First Section (प्रथमः परिच्छेदः)
sadāgamaikavijñēyaṁ samatītakṣarākṣaram। nārāyaṇaṁ sadā vandē nirdōṣāśēṣasadguṇam॥
I always bow to Nārāyaṇa, who is knowable through true scripture alone, completely transcends the perishable and the imperishable, is free from defects, and possesses every good quality.
viśēṣaṇāni yānīha kathitāni saduktibhiḥ। sādhayiṣyāmi tānyēva kramāt sajjanasaṁvidē॥
For the understanding of good people, I shall establish in sequence those very attributes that have been stated herein through true statements.
“r̥gādyā bhārataṁ caiva pañcarātramathākhilam। mūlarāmāyaṇaṁ caiva purāṇaṁ caitadātmakam। yē cānuyāyinastvēṣāṁ sarvē tē ca sadāgamāḥ। durāgamāstadanyē yē tairna jñēyō janārdanaḥ। jñēya ētaiḥ sadāyuktairbhaktimadbhiḥ suniṣṭhitaiḥ। naca kēvalatarkēṇa nākṣajēna na kēnacit। kēvalāgamavijñēyō bhaktairēva nacānyathā॥”
“The Vedas beginning with the Ṛgveda, the Bhārata, the entire Pañcarātra, the original Rāmāyaṇa, and the Purāṇa of this same nature—and as for those that follow these, they too are all true scriptures. Those that are other than these are false scriptures; Janārdana is not to be known through them. He is to be known through these by those who are ever engaged, endowed with devotion, and firmly established—not by mere reasoning, not by sense-born cognition, nor by anything whatsoever. He is knowable solely through scripture, by devotees alone, and not otherwise.”
iti brahmāṇḍē।
Thus in the Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa.
“nāvēdavinmanutēdaṁ br̥hantaṁ sarvānubhumātmānaꣳ sāmparāyē” - taittirīyāraṇyakam 3/12/9/17
“One who does not know the Veda does not contemplate, in the hereafter, this great Self, the experiencer of all.” — Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 3/12/9/17
iti taittirīyaśrutiḥ।
Thus says the Taittirīya revelation.
“naiṣā tarkēṇa matirāpanēyā prōktā’nyēnaiva sujñānāya prēṣṭha” - kāṭhakōpaniṣat 1/2/9
“This insight is not to be attained through reasoning; taught by another alone, it is readily understood, O dearest one.” — Kāṭhakopaniṣad 1/2/9
iti kaṭhaśrutiḥ।
Thus says the Kaṭha Śruti.
“nēndriyāṇi nānumānaṁ vēdā hyēvainaṁ vēdayanti tasmādāhurvēdā iti”
Neither the senses nor inference make him known; for the Vedas alone make him known. Therefore they call them “Vedas.”
iti pippalādaśrutiḥ।
Thus says the Pippalāda Śruti.
nacaitēṣāṁ vacanānāmēvāprāmāṇyam। apauruṣēyatvād vēdasya।
Nor are these statements themselves invalid, because the Veda is unauthored.
“itihāsapurāṇaḥ pañcamō vēdānāṁ vēdaḥ” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 7/1/2
“Itihāsa and Purāṇa are the fifth Veda among the Vedas.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 7/1/2
iti tadgr̥hītatvācca।
and because it is thus included by that statement.
nacāpauruṣēyaṁ vākyamēva nāstīti vācyam। tadabhāvē sarvasamayābhimatadharmādyasiddhēḥ।
Nor is it to be said, “No statement not authored by a person exists at all,” since, in its absence, dharma and the like, accepted by all traditions, would not be established.
yasya tau nābhimatau nāsau samayī, samayaprayōjanābhāvāt। naca tēna lōkōpakāraḥ। dharmādyabhāvajñānē parasparaṁ hiṁsādinā’pakārasyaiva prāptēḥ। nacōpakārēṇa tasya prayōjanam। adr̥ṣṭābhāvāt। atō dharmādyabhāvaṁ vadatā svasamayasyānarthakyamaṅgīkr̥tamēvēti nāsau samayī।
He who does not accept those two is not a proponent of a doctrinal system, because a doctrinal system has no purpose. Nor does the world receive any benefit from him, since, when the absence of dharma and the like is known, only harm to one another through violence and the like results. Nor does benefiting serve any purpose for him, since there is no unseen result. Therefore, one who asserts the absence of dharma and the like has indeed admitted the pointlessness of his own doctrinal system; on that account, he is not a proponent of a doctrinal system.
naca pauruṣēyēṇa vākyēna tatsiddhiḥ। ajñānavipralambhayōḥ prāptēḥ। naca tadarthatvēna sarvajñaḥ kalpyēta। anyatrādr̥ṣṭasya sarvajñatvasya kalpanam, tasyāvipralambhakatvakalpanam, tasya tatkr̥tatvakalpanaṁ cēti kalpanāgauravaprāptēḥ।
Nor is that established by a person-authored statement, since ignorance and deception would then be possible. Nor should an omniscient being be postulated for that purpose, since an undue burden of suppositions would result: the supposition of omniscience not observed elsewhere, the supposition of his non-deceptiveness, and the supposition that it was composed by him.
apauruṣēyavākyāṅgīkārē na kiñcit kalpyam।
When a statement not authored by a person is accepted, nothing is to be postulated.
apauruṣēyatvaṁ ca svata ēva siddham। vēdakarturaprasiddhēḥ। aprasiddhau ca kartustatkalpanē kalpanāgauravam। akalpanē cākartr̥katvaṁ siddhamēva। naca laukikavākyavat sakartr̥katvam। tasyākartr̥katvaprasiddhyabhāvāt। naca kēnacit kr̥tvā vēda ityuktaṁ vēdasamam। paramparābhāvāt। naca svayampratibhātavēdairdr̥ṣṭamavēdavākyaṁ bhavati। paramparāsiddhavēdavākyānusāritvāt। vēdadraṣṭr̥̄ṇāmuktaguṇavattvācca tēṣām। uktaṁ ca brahmāṇḍē-
And the Veda’s not being authored by a person is established of itself, because an author of the Veda is not established. When an author is not established, positing such an author entails a burden of postulation; if one is not posited, its authorlessness is indeed established. Nor does the Veda have an author as an ordinary statement does, because the latter is not established as authorless. Nor is something that someone has made and called “Veda” equal to the Veda, because it lacks a tradition of transmission. Nor is what is seen by those to whom the Veda has manifested of itself a non-Vedic statement, because it conforms to the Vedic statement established by tradition and because those seers of the Veda possess the specified qualities. And it is said in the Brahmāṇḍa:
“viṁśallakṣaṇatō’nūnastapasvī bahuvēdavit। vēda ityēva yaṁ paśyēt sa vēdō jñānadarśanāt॥”
Whatever an ascetic who is not deficient in the twenty characteristics and knows many Vedas should see precisely as Veda—that is Veda, on account of his knowledge and vision.
iti।
Thus.
prāmāṇyaṁ ca svata ēva। anyathā’navasthānāt। nacōktayuktyadhīnatvaṁ prāmāṇyasya। buddhidōṣanirāsamātrakāraṇatvād yuktīnām। aduṣṭabuddhīnāṁ svata ēva siddhatvācca prāmāṇyasya। nacākāṅkṣāyāmēva pramāṇāntarāpēkṣatvādanavasthābhāva iti vācyam। ākāṅkṣāyā ēva buddhidōṣātmakatvāt। duṣṭabuddhīnāmēvāprāmāṇyaśaṅkēti paratō’prāmāṇyam। prāmāṇyaṁ ca svata ēva siddham।
Validity, moreover, is intrinsic, since otherwise there would be an infinite regress. Nor is validity dependent on the aforementioned reasoning, for reasonings serve solely to remove defects of intellect, and validity is established of itself for those whose intellect is free from defect. Nor should it be said, “There is no infinite regress, since dependence on another means of knowledge occurs only when there is expectancy.” For expectancy itself consists in a defect of intellect. Only those whose intellect is defective have a suspicion of invalidity; thus invalidity is extrinsic. And validity is established of itself alone.
nacōccāraṇakāla ēva varṇānāmutpattiriti vācyam। tadēvēdaṁ vacanamiti pratyabhijñāvirōdhāt।
Nor should it be asserted that the phonemes originate only at the time of utterance, because this conflicts with the recognition, “This utterance is that very one.”
