scriptural testimonies support difference. For it is as follows:
“You are not that.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/5,7,9,11,12,13,14,15,16
Thus, the instruction is given nine times, accompanied by an illustrative example.
Nor is this a teaching of non-difference.
“Just as a bird, bound by a cord, having flown in every direction and found no resting place elsewhere, takes refuge in the bond itself.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/2
“Dear one, all these creatures have Being as their root, Being as their abode, and Being as their foundation.” — (1), Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/4
“Just as, dear one, bees produce honey and bring the collected mass of the saps of trees of diverse origins into unity, and just as those saps there do not have the discernment, ‘I am the sap of this tree; I am the sap of that tree,’ just so indeed, dear one, all these creatures, having merged into Being, do not know, ‘We shall merge into Being.’ Whatever they become here—whether a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a boar, a worm, a moth, a gadfly, or a mosquito—that they then become.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/6-7
“These rivers, dear one—those in the east flow eastward and those in the west westward. They flow from the ocean into the ocean itself. That becomes the ocean itself. Just as they do not know there, ‘I am this one; I am this one,’ in precisely the same way, dear one, all these creatures, having come from Being, do not know, ‘We come from Being.’ Here, whatever they become—whether a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a boar, an insect, a moth, a biting fly, or a mosquito—that they then become.” — (3),Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/8-9
This very one, pervaded by the living self, stands drinking abundantly and rejoicing. When the living self leaves one branch of it, that branch then withers. — (4), Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/10
“Bring a fruit of the banyan tree from there.” “Here it is, venerable sir.” “Split it.” “It is split, venerable sir.” “What do you see in it?” “These seeds are minute, as it were, venerable sir.” “Please split one of them.” “It is split, venerable sir.” “What do you see in it?” “Nothing at all, venerable sir.” Then he said to him, “That subtle essence which, dear one, you do not perceive—from the subtle essence of this, dear one, this banyan tree stands so great.” — (5),Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/12
“Place this salt in the water, and then approach me in the morning.” He did exactly so. He said to him, “Dear one, bring the salt that you placed in the water last night.” Having felt about for it, he did not find it, since it had completely dissolved. “Dear one, sip from this end of it.” “How is it?” “Salty.” “Sip from the middle.” “How is it?” “Salty.” “Sip from the end.” “How is it?” “Salty.” “Throw this away and then approach me.” He did exactly so. It continues to exist always. He said to him, “Dear one, here indeed you do not perceive Being; it is certainly right here.” — (6),Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/13
“Just as, dear one, having brought a man from Gandhāra with his eyes bound, one were then to abandon him in a deserted place...” — (7), Chāndogyopaniṣat 6/3/14
“Now, when his speech merges into the mind, the mind into the vital breath, the vital breath into heat, and heat into the supreme deity, then he does not know.” — (8), Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/15
“And, dear one, they bring a man who has been seized by the hand, saying, ‘He has stolen; he has committed theft. Heat the axe for him.’ If he is the perpetrator of that, on that very account he makes himself false. Intent upon falsehood, he conceals himself with falsehood and takes hold of the heated axe. He is burned and then put to death. But if he is not the perpetrator of that, on that very account he makes himself true. Intent upon truth, he conceals himself with truth and takes hold of the heated axe. He is not burned and is then released.” — Chāndogyopaniṣat 6/3/16 “In precisely this way, indeed, dear one, a person who has a teacher knows”—(9). Thus, even in the set of nine cases, there is difference alone, because an illustrative example is stated. — Chāndogyopaniṣat 6/3/14
For there is certainly no identity between the bird and the cord, among the juices of different trees, between the river and the ocean, between the jīva and the tree, between the subtle essence and the seed, between salt and water, between Gandhāra and the man, between the ignorant person and the controller of prāṇa and the rest, or between the thief and what is stolen.
Establishing that the illustration of the juices of various trees and the river-and-ocean illustration are intended to convey difference.
“Having merged into Being, they do not know, ‘We shall merge into Being.’ They here, whether a tiger or a lion…” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/6-7
Thus.
“Having come from Being, they do not know, ‘We come from Being.’ They—whether here a tiger or a lion—…” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/8-9
And because it thus declares misfortune as resulting from non-recognition of difference.
For one who has come from the house and entered the house is not thereby identical with it.
“Those rivers flow from the ocean into the ocean itself; that remains the ocean itself.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/8
Here too, difference alone is stated. Otherwise, the statement would be, “They become the ocean itself.” Accordingly, the meaning is that the rivers come from the ocean and enter it, while the ocean remains that same ocean; oceanhood does not arise for these rivers. For the identity of the distinct atoms of river water with oceanic atoms is not tenable. If that were so, two or three persons entering a large assembly of people would become identical with that assembly. And that is not tenable, because they are experienced as distinct.
“For he becomes absorbed into his own self.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/1
Here too, in this quoted statement…
The word “sva” is a designation of the Supreme Self.
“And by the Supreme Self in the latter two.” — Brahmasūtra 2/3/21
Thus, from the sūtra.
Because of his independence, this one is called “the independent one,” and because of being all-pervasive, “the Self.” Because of fullness in qualities, this imperishable Bhagavān Viṣṇu is Brahman.
Thus, in the Paramopaniṣad.
The expression “has entered” also denotes mere entry, because “one’s own” is specified in the accusative. If becoming one were intended, the wording would be “with one’s own.”
“Just as a bird would have entered its own nest, so the jīva enters the Lord in deep sleep and in liberation, even while always remaining distinct.”
And thus:
“Just so indeed, dear one, this individual self, having flown in every direction and not found a resting place elsewhere, takes refuge in the Supreme Self alone.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/2
Here too, in the quoted passage, “mind” means the individual self, and “prāṇa” means the Supreme Self.
“When this person is said to sleep.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/1
This is so because those two alone are under discussion.
Because of thinking, the pudgala, swallowing hell, is designated “mind”; and precisely because of the persistence of karma, the transmigrating being is known as “anuśayin.”
Thus also in the Parama Upaniṣad.
This Hari is known as Prāṇa because he leads forth, and as the Good One because of his goodness.
And thus.
“O gentle one, all these beings are rooted in Being, have Being as their abode, and have Being as their foundation.” — Chāndogyopaniṣad 6/3/3
Here too, difference is indeed apprehended.
Because he is the creator and the substratum, and because he establishes each of the liberated individually, the all-pervading Viṣṇu is held to be distinct from the transmigrating being.
And thus.
“Having entered by means of this living self, may I differentiate name and form.” — Chandogya Upanishad 6/2/2
Thus.
“This very one, animated by the jīva-self, remains drinking deeply and rejoicing.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/10
Here too, the Supreme Self is denoted by the word jīva.
“Jīva” is a name of the Lord Aniruddha.
Thus, according to the śruti statement.
“Viṣṇu is called jīva because he constantly sustains the vital breath. Having entered stationary and moving bodies, as well as the gross elements, following triplication, he, the all-pervading one, always causes the transmigrating being, characterized by otherness, to wander. Through him this one perpetually rejoices, even while in the state of a tree.”
And thus.
“That fire deliberated.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/2/1
“Those waters thought.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/2/1
“These three deities.” — Chāndogyopaniṣat 6/2/2
Since sentience has already been established earlier by these words...
“With this living self.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/2/2
Thus, the transmigrating self’s entering again is not tenable. Therefore, in that passage, the word jīva denotes the Supreme Self alone.
“Pervaded throughout by the living Self, he remains, drinking deeply and rejoicing.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/10
Here too, the Supreme alone is denoted by the word jīva. But the one drinking deeply and rejoicing is the transmigrating being. For delight, experience, and the like are not applicable to anything other than a conscious being.
“The body is an abode of pleasure, and the body is also an abode of pain. They say that this is insentient and constituted of prakṛti; the experiencer of both is the conscious, embodied being.” — Bhārata 12/173/22
Thus also in the Mahābhārata.
“Deprived of the Jīva, this indeed surely dies; the Jīva does not die.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/11
Here too, the word jīva denotes the Supreme. For being the sustainer of prāṇa in the primary sense is not tenable for the transmigrating soul.
“A man whose body has been abandoned by Brahman, however, is called ‘dead.’” — Bhārata 14/17/23
And thus.
“Indeed, dear one, this subtle essence which you do not perceive—from its subtle essence, dear one, this great banyan tree stands thus.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/12
In this passage too, the Supreme alone is denoted by the word aṇiman.
“He is this subtle one. All this has this as its Self. That is real. He is the Self. You are not that, Śvetaketu.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/12
And because it is stated thus.
But in the grains …
“These grains are as though minute.” — Chāndogyopaniṣat 6/3/12
Thus, because of the use of the feminine gender and because of the use of the word iva, there is no minuteness. Nor is it the case that you do not perceive them.
“The condition of having this as its self” means “that which belongs to this.”
“That is the Self.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/5-16
Thus, however, the word “ātman” refers exclusively to the Supreme.
“The abode of heaven, earth, and the rest is Brahman, because of the word ‘Self.’” — Brahma Sūtra 1/3/1
It is not that which is inferred, because no word denotes it. — Brahma-sūtra 1/3/3
“Nor the bearer of vital breath.” — Brahmasūtra 1/3/4
Here, with regard to this passage...
“Know him alone as the one Self.” — Ātharvaṇopaniṣat 2/2/6
Thus, because the term ātman is synonymous with the word sva, prakṛti and the individual self are not denoted, but rather the Supreme alone is denoted—so Bhagavān Vyāsa has stated. Therefore, the term ātman applies primarily to him alone.
Supreme Hari is called the Self because he is all-pervasive and because he is the maker. Those who are other than him are semblances of the Self, for such qualities do not belong to them.
Thus, in the Parama Upaniṣad.
“For so long as the vital heat is in the supreme deity, he does not know.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/15
And here, what is stated is precisely his being under His control: when the Supreme absorbs his vital breath and the other faculties, he does not know; when He gives them, he knows.
When the Lord gives the vital powers, then the sentient being knows everything; with his faculties swallowed up by Him, he knows nothing at all.
And thus.
“He stole it; he committed theft.” — Chāndogyopaniṣad 6/3/16
And here, since only an entity regarded as belonging to another can be stolen, this illustration is indeed one of difference. One who considers the Supreme Self, who is other than himself, to be himself is indeed a thief—such is the point. For one does not become a thief by abandoning what is one’s own.