naca sādr̥śyāt pratyabhijñā bhrāntiriti vācyam। ‘sō’yaṁ dēvadattaḥ’ ityādērapi tathātvaprāptēḥ। sarvakṣaṇikatvaṁ vadatā bauddhēna ‘sēyaṁ dig’ ityādipratyabhijñāyā bhrāntitvaṁ na vācyam। pañcaskandhēbhyō’nyatvāt।
Nor should it be said that recognition is erroneous because of similarity, for then even such recognition as “This is that Devadatta” would thereby be erroneous. A Buddhist who asserts universal momentariness should not say that recognition such as “This is that direction” is erroneous, because direction is distinct from the five aggregates.
naca diśa ēva bhrāntikalpitāḥ। vijñānaśūnyayōrapi sāmyāt। nacādityōdayādinaiva dikkalpanā। andhakārē’pi diṅmātrapratītēḥ। kādācitkabhrāntirēvādityōdayādidarśanānnivāryatē। sā ca vijñānaśūnyayōrapi bhavatīti tēṣāṁ matam, vādivipratipattēḥ। atō diśaḥ sthirā ēvēti siddhyati śūnyavadēva।
Nor are the directions themselves imagined through error, since the case is the same even for cognition and emptiness. Nor is the conception of direction based solely on sunrise and the like, since direction as such is cognized even in darkness. Only an occasional error is dispelled by seeing sunrise and the like. According to their view, that error also occurs with respect to cognition and emptiness, because disputants disagree. Thus, the directions are established to be stable indeed, just like emptiness itself.
atastadvad vēdasyāpi sthairyaṁ siddham। ‘tadēvēdaṁ vākyam’ iti pratyabhijñānāt।
Therefore, the permanence of the Veda also is established in the same way, because of the recognition, “This is that very sentence.”
nacānumānādīnāmāgamaṁ vinā prāmāṇyaṁ dharmādiṣu, tadagōcaratvāt। atō’pauruṣēyavākyēnaiva dharmādisiddhēḥ sarvavādināmapi tadaṅgīkāryam।
Nor do inference and the other means have validity concerning dharma and the like without scriptural testimony, because these lie beyond their scope. Therefore, because dharma and the like are established only through an unauthored statement, even proponents of every doctrine must accept that.
tatprāmāṇyaṁ ca svata ēva siddham। aprāmāṇyasya ca paratastvānaṅgīkārē duṣṭēndriyādērapyaprāmāṇyahētutvaṁ na syāt। tadanaṅgīkārē cānubhavavirōdhaḥ। ataḥ prāmāṇyaṁ svataḥ paratō’prāmāṇyamiti siddham।
Moreover, that validity is established from itself alone. If invalidity’s being from another were not accepted, even a defective sense faculty and the like would not be causes of invalidity. And if that is not accepted, there is conflict with experience. Therefore, it is established that validity is from itself and invalidity from another.
“vācā virūpa nityayā” - r̥gvēdasaṁhitā 8/75/6
“With eternal speech, O Virūpa.” — Ṛgveda-saṃhitā 8/75/6
“nityayā’nityayā staumi brahma tat paramaṁ padamiti॥śrutirvāva nityā anityā vāva smr̥tayō yāścānyā vācaḥ”
“With eternal speech and with non-eternal speech, I praise Brahman, that supreme abode.” Śruti is indeed eternal; the Smṛti texts and whatever other utterances there are are indeed non-eternal.
iti paiṅgiśrutiḥ
Thus says the Paiṅgi revelation.
“vijñēyaṁ paramaṁ brahma jñāpikā paramā śrutiḥ। anādinityā sā tacca vinā tāṁ na sa gamyatē”
“The supreme Brahman is to be known; the supreme Śruti makes it known. It is beginningless and eternal, and that Brahman is not apprehended without it.”
iti kātyāyanaśrutiḥ
Thus says the Kātyāyana Śruti.
“sahasradhā mahimānaḥ sahasraṁ yāvadbrahma viṣṭhitaṁ tāvatī vāk। kaśchandasāṁ yōgamāvēda dhīraḥ kō dhiṣṇyāṁ prati vācaṁ papāda॥” - r̥gvēdasaṁhitā 10/114/8-9
“The manifestations of greatness are in a thousand forms, a thousand in number. As far as brahman is extended, so extensive is speech. What discerning sage has fully known the yoking of the metres? Who has attained inspired speech?” — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 10/114/8-9
ityādi ca।
And other passages to this effect.
“nityā vēdāḥ samastāśca śāśvatā viṣṇubuddhigāḥ। sargēsargē’munaivaita udgīryantē tathaiva ca। tatkramēṇaiva tairvarṇaistaiḥ svarairēva nānyathā॥
“All the Vedas are eternal and everlasting, abiding in Viṣṇu’s intellect. At each creation, these are uttered forth by him alone in exactly the same way: in precisely that sequence, with those phonemes and precisely those accents, not otherwise.
ataḥ śrutitvamētāsāṁ śrutā ēva yatō’khilaiḥ। janmāntarē śrutāstāstu vāsudēvaprasādataḥ। munīnāṁ pratibhāsyanti bhāgēnaiva na sarvaśaḥ। yatastā hariṇā dr̥ṣṭāḥ śrutā ēvāparairjanaiḥ। śrutayō dr̥ṣṭayaścēti tēnōcyantē purātanaiḥ॥
Therefore, these have the status of Śruti, because they have only been heard by all. But those heard in a previous birth become manifest to the sages, through Vāsudeva’s grace, only in part and not in their entirety. Because they were seen by Hari but only heard by other people, they are for that reason called “Śrutis” and “Dṛṣṭis” by the ancients.
tadutpattivacaścaiva bhavēd vyaktimapēkṣya tu। cētanasya janiryadvaducyatē sarvalaukikaiḥ। purāṇāni tadarthāni sargēsargē’nyathaiva tu। kriyantē’tastvanityāni tadarthāḥ pūrvasargavat॥
The statement concerning their origination, too, would, however, be with reference to manifestation, just as the birth of a conscious being is spoken of by all ordinary people. The Purāṇas, which convey their meaning, however, are composed quite differently in each creation; for that reason they are non-eternal, while their meanings are as in the preceding creation.
vēdānāṁ sr̥ṣṭivākyāni bhavēyurvyaktyapēkṣayā। avāntarābhimānānāṁ dēvānāṁ vā vyapēkṣayā। nānityatvāt kutastēṣāmanityatvaṁ sthirātmanām॥”
Statements concerning the creation of the Vedas would be with reference to manifestation, or with reference to the subordinate presiding deities, not because of non-eternality. How could those whose nature is immutable be non-eternal?
iti brahmāṇḍē।
Thus, in the Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa.
nacānityatvē ‘śrutiḥ’ ‘vēdaḥ’ ityādiviśēṣaśabda upapadyatē।
Nor, under the supposition of non-eternality, is a distinctive designation such as “Śruti,” “Veda,” and the like tenable.
“vēdāstē nityavinnatvācchrutayaścākhilaiḥ śrutēḥ। āmnāyō’nanyathāpāṭhādīśabuddhisthitāḥ sadā॥”
They are the Vedas because they are eternally known, and the Śrutis because they are heard by all; they are the Āmnāya because of their unaltered recitation, always abiding in the Lord’s cognition.
iti mahāvārāhē।
Thus in the Mahāvarāha.
naca nityatvaṁ vinā vēdānāṁ darśanavyavahārō yujyatē। naca varṇapadādīnāmanityatvaṁ vaktuṁ yuktam। sarvajñatvādīśvarasya tadbuddhau sarvadā pratīyamānatvāt। naca ghaṭādivat saṁskāramātratvaṁ vaktuṁ yuktam। pratyabhijñāvirōdhasyōktatvāt। purāṇānāmapyanyathāśabdaracanamēvānityatvam।
Without eternality, the usage of speaking of the Vedas as “seen” is not tenable. Nor is it proper to assert the non-eternality of letters, words, and the like, because, owing to the Lord’s omniscience, they are always manifest in his cognition. Nor is it proper to assert that their presence there is merely a residual impression, as with a pot and the like, since the incompatibility with recognition has already been stated. Even for the Purāṇas, their non-eternality consists solely in a different verbal formulation.
ata ākāśaguṇē śabdē vyajyamānā varṇādayaḥ, tatkramātmakō vēdaśca nitya ēvēti siddham।
Thus, it is established that the phonemes and the rest, which are manifested in sound, a quality of ether, and the Veda, which consists in their sequence, are indeed eternal.
naca kēvalasiddhē’rthē vyutpattyabhāvādaprāmāṇyam। siddhānvita ēva vyutpattigr̥hītēḥ। ‘iyaṁ mātā’, ‘ayaṁ pitā’ ityādāvaṅguliprasāraṇādipūrvakanirdēśēnaiva hi tajjānāti। kāryānvita ēva vyutpattiriti vadataḥ kāryasya kāryānvayābhāvāt kalpanāgauravam।
Nor is there invalidity with regard to an object that is merely established, on account of an alleged absence of language acquisition there, since linguistic usage is apprehended precisely in connection with an established entity. In such examples as “This is mother” and “This is father,” one indeed comes to know that solely through indication preceded by extending a finger and the like. For one who maintains that language acquisition occurs only in connection with what is to be done, there is cumbersomeness of postulation, since what is to be done is not itself connected with what is to be done.