“Some unskilled people might proclaim this so-called identity of self—people whose strength lies in speaking thus, not having understood the truth of scripture; having come under the sway of egoism because they are overwhelmed by desire and anger; not having understood the true nature of the scriptures, robbers of scripture, thieves of Brahman, devoid of bliss, immature-minded, and inauspicious. They see deficiency alone and do not apply themselves to virtues. For those whose bodies consist of darkness, darkness alone is the ultimate destination.” — Bhāratam 12/275/51-54
“Since he is distinct in intrinsic nature, in kind, according to scripture, and in import, and is unconnected, how could there be a relation precisely in the form ‘I am he’?” — Bhārata 12/220/36
Thus, in the Mokṣadharma.
Just as a bird and a cord, just as the saps of various trees, just as rivers and the ocean, just as pure water and salt, just as a thief and what is to be stolen, and just as a person and an object, so the jīva and the Lord are different and indeed always dissimilar. Even so, because of his subtle form, Hari, though superior to the jīva and being the impeller, is not perceived as distinct by those of dull vision. Knowing the dissimilarity between the two, one is liberated; otherwise, one is bound.
And thus it is stated in the Paramopaniṣad.
“He is the impeller of all individual selves and the prompter of vital breath and intellect—Viṣṇu, who is distinct from the transmigrating self. Not knowing him, one of deluded intellect considers the direction of body, senses, vital breath, and intellect to belong to himself. Therefore, he always follows the path of transmigration. Having known the supreme distinctness between the individual self and the Lord, he is liberated; otherwise, he is bound.”
And thus.
“Having studied all the Vedas, he returned proud, regarding himself as learned, and arrogant.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/1/1
Thus, by making the arrogant man, who did not know the Supreme—other than himself and the bestower of qualities such as learnedness—understand his dependence on the Supreme, and by dispelling his arrogance, firm establishment in Him is indeed taught here.
“Regarding that, some indeed say: ‘In the beginning, this was non-being alone.’” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/2/1
Even what is accepted among its proponents in this and similar statements is refuted.
“Considering sacrificial and charitable works to be the highest, the utterly deluded know no other higher good.” — Ātharvaṇopaniṣat 1/2/10
And this too, as in passages such as this, is arrived at through failure to understand the purport of scripture. And it is also shown…
“This which some unskilled persons might call ‘oneness of self.’” — Bhāratam 12/275/51
Thus.”
and for the purpose of making known that subjection to it...
“In the beginning, dear one, this was Being alone.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/2/1
An account of creation beginning with this.
And knowledge of all through knowledge of one is due to primacy, to some similarity, and to being the cause.
But not because what is other than that is false. For false cognition does not arise from true cognition. A cognizer of shell is not said to be a cognizer of silver, because those two cognitions are opposed: a cognizer of shell is indeed a cognizer of non-silver, judging, “This is not silver”; and if one is a cognizer of silver, one is not a cognizer of shell. For one who cognizes something is not one who cognizes its absence. Moreover, the fact that its absence is preceded by cognition of it is observed solely because it exists elsewhere. If that is not accepted, that very thing is untenable.
There is indeed designation of what is non-principal as though it were known, from knowledge of the principal. For example, through knowing, summoning, and destroying the principal men, there is the designation, “The village is known, summoned, and destroyed.” And when the father, who is the cause, is known, there is the designation, “The son is known”—“I know this man; this is his son.” Likewise here too: “All this is created,” and so forth. And owing to similarity, there is knowledge of another woman from knowledge of one woman.
That very similarity is intended here too.
“Just as, dear one, by one lump of clay everything made of clay would be known.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/1/2
By this and similar passages.
Otherwise, the word “one” and the word “lump” would be pointless, since the statement would be complete with merely “with clay being known.” For other clay objects are not constituted by the one lump of clay; indeed, there is only similarity among them.
“Just as, dear one, by a single lump of copper, everything made of copper would be known.” — Chāndogyopaniṣad 6/1/3
“Just as, dear one, through one nail-cutter, everything made of black iron would become known.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/1/4
This and similar statements too would be pointless. For one thing is not constituted by another, while the other is made of iron. Nor is all black iron constituted by a single nail-cutter.
“A modification is the basis for names in speech; the designation is indeed ‘clay’—this statement is true.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/1/2,3,4
Here, a modification is the basis for names through speech, while the permanent, unmodified designation is precisely “clay.” The meaning of the śruti is that this statement is true. Nor is even the expression “speech-based” established in the sense of falsity. And the phrase “merely speech-based” is a supposition not stated in the śruti. On that position, the word “designation” and the word iti would be pointless.
Therefore, the falsity of the world is not stated anywhere.
“The seer, the thinker, the one who surpasses all, the self-existent, ordered the objects in accordance with their true nature for eternal ages.” — Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad 8
“What he has discerned is indeed true; that is not vain. He is both the winner and the giver of desirable wealth.” — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 10/55/6
“All that is true, O bounteous pair, is indeed yours; not even the waters violate your ordinance.” — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 2/24/12
“Now indeed I shall proclaim the great, true deeds of this great one, of the true one.” — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 2/15/1
This world, such as it is, beginningless and endless, continues; there is nothing here to deliberate. Nor was it ever otherwise, anywhere or for anyone, in the past, nor will it be so in the future.
The ignorant who do not know Hari’s supreme power indeed call this world unreal. But the great-souled one who, having created this world of such a kind, real in nature, became one whose deed is real.
“They say that the world is unreal, without foundation, without a Lord, and not arisen through mutual causation—what else could it be but caused by desire? Holding fast to this view, those whose selves are ruined and whose understanding is slight come forth, performing fierce deeds, hostile to the world and bent on its destruction.” — Bhagavad Gītā 16/8-9
and of passages beginning in this way...
The world resembles dreams and the like in respect of impermanence, susceptibility to modification, dependence, and similar characteristics, but not in being dispelled by cognition. For, because all this is always cognized by omniscient Viṣṇu, it is not incompatible with cognition; rather, it is indeed subject to his command.
Thus, in the Parama Upaniṣad.
Since the world is fashioned by intelligence, it is therefore made of māyā. Since it is pervaded by him, it is for that reason called untrue. Yet it is not sublatable by cognition and is indeed eternal in respect of continuity. The supreme deity is designated by the syllable “a”; through him this world is real. Because its nature is dependent on him, it is for that reason called not real. He, the all-pervading one, is the reality of the real, as the sun is of the rainbow.
And thus.
“Its secret designation is ‘the Truth of truth.’ The vital breaths are indeed truth; this is their truth.” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4/1/20
And thus.
Your will, O Infinite One, is thus called “Mahāmāyā,” “Avidyā,” “Niyati,” “Mohinī,” “Prakṛti,” and “Vāsanā.”
She is Prakṛti because of excellent activity and Vāsanā because she causes to dwell. Hari is denoted by “A”; his knowledge is designated “Avidyā.” She is called Māyā because of excellence, for what is excellent is called maya. The one consciousness of Viṣṇu alone is expressed by these words. For Hari is of the nature of consciousness, and that consciousness is characterized by his own bliss.
And thus also.
All the Vedas indeed make known Hari’s difference from everything. That difference consists of independence, omniscience, lordship over all, and other such attributes. This difference is the essential nature itself, and being an essential nature is exclusion from others, since the word sva is used to exclude everything. The Śruti beginning “not this, not this” states precisely Viṣṇu’s distinctness from everything. Therefore, every other Śruti too would state it, without doubt.
Thus says the Nārāyaṇa Śruti.
“I am Brahman.” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3/5/4
“Thus, he who is I is that one yonder; he who is that one yonder is I.” — Aitareya Āraṇyaka 2/2/4
“I am that person who is in the sun; I am indeed he.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 4/3/2
This and similar statements, however, are with reference to the Inner Controller.
“He who is here in the person and he who is there in the sun—he is one.” — Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2/8
“The syllable ‘A’ is Brahman; ‘aham’ occurs there.” — Aitareya Āraṇyaka 2/3/8
“Its secret designation is ‘I.’” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 7/7/2
Hari is always proclaimed as bearing the name “I,” because he cannot be relinquished. That same one is also “you” because he is the correlate, and “he” because he is beyond perception. All the inflected forms of the word denoting “I,” all those belonging to the word denoting “you,” those belonging to the word denoting “he,” those occurring in every word, and all grammatical numbers apply to Hari, the inner controller of all, because of his independence, although he is always distinct from everything. But in living beings, because of relation to him, and in insentient entities too, because of relation to him, all finite verbal forms operate by secondary usage. Therefore Viṣṇu is all-pervading, one, the differentiator, and consequently manifold.
Thus says the Nārāyaṇa Śruti.
“Know as sāttvic that knowledge by which one sees in all beings the one imperishable being, undivided among the divided.” — Bhagavad Gītā 18/20
Thus states the Lord.
And difference is not unreal.
“Truly, all rejoice along with him at Maghavan’s bounty for one who praises the god.” — Ṛgvedasaṃhitā 4/17/5
“That greatness of his is true; I proclaim his might at sacrifices, in the inspired poet’s sovereignty.” — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 8/3/4
The Self is real; the individual self is real; difference is real, difference is real, difference is real. It must certainly not be gainsaid, it must certainly not be gainsaid, it must certainly not be gainsaid.
“The Self indeed is supremely independent, all-knowing, possessed of all power, supremely blissful, and supreme; but the individual self is under his control, of little knowledge, of little power, afflicted, and small”—thus.
From revealed texts such as these.
Nor is this an intermediate order of reality.