‘iyaṁ mātā’, ‘ayaṁ pitā’, ‘surūpō’si’ ityādau siddhamātrajñāpanēna paryavasitatvād vākyasya।
Because, in statements such as “This is the mother,” “This is the father,” and “You are handsome,” the sentence is complete upon conveying only what is already established.
tasya tatra prāmāṇyānubhavācca। naca kutracit siddhajñāpanādanyad vākyasya prayōjanaṁ dr̥ṣṭam। jñātvaiva hīṣṭasādhanatāṁ pravartatē, nivartatē ca viparyayēṇa। ataḥ siddha ēva sarvavākyānāṁ prāmāṇyaṁ siddham।
And because its validity is experienced in that case. Nor is any purpose of a sentence other than making an established fact known observed anywhere. For one acts only after knowing something to be a means to a desired end, and refrains upon knowing the opposite. Thus, it is established that the validity of all sentences pertains only to an established fact.
prasiddhaṁ ca vyākaraṇaniruktādīnāṁ siddhamātrē prāmāṇyaṁ sarvavādinām। tadanaṅgīkārē ca sarvaśābdavyavahārāsiddhiḥ।
And it is well established among proponents of all positions that grammar, Nirukta, and the like have validity as sources of knowledge with regard only to what is already established. And if that is not accepted, all verbal usage fails to be established.
uktaṁ ca nāradīyē-
It is also stated in the Nāradiya: …
“sarvajñaṁ sarvakartāraṁ nārāyaṇamanāmayam। sarvōttamaṁ jñāpayanti mahātātparyamatra hi। sarvēṣāmapi vēdānāmitihāsapurāṇayōḥ। pramāṇānāṁ ca sarvēṣāṁ tadarthaṁ cānyaducyatē॥”
They make known Nārāyaṇa as omniscient, the doer of all, free from defect, and highest of all. For here, indeed, this is the principal purport of all the Vedas without exception, of Itihāsa and Purāṇa, and of all sources of valid knowledge; and anything else is stated for that purpose.
iti।
Thus.
naca jīvēśvarābhēda ēva tātparyamāgamasya। tatra pramāṇābhāvāt।
Nor is non-difference between the jīva and Īśvara alone the purport of scripture, since there is no valid means of knowledge for that.
naca jīvēśvarabhēdaḥ siddha ityanuvādakatvaṁ bhēdākyānām। āgamaṁ vinēśvarasyaivāsiddhēḥ। nacānumānāt tatsiddhiḥ। viparyayēṇāpyanumātuṁ śakyatvāt। ‘vimataṁ sakartr̥kam, kāryatvāt, ghaṭavat’ ityuktē, ‘vimataṁ vikartr̥kam, asmatsammatakartr̥rahitatvāt, ātmavat’ ityanumānavirōdhāt। ‘akāryatvamupādhiḥ’ ityuktē, ‘śarīrijanyatvamitaratrāpyupādhiḥ’ ityuttaram।
Nor do the statements of difference have the status of reiteration on the ground that the difference between the individual self and Īśvara is established, since Īśvara himself is unestablished apart from scripture. Nor is Īśvara established by inference, since the opposite can also be inferred. When it is stated, “The disputed subject possesses a maker, because it is an effect, like a pot,” this is opposed by the inference, “The disputed subject is makerless, because it lacks a maker accepted by us, like the self.” If it is said, “‘Not being an effect’ is an upādhi,” the reply is, “‘Being produced by an embodied agent’ is also an upādhi in the other inference.”
pratyakṣānumānasiddhatvē ca bhēdasya tadvirōdhādēvāprāmāṇyamabhēdāgamasya। tēnābhēdāgamasyāprāmāṇyābhāvē nānuvādakatvaṁ bhēdavākyānām। nahi balavatō’nuvādakatvam। dārḍhyahētutvāt।
And when difference is established by perception and inference, the scriptural testimony of non-difference lacks validity precisely because it contradicts that. Accordingly, if the scriptural testimony of non-difference is not invalid, statements of difference do not have reiterative status. For what possesses force does not have reiterative status, because it produces firmness.
pratyakṣādērāgamasya prābalyē’pi nōpajīvyapramāṇavirōdhē prāmāṇyam। viṣayābhāvē svasyaivāprāmāṇyaprāptēḥ। tēnaiva hyanumānādinā’’gamasya viṣayaḥ siddhyati tatpakṣē’pi। anumānēna hyanuvāditvapakṣa īśvarō bōddhavyaḥ, pratyakṣēṇa cāgamaḥ। atastayōrvirōdhē prāmāṇyaṁ na syāt। anumānasiddhēśvarācca bhēdō’nubhavata ēva siddhō jīvasya। asarvakartr̥tvēnānubhavāt।
Even though scriptural testimony is stronger than perception and the like, it has no validity when it conflicts with a source of knowledge on which it depends, because in the absence of an object its own invalidity would follow. For even on that view, the object of scriptural testimony is established by that very inference and the like. On the view that scriptural testimony is reiterative, Īśvara is to be known by inference and scriptural testimony by perception. Thus, if it conflicts with those two, it would have no validity. And the jīva’s difference from Īśvara, who is established by inference, is established for the experiencing jīva itself, because it experiences itself as not the agent of everything.
nacānubhavavirōdhē āgamasya prāmāṇyam। āgamaprāmāṇyānubhavasyāpyaprāmāṇyaprāptēḥ।
Nor does scripture have validity when it conflicts with experience, since it would follow that even the experience of scripture’s validity is invalid.
bahupramāṇasaṁvādaśca dārḍhyahēturēva। bahūnāṁ vacanē tasyaiva darśanē dārḍhyasyaiva dr̥ṣṭēḥ। sarvāvivādasthala ēva kathañcidanuvādakatvam। nacātra sarvāvivādaḥ। ēkatvavādināmēva vivādadarśanāt।
And corroboration by many valid sources of knowledge is indeed a cause of firmness, since firmness itself is observed when many state something and that very thing is perceived. Only in a case uncontested by anyone is there somehow a reiterative status. But there is no universal absence of dispute here, since dispute is observed precisely on the part of the proponents of oneness.
bahupramāṇavirōdhē caikasyāprāmāṇyaṁ dr̥ṣṭaṁ śuktirajatādau। naca dōṣajanyatvādēva durbalatvamiti virōdhaḥ। bahupramāṇaviruddhānāṁ dōṣajanyatvaniyamāt। dōṣajanyatvaṁ ca balavatpramāṇavirōdhādēva jñāyatē।
And when one conflicts with many pramāṇas, the invalidity of that one is observed, as in the case of silver in mother-of-pearl and the like. Nor is there the objection, “Weakness is due solely to being produced by a defect,” because those contradicted by many pramāṇas are invariably produced by a defect. And being produced by a defect is known precisely from conflict with a strong pramāṇa.