“He who knows that which is hidden in the cave, in the highest space, enjoys all objects of desire together with the all-knowing Brahman.” — Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2/1
“Having attained this self consisting of bliss, traversing these worlds, eating food at will and assuming forms at will, he remains singing this Sāman chant.” — Taittirīya Upaniṣad 3/10
“One sits amid the flourishing of the ṛc verses, having fully flourished; another sings a Gāyatra chant among the Śakvarī verses. Another, the Brahman priest, speaks the knowledge of origins, while yet another measures out the measure of the sacrifice.” — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 10/71/11
“Having attained the supreme light, he becomes fully manifest in his own form.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8/4/2
“There he moves about, eating, playing, and delighting himself, whether with women, conveyances, relatives, or strangers.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8/4/3
“But when everything for him has become the Self alone, then by what should he see whom? Then by what should he smell whom? Then by what should he know whom? And by what should he know that by which he knows all this? By what, my dear, should he know the knower?” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 6/5/15
“Just as pure water poured into pure water becomes exactly like it…” — Kaṭhopaniṣat 2/1/15
“Then the knower, having shaken off merit and demerit, stainless, attains supreme similarity.” — Ātharvaṇa Upaniṣad 3/1/3
“This is the bridge to immortality.” — Ātharvaṇopaniṣat 2/2/6
Possessing eyes and possessing ears, the companions became unequal in mental quickness. Some appeared mouth-deep, some armpit-deep, and yet others like pools suitable for bathing. — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 10/71/7
Having taken refuge in the Lord, those liberated from the ocean of saṃsāra abide, enjoying pleasures as desired, in successively higher gradation up to Brahmā.
Thus, after liberation, according to the scriptural statements of difference.
“Taking recourse to this knowledge, those who have attained similarity of nature to me are not born even at creation and are not afflicted at dissolution.” — Bhagavad Gītā 14/2
Thus says the Lord.
“Except for activity concerning the universe.” — Brahma-sūtra 4/4/17
“Because of the context and because of non-proximity.” — Brahmasūtram 4/4/18
And so forth.
“This Self, dear one, is indeed imperishable, whose nature is non-annihilation.” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 6/5/14
Thus, because the non-cessation even of its attributes is under discussion, …
“Right here Your Reverence has plunged me into utter bewilderment: there is no consciousness after death.” — Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat 6/5/14
Since the loss of consciousness has thus been stated to be a defect, …
“But where, for him, everything has become the Self alone, then by what could one see whom?” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 6/5/15
For this statement is indeed merely a rhetorical challenge.
For it is not the absence of experience…
“By what, dear one, should one know the knower?” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 6/5/15
Thus, non-cognition of the knower is also intended.
“He who is to be known precisely as ‘I’ is designated the jīva. He experiences suffering, he experiences happiness, and indeed he is the subject of bondage and liberation.”
Thus says the supreme revealed text.
“For one immersed in profound ignorance, what indeed would not be more painful?” — Bhārata 12/307/83
Thus in the Mokṣadharma.
“But there is no second to it.” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 6/3/23-30
And with these words, it says that precisely that Brahman which one does not see as dual is not a second.
“What it might see as other than that, precisely as separate…”
Thus, from the remainder of the sentence.
“For there is no cessation of the seer’s seeing.” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 6/3/23
and because of the reason stated thus.
“Actions and the self consisting of cognition all become one in the supreme imperishable.” — Ātharvaṇopaniṣat 3/2/7
Here too, “becoming one” is unity of understanding, or, with reference to his forms situated in the Ocean of Milk and elsewhere, a unity accompanied by nonidentity.
“Through desire, desire has come to me, from the heart to the heart of Death. Whatever dear thing of these is yonder, may that come near, toward me.” — Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 3/15
In liberation, my mind will be exceedingly favorably disposed toward Brahman. Therefore, even now, this favorable disposition is for the most part established.
“By which, indeed, the seers whose desires are fulfilled ascend to where that supreme abode of truth is.” — Ātharvaṇopaniṣad 3/1/6
“He attains this Self consisting of bliss.” — Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2/8
From scriptural passages beginning thus...
when identity of essential nature is intended…
“Actions, and the one consisting of cognition…” — Ātharvaṇa Upaniṣad 3/2/7
Thus, this is not tenable. For even on that position, the actions have no identity with Brahman in liberation; and if cessation is intended, because the same applies to the fifteen parts as well…
“The fifteen parts have gone to their foundations, and all the gods to their respective deities.” — Ātharvaṇa Upaniṣad 3/2/7
Having thus stated the going of the other parts, the statement that the karmas and the cognitive self become one would be pointless, because there is no distinction. Nor is there any usage according to which silver sublated by knowledge becomes one with nacre.
“In the supreme, imperishable.” — Ātharvaṇa Upaniṣad 3/2/7
And this statement of being a locus indicates difference. Otherwise…
“They exist in the Supreme alone.”
The statement would be thus.
“The jīva’s unity with the Supreme, however, is indeed only similarity in cognition, or that unity is dwelling in the same location with reference to the locus of manifestation. It is not identity of essential nature for that jīva, even when liberated, because of dissimilarity. Independence and completeness, and finitude and dependence, constitute the dissimilarity.”
Thus declares the supreme revelation.
“The one who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself.” — Ātharvaṇopaniṣat 3/2/9
And so forth.
“Having worshipped a Brahmin with devotion, even a Śūdra may become a Brahmin.”
As in the preceding statement.
The meaning is, “He becomes magnified.” For a worshipper of a Brāhmaṇa does not himself become a Brāhmaṇa.
“All souls too are Brahmans; those who attain liberation are higher Brahmans. Prakṛti is the highest Brahman; Acyuta is the highest Great One. Accordingly, neither the liberated souls nor she ever attain Viṣṇu’s majesty. He alone is the one who is independent and possesses the six attributes in full.”