“aduṣṭamindriyaṁ tvakṣaṁ tarkō’duṣṭastathā’numā। āgamō’duṣṭavākyaṁ ca svadr̥k cānubhavaḥ smr̥taḥ। balavatpramāṇataścaiva jñēyā dōṣā nacānyathā। dvividhaṁ balavattvaṁ ca bahutvācca svabhāvataḥ। tayōḥ svabhāvō balavānupajīvyādikaśca saḥ॥
Sense perception, however, is a non-defective sense faculty; inference is likewise non-defective reasoning. Verbal testimony is a non-defective statement, and direct self-awareness is held to be experience. Defects are to be ascertained only on the basis of a stronger means of valid knowledge, and not otherwise. Greater strength is of two kinds: from multiplicity and from intrinsic nature. Of these two, that based on intrinsic nature is stronger, and it consists in being depended upon and the like.
yāthārthyamēva prāmāṇyaṁ tanmukhyaṁ jñānaśabdayōḥ। jñānaṁ ca dvividhaṁ bāhyaṁ tathā’nubhavarūpakam। balyēvānubhavastatra nirdōṣaṁ tvakṣajādikam॥
Validity is conformity to reality alone; that is primary in cognition and verbal statement. Cognition is twofold: external and of the nature of experience. Among these, experience alone has greater force, while faultless cognition arising from the senses and the like…
anupramāṇatāṁ yāti tathā’kṣāditrayaṁ tataḥ। prābalyamāgamasyaiva jātyā tēṣu triṣu smr̥tam। upajīvyavirōdhē tu na prāmāṇyamamuṣya ca॥"
Likewise, the triad beginning with perception thereby attains the status of a subsidiary source of valid knowledge. Among those three, scriptural testimony specifically is held to possess superior force by virtue of its class; but this too has no validity when it conflicts with that on which it depends.
yāmāhuranumāṁ kēcit triyādyavayavātmikām। sā vyarthā nōpapattyā hi vinā sā’pi pramāṇatām। yātyatō yuktirēvaikā pramāṇamanumātmakam। yuktiḥ pratijñārūpā ca hētudr̥ṣṭāntarūpikā। tathōpanayarūpā ca parā nigamanātmikā। pr̥thakpr̥thakpramāṇatvaṁ yāti yuktitayaiva tu। pratijñā hētugarbhaiva pr̥thak prāmāṇyamēṣyati। siddhatvēna pratijñāyā hēturmānaṁ pr̥thag bhavēt। pratijñāvayavatvāttu svātantryēṇaiva mānatām। dr̥ṣṭāntō yātyupanayō vyāptimāśritya kēvalam। vyāptistu kēvalā’pi syāt pramāṇaṁ niyamāśrayāt। tathā nigamanaṁ cōpasaṁhāraikasvarūpataḥ। prāmāṇyaṁ yātyanubhavō jñāpayatyupapattitām॥
The inference that some call one consisting of three or more members is pointless; for without rational justification, even it does not attain the status of a means of knowledge. Therefore, reasoning alone is the single means of knowledge having the nature of inference. Reasoning is in the form of a proposition, in the forms of a reason and an example, and likewise in the form of application; another is in the form of a conclusion. Each separately attains the status of a means of knowledge precisely by being reasoning. The proposition itself, containing the reason, will separately attain validity. Through the proposition’s being established, the reason would be a distinct means of knowledge. The example, however, independently attains the status of a means of knowledge because it is a member of the proposition; the application does so solely by relying upon pervasion. Even pervasion alone may be a means of knowledge because it rests upon invariability. Likewise, the conclusion attains validity because its nature is solely summation. Experience makes known their cogency as rational justification.
virōdhaśca tathā’dhikyaṁ nyūnatā’saṅgatistathā। upapattidōṣā vijñēyā virōdhaśca svatō’nyataḥ॥janakasyātyayō jātiḥ svasya vā’nyasya vā bhavēt। janakaṁ pramāṇamuddiṣṭaṁ svasyārthasya prakāśanāt॥nigrahā ēta ēva syuḥ saṁvādānuktisaṁyutāḥ॥
Contradiction, excess, deficiency, and incoherence are likewise to be recognized as defects of reasoning; and contradiction is intrinsic or derives from another. (जनकस्यात्ययो जातिः स्वस्य वाऽन्यस्य वा भवेत्। जनकं प्रमाणमुद्दिष्टं स्वस्यार्थस्य प्रकाशनात्॥निग्रहा एत एव स्युः संवादानुक्तिसंयुताः)
arthataḥ prāptirēvārthāpattirityabhidhīyatē। dr̥ṣṭvā sadr̥śamēvānyaṁ pūrvadr̥ṣṭē tu vastuni। ētatsadr̥śatājñānamupamānaṁ prakīrtitam॥abhāvasya parijñānaṁ dvividhaṁ samudāhr̥tam। ēkaṁ tatrānubhavatō yōgyasyānupalabdhitaḥ। dvitīyamapi vijñēyaṁ sukhādyē ca ghaṭādikē॥ēkaṁ pratyakṣarūpaṁ syād dvitīyamanumātmakam। kvacid ghaṭādyabhāvō’pi pratyakṣēṇāvagamyatē। jhaṭityēva parijñānānna liṅgōdbhavatā matā॥arthāpattiścōpamā ca hyanumābhēda ēva tu॥
Presumption is said to be precisely ascertainment from a fact. When an object has previously been seen, however, upon seeing another that is indeed similar, the cognition of its similarity to this object is declared to be comparison. (अभावस्य परिज्ञानं द्विविधं समुदाहृतम्। एकं तत्रानुभवतो योग्यस्यानुपलब्धितः। द्वितीयमपि विज्ञेयं सुखाद्ये च घटादिके॥एकं प्रत्यक्षरूपं स्याद् द्वितीयमनुमात्मकम्। क्वचिद् घटाद्यभावोऽपि प्रत्यक्षेणावगम्यते। झटित्येव परिज्ञानान्न लिङ्गोद्भवता मता॥अर्थापत्तिश्चोपमा च ह्यनुमाभेद एव तु)
āgamō dvividhō jñēyō nityō’nityastathaiva ca।
Authoritative testimony is to be understood as being of two kinds: eternal and, likewise, non-eternal.
pratyakṣaṁ trividhaṁ jñēyamaiśvaraṁ yaugikaṁ tathā। ayaugikaṁ cēti tathā sarvamakṣātmakaṁ matam॥akṣāṇi ca svarūpāṇi nityajñānātmakāni ca। viṣṇōḥ śriyastathaivōktānyanyēṣāṁ dvividhāni tu॥svarūpāṇi ca bhinnāni bhinnāni trividhāni ca। daivāsurāṇi madhyānītyētat pratyakṣamīritam॥viṣayān prati sthitaṁ hyakṣaṁ pratyakṣamiti kīrtitam। akṣayaṁ puruṣasyākṣaṁ svarūpē mukhyamēva tu। upacārastadanyatra sr̥ṣṭāvupacayō yataḥ।
Direct perception is to be understood as threefold: the Lord’s, yogic, and non-yogic; likewise, all of it is held to be constituted by an akṣa. The akṣas of Viṣṇu and Śrī are said to be their essential natures and to consist of eternal cognition. Those of others, however, are twofold: intrinsic and separate; the separate ones are in turn threefold—divine, demonic, and intermediate. Thus direct perception has been described. For an akṣa directed toward objects is termed “direct perception.” A person’s akṣa in the essential nature is imperishable and indeed primary; its application elsewhere is figurative, because there is accretion at creation.
upapattisvarūpatvādanumā sambhavādikam॥
Sambhava and the like constitute inference, because they have the nature of reasoning.
pratyakṣāgamamāhātmyādanumānaṁ pramāṇatām। yāti naivānyathā tasya niyatatvaṁ kvacid bhavēt॥” ityādi brahmatarkē।
“By virtue of the authority of perception and āgama, inference attains the status of a valid means of knowledge; otherwise, its invariability could not obtain anywhere at all,” and so forth. — Brahmatarka
atra cōpajīvyatvēna pramāṇaprābalyād bhēda ēva tātparyaṁ yuktam।
Here too, because of its greater strength as a means of knowledge by virtue of being epistemically prerequisite, it is warranted that difference alone be the purport.
kathañcānuvādakatvaṁ bhēdasya pramāṇēnāsiddhau। siddhau ca kathamabhēdavākyasyābādhaḥ। nacāpramāṇasiddhēnānuvādakatvaṁ pramāṇasya bhavati। durbalatvē ca bhēdapramāṇasyābhāsatvānna bhēdavākyānāmanuvāditvam। ataśca bhēdavākyānāmēva prābalyam।
How, then, can there be reiterative status when difference has not been established by a valid means of knowledge? And if it is established, how can the statement of non-difference remain unsublated? Nor does a valid means of knowledge acquire reiterative status through what is established by an invalid means of knowledge. And if the means of knowledge establishing difference is weak, then, because it is merely apparent, the statements of difference do not have reiterative status. For this reason, it is precisely the statements of difference that have superior force.
sarvapramāṇaviruddhavacanānāmēva prābalyāṅgīkārē
If superior authority is accepted only for statements contrary to every valid means of knowledge…
“idaṁ vā’grē naiva kiñcanāsīt” - taittirīyāraṇyakam 2/2/9/1
“In the beginning, this indeed was not anything whatsoever.” — Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 2/2/9/1
“asataḥ sadajāyata” - r̥gvēdasaṁhitā 10/72/2
“Being arose from non-being.” — Rigveda Samhita 10/72/2
ityādīnāmēvāvicārēṇa pratīyamānasyārthasya sarvapramāṇaviruddhatvāt tatra sarvāgamānāṁ mahātātparyaṁ prasajyēta। naca tatra yuktivirōdha iti vācyam। tasmin pakṣē yuktiviruddhatvēnānanuvāditvamiti guṇa ēva syāt। yuktisiddhatvē hyanuvāditvaṁ syāt। ataḥ pramāṇasiddhatvē tadapalāpāyuktēḥ, apramāṇasiddhatvē ca bhēdapramāṇasyānuvāditvābhāvācca na bhēdavākyānāṁ daurbalyam।
Because the meaning apprehended without examination from precisely such passages conflicts with every valid means of knowledge, it would follow that all scriptural texts have their principal purport in that meaning. Nor may it be said, “There is no conflict with reasoning in that case.” On that position, its being non-reiterative because it conflicts with reasoning would indeed be an advantage. For if it were established by reasoning, it would be reiterative. Thus, statements asserting difference are not weak: if difference is established by a valid means of knowledge, denying it is unreasonable; and if it is not established by a valid means of knowledge, the pramāṇa establishing difference is not reiterative.
naca pramāṇabahutvē daurbalyam। dārḍhyamēva hi bahuvākyasaṁvādē dr̥ṣṭam। tathāsatyabhyāsādēraprāmāṇyahētutvaṁ syāt। abhyāsasya ca tātparyaliṅgatvaṁ sarvēṣāṁ siddham। tadanaṅgīkārē tatpakṣē’pi navakr̥tvaḥ “tattvamasi” ityabhyāsasyānuvādakatvēnāprāmāṇyaṁ syāt। prathamavākyēnaiva yasyāsiddhaṁ tadarthamaparamityuktē pratyakṣādinā bhēdō yēnāniścitastadarthaṁ vākyamityuttaram। tasmād bahupramāṇasaṁvāditvē prābalyamēva।
Nor is there weakness when means of valid knowledge are numerous. Indeed, firmness alone is observed when many statements concur. If that were so, repetition and the like would be grounds for invalidity. And it is accepted by all that repetition is an indicator of purport. If that is not accepted, then even on that position the ninefold repetition, “You are that,” would be invalid on account of being a restatement. If it is said, “A further statement is for one for whom it was not established by the very first statement,” the reply is: “A statement is for one by whom difference has not been ascertained through perception and the like.” Therefore, when there is concordance with many means of valid knowledge, there is strength alone.
ataḥ sarvapramāṇaviruddhatvānnābhēdē tātparyaṁ vākyasya। kintu viṣṇōḥ sarvōttamatva ēva mahātātparyaṁ sarvāgamānām।
Therefore, because non-difference is opposed to every valid means of knowledge, the sentence does not have non-difference as its purport. Rather, the principal purport of all the Āgamas lies exclusively in Viṣṇu’s being highest of all.
tathācōktaṁ bhagavatā-
And likewise, it has been stated by the Lord:
“dvāvimau puruṣau lōkē kṣaraścākṣara ēva ca। kṣaraḥ sarvāṇi bhūtāni kūṭasthō’kṣara ucyatē। uttamaḥ puruṣastvanyaḥ paramātmētyudāhr̥taḥ। yō lōkatrayamāviśya bibhartyavyaya īśvaraḥ। yasmāt kṣaramatītō’hamakṣarādapi cōttamaḥ। atō’smi lōkē vēdē ca prathitaḥ puruṣōttamaḥ। yō māmēvamasammūḍhō jānāti puruṣōttamam। sa sarvavid bhajati māṁ sarvabhāvēna bhārata। iti guhyatamaṁ śāstramidamuktaṁ mayā’nagha। ētad buddhvā buddhimān syāt kr̥takr̥tyaśca bhārata॥” - bhagavadgītā 15/16-20
“There are these two Puruṣas in the world, namely, the perishable and the imperishable. All beings are the perishable; the one abiding unchanged is called the imperishable. But the supreme Puruṣa is another, designated the Paramātman—the imperishable Lord who, having entered the three worlds, sustains them. Because I transcend the perishable and am higher even than the imperishable, I am thus celebrated as Puruṣottama in the world and in the Veda. Whoever, being undeluded, knows me thus as Puruṣottama is the knower of all and worships me with his whole being, O Bhārata. Thus has this most secret teaching been declared by me, O sinless one. Having understood this, one would become wise and one who has accomplished what was to be accomplished, O Bhārata.” — Bhagavad Gītā 15/16-20
iti।
Thus.
“sarvōtkarṣē dēvadēvasya viṣṇōrmahātātparyaṁ naiva cānyatra satyam। avāntaraṁ tatparatvaṁ tadanyat sarvāgamānāṁ puruṣārthastatō’taḥ॥”
Truly, the principal purport of all scriptures lies in the supremacy over all of Viṣṇu, the God of gods, and certainly nowhere else. Any purport other than that is subsidiary. Therefore, the human goal comes from Him.
iti paiṅgiśrutiḥ।
Thus says the Paiṅgi Śruti.
“mukhyaṁ ca sarvavēdānāṁ tātparyaṁ śrīpatēḥ param। utkarṣē tu tadanyatra tātparyaṁ syādavāntaram॥”
The principal and supreme purport of all the Vedas concerns the supremacy of Śrīpati; but their purport concerning supremacy in anything other than him would be subordinate.
iti mahāvārāhē।
Thus, in the Mahāvarāha.
yuktaṁ ca viṣṇōḥ sarvōttamatva ēva mahātātparyaṁ sarvāgamānām।
And it is reasonable that the principal purport of all scriptures lies exclusively in Viṣṇu’s being supreme over all.
mōkṣō hi sarvapuruṣārthōttamaḥ-
For liberation is indeed the highest of all human ends—
“dharmārthakāmāḥ sarvē’pi na nityā mōkṣa ēva hi। nityastasmāt tadarthāya yatēta matimān naraḥ॥”
Dharma, artha, and kāma are all non-eternal; liberation alone is indeed eternal. Therefore, an intelligent person should strive for that end.
iti bhāllavēyaśrutiḥ।
Thus says the Bhāllaveya revelation.
“anityatvāt saduḥkhatvānna dharmādyāḥ paraṁ sukham। mōkṣa ēva parānandaḥ saṁsārē parivartatām॥”
Because they are impermanent and attended by suffering, dharma and the rest are not the supreme happiness. Liberation alone is the supreme bliss for those who transmigrate in saṃsāra.
iti bhāratē।
Thus, in the Mahābhārata.
mōkṣaśca viṣṇuprasādēna vinā na labhyatē-
And liberation is not attained without the grace of Viṣṇu:
“yasya prasādāt paramārtirūpādasmāt saṁsārānmucyatē nāparēṇa। nārāyaṇō’sau paramō vicintyō mumukṣubhiḥ karmapāśādamuṣmāt॥”
“That supreme Nārāyaṇa, by whose grace one is released from this saṃsāra, which is of the nature of utmost affliction—and not by another—is to be contemplated by those desiring liberation from that bond of karma.”
iti nārāyaṇaśrutiḥ।
Thus says the Nārāyaṇa Śruti.
“nāyamātmā pravacanēna labhyō na mēdhayā na bahunā śrutēna। yamēvaiṣa vr̥ṇutē tēna labhyastasyaiṣa ātmā vivr̥ṇutē tanūṁ svām॥” - kāṭhakōpaniṣat 1/2/23
“This Self is not attainable through exposition, nor through intelligence, nor through much hearing. It is attainable by the very person whom this Self chooses; to that person this Self reveals its own form.” — Kāṭhakopaniṣad 1/2/23
iti kaṭhaśrutiḥ।
Thus says the Kaṭha Śruti.
“tēṣāmahaṁ samuddhartā mr̥tyusaṁsārasāgarāt। bhavāmi na cirāt pārtha mayyāvēśitacētasām॥” - bhagavadgītā 12/7
“For those whose minds are fixed on me, I become the deliverer from the ocean of death and saṃsāra before long, O Pārtha.” — Bhagavad Gītā 12/7
iti bhagavadvacanam।
Thus is the Lord’s statement.