Thus says the Parama Śruti.
“They do not attain your greatness, O one growing beyond measure in bodily form.” — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 7/99/1
O Hari, You are that one whose intrinsic nature is what cannot at all be attained by the gods beginning with Brahmā and Īśāna—absolute uniqueness itself, the sole one.
And thus.
Just as luminous bodies enter the greatly radiant sun by day while each remains separate in every respect, even with its own form, so indeed the Brahmans called jīvas also enter the Supreme Brahman at liberation while remaining separate. That is their non-perception by others. This is designated “mergence,” never identity of essential nature.
Thus says the Nārāyaṇa Śruti.
Therefore, the identity of the individual self and the Lord is indeed contrary to all scripture.
And in just the same way, it is contrary to all reasoning.
To begin with, the doctrine that there is only one individual self is not tenable.
Moreover, if everything is projected by a single ignorance, then instruction of disciples and others is not tenable for one who knows, “All this is projected.” For, having ascertained, “This is a dream,” one does not make an effort for the sake of a gift to a dream-son. In a dream, however, one makes an effort solely from ignorance of its being a dream.
Nor, since many are observed, is the ascertainment, “This is imagined by the ignorance of this one,” tenable. In a dream, however, there is ascertainment because, after awakening, one remains. But here it is not so.
If it is accepted that each respective one must be understood in its respective manner, then, because alternatives are impossible with regard to the entity, it would be precisely unimagined. And there is no valid means of knowledge for the claim that it must be understood in that manner.
If it is accepted that it is imagined by a disciple’s ignorance, then, when that very person becomes a teacher, he himself becomes imagined. Thus, correct comprehension of the text itself would be a cause of harm, and no one would attain liberation, because, upon comprehension of the text, it follows that that very person is imagined by a disciple’s ignorance.
And if that single jīva asserts difference, then, because of his firm conviction in that very position, difference would never cease; thus there would be no liberation for anyone. Since things become exactly as imagined by him, when the proponents of the one-jīva doctrine conceive eternal hell, for that reason that very hell would exist.
And there is no valid means of knowledge whatsoever for the claim that everything is imagined by the ignorance of a single individual self.
“If the phenomenal manifold were to exist, it would cease—there is no doubt. This duality is mere illusion; ultimately, there is nonduality.” — Māṇḍūkopaniṣat 2/9
And this is the meaning of this passage:
If the manifold world were to come into existence—to come to be, to arise—then it would cease; and it does not cease. Therefore, this is indeed beginningless. Prapañca is the preeminent fivefold difference. Nor is this nonexistent, because it is māyā-mātra. Māyā means the Lord’s cognition. That of which it alone is the agent of cognition and protection is māyā-mātra. Since duality is cognized and protected by the Supreme Lord, it is not imagined through delusion—this is the meaning. For Īśvara certainly has no delusion. Then…
“The non-dual one among all entities”
How can there be such a designation? In response to this, he says: “Non-dual with respect to the supreme entity.” For it is non-dual with reference to the supreme entity. The meaning is: “The entity superior to everything is he alone.” Otherwise …
“Without an equal among all beings.”
Thus, it would be pointless. If it were stated that, among all entities, that one alone possesses non-duality, only the absence of equals or superiors would have been stated. For the others, there is the presence of equals or superiors.
“Conceptual differentiation would cease if it were imagined by someone.” — Māṇḍūkopaniṣat 2/10
Thus, from the remainder of the sentence too, it is understood that this is not imagined. If “it ceases” is accepted, the statements “it would cease” and “it would come into being” in the form of hypothetical consequences, as well as the two occurrences of “if,” are inappropriate. And if “it would come into being” is not accepted as having the sense of origination, “it would cease” is inappropriate, since there is no invariable concomitance that whatever exists ceases. Therefore, this statement has the beginningless reality of the world as its purport. Hence, on the basis of this instruction, he states this thesis: “When it is unknown, duality does not exist.” Only when it is unknown does duality not exist. The meaning is that duality does not exist only from the standpoint of the ignorant.
“The difference between the individual self and Īśvara, the difference between the insentient and Īśvara, likewise the mutual difference among individual selves, the difference between the insentient and individual selves, and the mutual difference among insentient entities—this world is the fivefold difference. This very world is indeed real and beginningless; if it had a beginning, it would undergo destruction. This world does not undergo destruction, nor is it imagined through error. If it were imagined, it would be sublated, yet it is not sublated. Therefore, ‘duality does not exist’ is the view of the ignorant. For this is acknowledged by those who know, and is measured and protected by Viṣṇu. Therefore it has been declared real. But Hari alone is supreme.”
Thus says the supreme revealed scripture.
And in the Maitreyī branch …
“Now, the impediments to knowledge.” — Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad 7/8
Having said thus…
“Now, as for those others who wish to establish themselves among Vedic adherents by false reasonings, examples, deceptions, and magical illusions, one should not live in company with them. For these are manifest thieves, unfit for heaven; for it says: ‘The world, wandering in error through the deceptions of the doctrine of no-self and through false examples and reasons, does not, however, know what the distinction from Vedic knowledge is.’” — Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad 7/8
The doctrine that nothing whatsoever related to the self exists is the doctrine of no-self.