“utpattisthitisaṁhārā niyatirjñānamāvr̥tiḥ। bandhamōkṣau ca puruṣād yasmāt sa harirēkarāṭ॥”
Hari is the sole sovereign—the Person from whom creation, maintenance, dissolution, governance, knowledge, concealment, bondage, and liberation arise.
iti skāndē।
Thus, in the Skānda.
“ajñānāṁ jñānadō viṣṇurjñānināṁ mōkṣadaśca saḥ। ānandadaśca muktānāṁ sa ēvaikō janārdanaḥ॥”
“Viṣṇu is the giver of knowledge to the ignorant; he is also the giver of liberation to those who possess knowledge and the giver of bliss to the liberated. He alone is the one Janārdana.”
iti ca।
And thus:
“bandhakō bhavapāśēna bhavapāśācca mōcakaḥ। kaivalyadaḥ paraṁ brahma viṣṇurēva na saṁśayaḥ॥”
Viṣṇu alone binds with the fetter of transmigratory existence and releases from that fetter; he is the bestower of liberation and the supreme Brahman. There is no doubt.
iti ca।
And thus.
prītiśca guṇōtkarṣajñānādēva viśēṣatō dr̥ṣṭā। nābhēdajñānāt। abhēdajñānādaprītirēvōttamānāṁ bhavati। ghātayanti hi rājānō rājā’hamiti vadantam। dadati ca sarvamabhiprētaṁ guṇōtkarṣaṁ vadataḥ।
“na tādr̥śī prītirīḍyasya viṣṇōrguṇōtkarṣajñātari yādr̥śī syāt। tatprīṇanānmōkṣamāpnōti sarvastatō vēdāstatparāḥ sarva ēva॥”
No love could be like that of the praiseworthy Viṣṇu toward one who knows the excellence of his qualities. By pleasing him, everyone attains liberation; therefore all the Vedas indeed have him as their purport.
iti sauparṇaśrutiḥ।
Thus says the Sauparṇa Śruti.
“yō māmēvamasammūḍhō jānāti puruṣōttamam। sa sarvavid bhajati māṁ sarvabhāvēna bhārata॥” - bhagavadgītā 15/19
“Whoever, being free from delusion, knows me thus as the Supreme Person—he is a knower of all and worships me with his whole being, O Bhārata.” — Bhagavadgītā 15/19
iti guṇōtkarṣajñānādēva paramā prītirbhagavatā svayamēvābhihitā।
Thus, supreme love has been declared by the Lord himself to arise solely from knowledge of the excellence of the qualities.
atō viṣṇōrguṇōtkarṣa ēva sarvaśrutismr̥tīnāṁ mahātātparyam।
Therefore, the supremacy of Viṣṇu’s qualities alone is the principal purport of all Śruti and Smṛti texts.
nacābhēdē tātparyamityatra kiñcinmānam।
Nor is there any valid means of knowledge for the claim that the purport lies in non-difference.
naca viśēṣaṇaviśēṣyatayā bhēdasiddhiḥ, viśēṣaṇaviśēṣyabhāvaśca bhēdāpēkṣaḥ, dharmipratiyōgyapēkṣayā bhēdasiddhiḥ, bhēdāpēkṣaṁ ca dharmipratiyōgitvam – ityanyōnyāśrayatayā bhēdasyāyuktiḥ। padārthasvarūpatvād bhēdasya।
Nor is difference established through the relation of qualifier and qualificand: the qualifier–qualificand relation depends on difference; difference is established in dependence on a substratum and a counterpositive; and being the substratum and the counterpositive depends on difference. Thus, difference would be untenable because of mutual dependence. But it is not, because difference is the intrinsic nature of an entity.
naca dharmipratiyōgyapēkṣayā bhēdasyāsvarūpatvam। aikyavat svarūpasyaiva tathātvāt।
Nor does difference fail to be the intrinsic nature because of its dependence on the bearer and the counterpositive; for, as in the case of identity, the intrinsic nature itself is dependent in that way.
svarūpasiddhāvapi tadasiddhiśca jīvēśvaraikyaṁ vadataḥ siddhaiva। bhēdastu svarūpadarśana ēva siddhaḥ। prāyaḥ sarvatō vilakṣaṇaṁ hi padārthasvarūpaṁ dr̥śyatē।
Even when intrinsic nature is established, its non-establishment is indeed also established for one who asserts the identity of the individual self and the Lord. Difference, however, is established in the very apprehension of intrinsic nature. For the intrinsic nature of an entity is generally observed to be distinct from everything else.
‘asya bhēdaḥ’ iti tu ‘padārthasya svarūpam’ itivat।
But the expression “its difference” is like “the intrinsic nature of the entity.”
yadi na svarūpaṁ bhēdaḥ, tadā padārthē dr̥ṣṭē prāyaḥ sarvatō vailakṣaṇyaṁ tasya na jñāyēta। ajñātē ca vailakṣaṇyē ātmani ghaṭa ityapi saṁśayaḥ syāt। nahi kaścit tathā saṁśayaṁ karōti।
If difference were not the thing’s own nature, then, when an entity is perceived, its distinctness from almost everything would not be known. And if its distinctness were unknown, there would even be doubt regarding the self: “Is it a pot?” For no one entertains such a doubt.
jñātvaiva prāyaḥ sarvatō vailakṣaṇyaṁ kasmiṁścidēva sadr̥śē saṁśayaṁ karōti। nahyātmani ‘ahaṁ dēvadattō na vā’ iti kasyacit saṁśayō bhavati। sāmānyataḥ sarvavailakṣaṇyē jñāta ēva ghaṭatvādijñānam।
Only after knowing its distinctness from almost everything does one entertain doubt regarding some particular similar thing. For no one has the doubt regarding himself, “Am I Devadatta or not?” Knowledge of potness and the like occurs only when distinctness from everything is known in a general way.
atō nānyōnyāśrayatā।
Therefore, there is no mutual dependence.
naca yugapajjñānānutpattirdōṣaḥ। yathā yugapadēva dīpasahasradarśanē sāmānyataḥ sarvē jñāyanta ēva, tathā syāt।
Nor is the failure of cognition to arise simultaneously a defect. Just as, when a thousand lamps are seen at the very same time, all of them are indeed cognized in a general way, so too it may be here.
ēkasminnēva vastuni viśēṣastairapyaṅgīkr̥ta ēva। “nētinēti” ityatra sarvavailakṣaṇyāṅgīkārāt। viśēṣānaṅgīkārē ca punaruktēḥ। naca ghaṭād vailakṣaṇyamēva paṭād vailakṣaṇyam। anubhavavirōdhāt।
Particularity in one and the same entity is indeed accepted even by them, because in the statement “not this, not this” they accept dissimilarity from everything, and because, if particularity were not accepted, repetition would result. Nor is dissimilarity from a pot identical with dissimilarity from a cloth, since that conflicts with experience.
tasmād bhēdadarśanaṁ yuktamēva।
Therefore, the perception of difference is indeed justified.
yacca pramāṇadr̥ṣṭānāmapi padārthānāṁ mithyātvakalpanaṁ tacca pramāṇaviruddhatvādēva prakāśataskaratvam।
And the supposition of unreality even regarding entities apprehended through a valid means of knowledge is, precisely because it contradicts a valid means of knowledge, daylight robbery.
nahi pramāṇadr̥ṣṭasya tarkabādhyatvam। pratyakṣādiviruddhānāṁ tarkābhāsatvaniyamāt। śuktyādē rajatatvādipratītērapi balavatpratyakṣaviruddhatvādēva bhramatvaṁ na tarkamātrāt। tarkamātrataḥ pratyakṣabādhanē bhūtacatuṣṭayasyābādēḥ pr̥thivītvādr̥ṣṭēḥ pr̥thivyā api pr̥thivītvaṁ na syāt। atō na tarkamātrata ēva dr̥ṣṭasya bhrāntitvaṁ kalpyam।
What is established by a valid means of knowledge is certainly not sublatable by reasoning, since reasonings opposed to perception and the like are invariably fallacious. Even the cognition of silverhood and the like in shell and the like is erroneous precisely because it is opposed to a stronger perception, not because of mere reasoning. If perception were sublated by mere reasoning, then, because earthhood is not observed in the tetrad of elements beginning with water, even earth’s earthhood would not exist. Therefore, what is observed should not be supposed to be erroneous on the basis of mere reasoning alone.
ataḥ sarvabhēdanirāsakatarkasya sarvaśrutismr̥tipratyakṣānumānaviruddhatvānnitarāmābhāsatvam।
Thus, because the reasoning that negates every difference conflicts with all Śruti, Smṛti, perception, and inference, it is utterly specious.
naca paramārthatō bhēdābhāvō vyāvahārikaḥ sō’stīti vācyam। sadasadvailakṣaṇyē pramāṇābhāvāt।
Nor should it be said, “Ultimately there is an absence of difference, but conventionally it exists,” because there is no valid means of knowledge for its distinctness from the existent and the nonexistent.
asataḥ khyātyayōgāditi vadataḥ khyātirabhūt, navā? yadi nābhūt, na tatkhyātinirākaraṇam । yadyabhūt, tathā’pi । nacāsatō vailakṣaṇyaṁ tatpratītiṁ vinā jñāyatē।
Did an appearance of the unreal arise for one who says, “Because an appearance of the unreal is impossible,” or not? If it did not arise, there is no refutation of the appearance of it. If it did arise, even then... Nor is the distinctness of the unreal known without cognition of it.
naca śuktē rajatatvaṁ sadasadvilakṣaṇam । asadēva rajataṁ pratyabhādityanubhavāt। naca pratītatvādasattvābhāvaḥ। asataḥ sattvapratītiḥ satō’sattvapratītirityanyathāpratītērēva bhrāntitvāt। nacāsatō bhrāntāvapi pratītirnāstīti vācyam। anirvacanīyaparamārthatvasyāsata ēva dr̥ṣṭyaṅgīkārāt। naca tadapyanirvācyam। anavasthitēḥ। prathamānirvacanīyāsiddhyā sarvānirvacanīyāsiddhiriti mūlakṣatiḥ। anirvacanīyatvē rajatasyānirvacanīyamidaṁ rajatamiti bādhakajñānamutpadyēta। mithyāśabdastvabhāvavācī। naca sadasadvailakṣaṇyaṁ nāmāstītyatra kiñcinmānam।
Being silver in nacre is not distinct from both the existent and the nonexistent, for the experience is that precisely nonexistent silver appeared. Nor is there an absence of nonexistence merely because it was cognized, since error consists precisely in cognition otherwise: cognition of existence regarding what is nonexistent and cognition of nonexistence regarding what exists. Nor should it be said, “Even in error, there is no cognition of what is nonexistent,” for cognition of the ultimate reality of the indeterminable—which is itself nonexistent—is admitted. Nor is that too indeterminable, because of infinite regress. Through the nonestablishment of the first indeterminable, every indeterminable is unestablished; this is damage at the root. If the silver were indeterminable, the sublating cognition “This silver is indeterminable” would arise. But the word mithyā denotes absence. And there is no valid means of knowledge whatsoever for the claim that there exists something called distinctness from both the existent and the nonexistent.
anubhavavirōdhaśca tatpakṣē। sadasatōrdvayōrēva sarvairanubhūyamānatvāt।
There is also conflict with experience on that position, since both the existent and the nonexistent are indeed experienced by everyone.
atō’nirvacanīyābhāvādasataḥ pratītyanaṅgīkārāt pratīyamānatvācca bhēdasya sattvaprāptērnādvitīyatvaṁ yujyatē।
Thus, because the indefinable is absent, because cognition of what is unreal is not admitted, and because difference is cognized, reality follows for difference; nonduality is not tenable.
kathaṁ ca śrutisiddhō jīvaparamātmabhēdō nirākriyatē। mithyāvāditvē ca śrutēḥ kathamaikyasya satyatvam। kathaṁ caivaṁvādināṁ vēdavāditvam। vēdōktasya mithyātvāṅgīkārādēva hyavēdavāditvaṁ bauddhādīnāmapi।
Moreover, how can the distinction between the individual self and the Supreme Self, established by Śruti, be denied? And if Śruti speaks falsely, how can oneness be true? Moreover, how can those who speak thus be adherents of the Veda? For even the Buddhists and others are non-adherents of the Veda precisely because they accept as false what the Veda states.
atō viṣṇōḥ sarvōttamatva ēva mahātātparyaṁ sarvāgamānām।
Therefore, the principal purport of all scriptures lies solely in Viṣṇu’s supremacy over all.
kathaṁ ca jīvaparamātmaikyē sarvaśrutīnāṁ tātparyaṁ yujyatē। sarvapramāṇaviruddhatvāt।
Moreover, how can it be tenable that the purport of all the śrutis lies in the identity of the individual self and the Supreme Self, since that identity is contradicted by every valid means of knowledge?
tathāhyanubhavavirōdhaḥ। nahyahaṁ sarvajñaḥ sarvēśvarō nirduḥkhō nirdōṣa iti vā kasyacidanubhavaḥ। asti ca tadviparyayēṇānubhavaḥ। naca mithyānubhavō’yam। tadviparītapramāṇābhāvāt।
For thus there is conflict with experience: no one has any experience such as, “I am omniscient, Lord of all, free from suffering, and free from defect.” And there is experience of the contrary. Nor is this a false experience, because there is no valid means of knowledge that contradicts it.
nacābhēdē kaścidāgamaḥ। santi ca bhēdē sarvāgamāḥ। tathāhi –
And there is no scriptural testimony whatsoever in support of non-difference, whereas all scriptural testimonies support difference. For it is as follows:
“atattvamasi” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/5,7,9,11,12,13,14,15,16
“You are not that.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/5,7,9,11,12,13,14,15,16
iti navakr̥tva upadēśaḥ sadr̥ṣṭāntakaḥ।
Thus, the instruction is given nine times, accompanied by an illustrative example.
nacāyamabhēdōpadēśaḥ।
Nor is this a teaching of non-difference.
“sa yathā śakuniḥ sūtrēṇa prabaddhō diśaṁ diśaṁ patitvā’nyatrāyatanamalabdhvā bandhanamēvōpāśrayatē। ” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/2
“Just as a bird, bound by a cord, having flown in every direction and found no resting place elsewhere, takes refuge in the bond itself.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/2
“sanmūlāḥ sōmyēmāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatanāḥ satpratiṣṭhāḥ” - (1),chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/4
“Dear one, all these creatures have Being as their root, Being as their abode, and Being as their foundation.” — (1), Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/4
“yathā sōmya madhu madhukr̥tō nistiṣṭhanti nānātyayānāṁ vr̥kṣāṇāṁ rasānāṁ samavahāramēkatāṁ gamayanti tē yathā tatra na vivēkaṁ labhantē’muṣyāhaṁ vr̥kṣasya rasō’smyamuṣyāhaṁ vr̥kṣasya rasō’smītyēvamēva khalu sōmyēmāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sati sampadya na viduḥ sati sampatsyāmaha iti। ta iha vyāghrō vā siṁhō vā vr̥kō vā varāhō vā kīṭō vā pataṅgō vā daṁśō vā maśakō vā yadyad bhavanti tat tadā bhavanti। ” - (2),chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/6-7
“Just as, dear one, bees produce honey and bring the collected mass of the saps of trees of diverse origins into unity, and just as those saps there do not have the discernment, ‘I am the sap of this tree; I am the sap of that tree,’ just so indeed, dear one, all these creatures, having merged into Being, do not know, ‘We shall merge into Being.’ Whatever they become here—whether a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a boar, a worm, a moth, a gadfly, or a mosquito—that they then become.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/6-7
“imāḥ sōmya nadyaḥ purastāt prācyaḥ syandantē paścāt pratīcyastāssamudrāt samudramēvāpiyanti। sa samudra ēva bhavati। tā yathā tatra na viduriyamahamasmīyamahasmītyēvamēva khalu sōmyēmāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sata āgamya na viduḥ sata āgacchāmaha iti। ta iha vyāghrō vā siṁhō vā vr̥kō vā varāhō vā kīṭō vā pataṅgō vā daṁśō vā maśakō vā yadyad bhavanti tat tadā bhavanti। ” - (3),chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/8-9
“These rivers, dear one—those in the east flow eastward and those in the west westward. They flow from the ocean into the ocean itself. That becomes the ocean itself. Just as they do not know there, ‘I am this one; I am this one,’ in precisely the same way, dear one, all these creatures, having come from Being, do not know, ‘We come from Being.’ Here, whatever they become—whether a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a boar, an insect, a moth, a biting fly, or a mosquito—that they then become.” — (3),Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/8-9
“sa ēṣa jīvēnātmanā’nuprabhūtaḥ pēpīyamānō mōdamānastiṣṭhati। asya yadaikāṁ śākhāṁ jīvō jahātyatha sā śuṣyati। ” - (4),chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/10