And if the world is imagined through illusion, a real pair of worlds is required. For illusion does not arise in the absence of a real shell, real silver, and similarity between the two.
Even in a dream, the real world, present in the mind in the form of latent impressions, is perceived as being externally situated. The body and the self too certainly have a resemblance such as being located in the same place. Even in such cases as “The conch is yellow” and “The sky is blue,” yellow objects and the like certainly exist elsewhere. And conches and the like too certainly have some resemblance to those, such as being substances. Thus, nowhere is there an illusion without a pair of similar real objects.
Nor is a delusion of the non-self in the self ever observed. For no one is observed to be deluded with the thought, “I am not I.” They say that this world is precisely a delusion of the non-self in the self. If, entirely without that, a delusion of the self in the non-self is posited, the non-self would be real. Then, in positing nonduality, it follows that only the non-self exists, not the self. And if the world consisted in ignorance of the self, it would not be perceived as different from the self. For in an illusion, silver is not perceived as different from nacre. Nor, in an illusion, is one and the same thing perceived simultaneously as manifold. Nor is a delusion of difference in the self ever observed. Nor is a difference produced by a false adjunct observed anywhere.
Nor is even cognition or ignorance observed to be falsely imagined. In an erroneous cognition, only its object is observed to be otherwise.
This position is contradicted by innumerable arguments such as these. One desists only because the text would become excessively long.
And there is no defect in accepting it as true.
In the position of those who maintain a plurality of individual selves as well, if the falsity of difference is accepted, these defects do indeed arise.
For even their plurality is produced by an unreal adjunct. And a difference produced by an unreal adjunct is not observed anywhere.
A false limiting adjunct itself is not tenable, because it consists in the superimposition of the non-self upon the self.
Even a creation constituted by māyā is observed only when another thing resembling it exists, and only by relying upon some substratum possessing similarity in substantiality and the like.
Without a substrate and a similar entity—the pair being real entities—misapprehension does not arise anywhere, even in dreams, magical displays, and the like. Dream-error, however, is the imagining of external objecthood in a mental latent impression; and in a magical display, error is held to be the imagining of being a fourfold army and the like in entities such as the performer's body. Therefore, the universe is not imagined through misapprehension; it rests upon Viṣṇu's power.
Thus, in the Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa.
Nor is an illusion perceived by the illusionist. Īśvara always sees the universe; on that account, let it be ascertained that this universe is not an illusion.
And thus.
False cognition could never occur in one who sees directly. Viṣṇu directly knows all and sees the universe; therefore, the universe is not unreal.
And thus.
And if the one Brahman alone transmigrates and is liberated because of differences among adjuncts, then, since transmigrators always exist, Brahman is always nothing but a transmigrator. Consequently, even becoming that is not liberation, because it is always connected with an adjunct.
Nor should it be said that the pure has no relation to an adjunct. For if a relation to an adjunct is postulated for what is related to an adjunct, an infinite regress would follow. Nor can it be postulated for what is related by that very relation, since self-dependence would follow.
For this further reason, a false limiting adjunct is not tenable: the false limiting adjunct is established upon the establishment of ignorance, since without ignorance its falsity is not established. Nor is ignorance established without the false limiting adjunct, since only what is distinct from the false limiting adjunct is ignorant.
Because, if the pure one itself were ignorant, ignorance would follow even for the liberated one.
Because of being intrinsic, because of being real, and because of the implication of having a second.
And because of accepting that what is intrinsic does not cease, and because non-cessation would follow. For their position, indeed, is also that what is real does not cease.
From this there is also mutual dependence: upon the establishment of ignorance comes the establishment of a false limiting adjunct; upon the establishment of the false limiting adjunct, the establishment of the individual self; and upon the establishment of the individual self, the establishment of ignorance having that self as its locus—thus, alternatively, there is circularity.
Nor is it tenable that pure Brahman itself is ignorant through error: error is established upon the establishment of ignorance, and ignorance is established upon the establishment of that error, because of mutual dependence.
As many future and past moments as there are, taken together, and as many past and future atoms as there are, the multitudes of souls are, each separately, infinitely many times more numerous than even that.
Thus, because of the Vatsa Śruti, there is no complete exhaustion of transmigrating beings in our position.
“Indeed, even within an atom-sized region there are infinitely many hosts of living beings. Even gross beings are indeed situated there owing to subtlety, solely through the Lord’s power. Through the power of Viśvakarman, infinite, endless hosts of creatures occupy a hall a thousand yojanas in extent.”
Thus, in the Skānda.
Nor is impossibility itself an excellence of an unreal entity.
Because supposing that a perceived object is false requires reasoning grounded in a means of knowledge stronger than perception, in the absence of such reasoning its reality is established by perception itself. For surely, having perceived food and the like as fit for consumption, one does not require another means of knowledge regarding its reality in order to consume it. When, then? When someone says, “This is not food,” one requires another means of knowledge showing how this food, which is perceived as food, is not food.
Nor is the sublation of what is seen by perception observed through inference and the like alone, without the occurrence of a perception stronger than it. In cases such as the shortness of a distant tree, because perception’s lack of acuity has been ascertained, its tallness is ascertained there by reasoning. For it has been ascertained only by a perception stronger than it that perception at a distance apprehends weakly and presents magnitude and the like otherwise. Nor has the falsity of perception of the world been established by any valid means of knowledge. In particular, the falsity of experience whose objects are knowledge, ignorance, pleasure, pain, the self, difference, and the like has not been observed.
And for this reason, because saṃsāra is real and because it is accepted that what is real does not cease, there would be no liberation.
If the unreality of what is established by experience is accepted solely through reasoning, without a stronger experience, then even the self would be unreal. And the reasoning is as follows: since the unreality of everything else is accepted, making a twofold supposition entails a burdensome multiplication of suppositions.
Because an error whose substratum is the self is itself not observed, even that self's status as a substratum is not tenable.
If impossibility were an ornament, even the Self’s unreality, though impossible, would indeed be the case. Since even cognition is accepted as an effect of ignorance, since the impossibility of that ignorance is an ornament, and since truth depends on reasoning, everything contradictory—such as pots and the like being cognizers, the Self being insentient, cognition in the absence of a cognizer, and illusion even without a substratum—would also be the case.
If difference among limiting adjuncts is accepted, then, just as no difference is cognized in the experiencer of the pleasure, pain, and the like located in the differing limiting adjuncts such as hands and feet, so too no difference in the experiencer would be perceived when bodies and the like differ. The pleasure, pain, and the like present in all bodies would be experienced by one alone.
And just as there is no liberation even upon the removal of one finger or the like, similarly, even upon the removal of one limiting adjunct, there would be no liberation, because that very one is connected with infinitely many limiting adjuncts.
Even the headless trunks, whose staff-like arms bore upraised weapons, seeing with the eyes in their own fallen heads, felled enemies in battle.
Thus, from the statement in the Bhārata, no distinction arises from separation.
Moreover, does the limiting adjunct engulf one part of the self, or the whole self? If one part is accepted, the self possesses parts; and they accept that what possesses parts is impermanent. If the whole is engulfed, the limiting adjunct would not be a differentiator. If a part produced by the limiting adjunct is posited, then, if it is produced by that limiting adjunct, there is self-dependence. If another limiting adjunct is posited, there is an infinite regress.
Nor, because Īśvara is omnipresent, does a difference from Brahman due to limiting adjuncts arise. For no difference due to limiting adjuncts is observed between two entities unlimited with respect to both space and time.
Because the one and same Lord is present in all limiting adjuncts, and because difference is false, just as the experiencer is one even amid differences of hands, feet, and the like, the Lord alone would be the experiencer of all pleasure, pain, and the like.
Precisely because there is no figurative distinction between the two, both unlimited with respect to space and time, a pure Brahman other than the suffering one is not established. Hence saṃsāra would be intrinsic, and thus there would be no cessation at all.
Moreover, does transmigration belong to the qualified one or to the pure one? If it is said that transmigration belongs to the pure one, there is self-contradiction. If it is said that it belongs to the qualified one, is the qualified one different, or is it that very one? If it is that very one, the defect already stated follows. If it is different, is it eternal or non-eternal? If it is non-eternal, its destruction alone occurs, not liberation. And if it is eternal, difference is real, because that difference is present even in liberation. If it is accepted that there is non-difference merely as to intrinsic nature, while the qualified one is different precisely through an adjunct, then intrinsic nature itself is connected with an adjunct, so it is not pure. And that position is that what has an impure nature is never pure.
And, in accepting the unreality of the limiting adjunct, defects such as mutual dependence have been stated.
Nor is difference due to difference in beginningless karma, because difference in karma is established upon the establishment of difference based on limiting adjuncts, and the latter is established upon the establishment of the former, thus involving mutual dependence.
Therefore, [the discussion] is brought to a close solely with the consideration that, since [it] is vitiated by innumerable defects, the treatise would become too extensive.
Therefore, because it is contrary to every valid means of knowledge, the purport of śruti does not lie in non-difference.
Since even secondary signification is not observed for that which is not denoted by any word, it is not knowable through scripture.
Therefore, because it is inexpressible and unknowable, it follows that it is nothing whatsoever.
Nor do they assert that it is knowable even by itself. For they say that agent and object are incompatible.
Nor is cognition observed without a knower and an object of knowledge, whether its own nature or something else. Thus, because of the absence of a knower and an object of knowledge, cognition too is nothingness alone. Thus, there is no difference whatsoever from the doctrine of emptiness. Nor is cognition devoid of a knower and an object of knowledge observed anywhere.
And because difference from the Lord is not already established, it is not tenable that the purport of śruti lies in non-difference.
All the Vedas are primarily engaged in making known the one who is supreme over all, free from every defect, full of all attributes without exception, and distinct from everything on account of his distinctiveness—and certainly not anything else.
Thus in the Mahopaniṣad.
Therefore, it is established that the Lord Nārāyaṇa is to be known through authoritative scriptures alone as different from everything and superior to everything.
Thus ends the First Section of the Śrī Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya, composed by the venerable Ānandatīrtha Bhagavatpāda.