This very one, pervaded by the living self, stands drinking abundantly and rejoicing. When the living self leaves one branch of it, that branch then withers. — (4), Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/10
“nyagrōdhaphalamata āharētīdaṁ bhagava iti bhindhīti bhinnaṁ bhagava iti kimatra paśyasītyaṇvya ivēmā dhānā bhagava ityāsāmaṅgaikāṁ bhindhīti bhinnā bhagava iti kimatra paśyasīti na kiñcana bhagava iti। taṁ hōvāca yaṁ vai sōmyaitamaṇimānaṁ na nibhālayasē asya sōmyaiṣō’ṇimna ēvaṁ mahān nyagrōdhastiṣṭhati। ” - (5),chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/12
“Bring a fruit of the banyan tree from there.” “Here it is, venerable sir.” “Split it.” “It is split, venerable sir.” “What do you see in it?” “These seeds are minute, as it were, venerable sir.” “Please split one of them.” “It is split, venerable sir.” “What do you see in it?” “Nothing at all, venerable sir.” Then he said to him, “That subtle essence which, dear one, you do not perceive—from the subtle essence of this, dear one, this banyan tree stands so great.” — (5),Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/12
“lavaṇamētadudakē’vadhāyātha mā prātarupasīdathā iti। taddha tathā cakāra। taṁ hōvāca। yaddōṣā lavaṇamētadudakē avadhā aṅga tadāharēti। taddhāvamr̥śya na vivēda। yathā vilīnamēvāṅgāsyāntādācāmēti। kathamiti। lavaṇamiti। madhyādācāmēti। kathamiti। lavaṇamiti। antyācāmēti। kathamiti। lavaṇamiti। abhiprāsyaitadatha mōpasīdathā iti। taddha tathā cakāra। tacchaśvat saṁvartatē। taṁ hōvācātra vāvakila sat sōmya na nibhālayasē’traiva kilēti। ” - (6),chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/13
“Place this salt in the water, and then approach me in the morning.” He did exactly so. He said to him, “Dear one, bring the salt that you placed in the water last night.” Having felt about for it, he did not find it, since it had completely dissolved. “Dear one, sip from this end of it.” “How is it?” “Salty.” “Sip from the middle.” “How is it?” “Salty.” “Sip from the end.” “How is it?” “Salty.” “Throw this away and then approach me.” He did exactly so. It continues to exist always. He said to him, “Dear one, here indeed you do not perceive Being; it is certainly right here.” — (6),Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/13
“yathā sōmya puruṣaṁ gandhārēbhyō’bhinaddhākṣamānīya taṁ tatō’tijanē visr̥jēt” - (7),chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/14
“Just as, dear one, having brought a man from Gandhāra with his eyes bound, one were then to abandon him in a deserted place...” — (7), Chāndogyopaniṣat 6/3/14
“atha yadā’sya vāṅ manasi sampadyatē manaḥ prāṇē prāṇastējasi tējaḥ parasyāṁ dēvatāyāṁ tāvanna jānāti” - (8),chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/15
“Now, when his speech merges into the mind, the mind into the vital breath, the vital breath into heat, and heat into the supreme deity, then he does not know.” — (8), Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/15
“puruṣaṁ sōmyōta hastagr̥hītamānayantyapahārṣīt stēyamakārṣīt paraśumasmai tapatēti। sa yadi tasya kartā bhavati tata ēvānr̥tamātmānaṁ kurutē। sō’nr̥tābhisandhō’nr̥tēnātmānamantardhāya paraśuṁ taptaṁ pratigr̥hṇāti sa dahyatē’tha hanyatē। atha sa yadi tasyākartā bhavati tata ēva satyamātmānaṁ kurutē। sa satyābhisandhaḥ satyēnātmānamantardhāya paraśuṁ taptaṁ pratigr̥hṇāti sa na dahyatē’tha mucyatē। ”chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/16 “ēvamēva khalu sōmyācāryavān puruṣō vēda” - (9) iti sthānanavakē’pi bhēda ēva dr̥ṣṭāntābhidhānāt। - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/14
“And, dear one, they bring a man who has been seized by the hand, saying, ‘He has stolen; he has committed theft. Heat the axe for him.’ If he is the perpetrator of that, on that very account he makes himself false. Intent upon falsehood, he conceals himself with falsehood and takes hold of the heated axe. He is burned and then put to death. But if he is not the perpetrator of that, on that very account he makes himself true. Intent upon truth, he conceals himself with truth and takes hold of the heated axe. He is not burned and is then released.” — Chāndogyopaniṣat 6/3/16 “In precisely this way, indeed, dear one, a person who has a teacher knows”—(9). Thus, even in the set of nine cases, there is difference alone, because an illustrative example is stated. — Chāndogyopaniṣat 6/3/14
nahi śakunisūtrayōḥ, nānāvr̥kṣarasānām, nadīsamudrayōḥ, jīvavr̥kṣayōḥ, aṇimādhānayōḥ, lavaṇōdakayōḥ, gandhārapuruṣayōḥ, ajñaprāṇādiniyāmakayōḥ, stēnāpahāryayōścaikyam।
For there is certainly no identity between the bird and the cord, among the juices of different trees, between the river and the ocean, between the jīva and the tree, between the subtle essence and the seed, between salt and water, between Gandhāra and the man, between the ignorant person and the controller of prāṇa and the rest, or between the thief and what is stolen.
1.8.2.1.2. nānāvr̥kṣarasadr̥ṣṭāntasya nadīsamudradr̥ṣṭāntasya ca bhēdaparatvasamarthanam
Establishing that the illustration of the juices of various trees and the river-and-ocean illustration are intended to convey difference.
“sati sampadya na viduḥ sati sampatsyāmaha iti ta iha vyāghrō vā siṁhō vā” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/6-7
“Having merged into Being, they do not know, ‘We shall merge into Being.’ They here, whether a tiger or a lion…” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/6-7
iti
Thus.
“sata āgamya na viduḥ sata āgacchāmaha iti ta iha vyāghrō vā siṁhō vā” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/8-9
“Having come from Being, they do not know, ‘We come from Being.’ They—whether here a tiger or a lion—…” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/8-9
iti bhēdāparijñānēnānarthavacanācca।
And because it thus declares misfortune as resulting from non-recognition of difference.
nahi gr̥hādāgatasya gr̥hē praviṣṭasya ca tadaikyam।
For one who has come from the house and entered the house is not thereby identical with it.
“tāḥ samudrāt samudramēvāpiyanti sa samudra ēva bhavati” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/8
“Those rivers flow from the ocean into the ocean itself; that remains the ocean itself.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/8
ityatrāpi bhēda ēvōcyatē। anyathā, ‘tāḥ samudra ēva bhavanti’ iti vyapadēśaḥ syāt। atō nadyaḥ samudrādāgacchanti taṁ praviśanti ca, samudrastu sa ēva, naitāsāṁ samudratvaṁ bhavatītyarthaḥ। nahi bhinnānāṁ nadījalaparamāṇūnāṁ sāmudrāṇubhiraikyaṁ yujyatē। tathāsati mahājanasamitau praviṣṭānāṁ dvitrāṇāṁ tadaikyaṁ syāt। naca tad yujyatē। bhēdēnānubhavāt।
Here too, difference alone is stated. Otherwise, the statement would be, “They become the ocean itself.” Accordingly, the meaning is that the rivers come from the ocean and enter it, while the ocean remains that same ocean; oceanhood does not arise for these rivers. For the identity of the distinct atoms of river water with oceanic atoms is not tenable. If that were so, two or three persons entering a large assembly of people would become identical with that assembly. And that is not tenable, because they are experienced as distinct.
“svaṁ hyapītō bhavati” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/1
“For he becomes absorbed into his own self.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/1
ityatrāpi।
Here too, in this quoted statement…
sva iti paramātmanō’bhidhānam।
The word “sva” is a designation of the Supreme Self.
“svātmanā cōttarayōḥ” - brahmasūtram 2/3/21
“And by the Supreme Self in the latter two.” — Brahmasūtra 2/3/21
iti sūtrāt।
Thus, from the sūtra.
“svātantryāt sva iti prōkta ātmā’yaṁ cātatatvataḥ। brahmāyaṁ guṇapūrṇatvāt bhagavān viṣṇuravyayaḥ॥”
Because of his independence, this one is called “the independent one,” and because of being all-pervasive, “the Self.” Because of fullness in qualities, this imperishable Bhagavān Viṣṇu is Brahman.
iti paramōpaniṣadi।
Thus, in the Paramopaniṣad.
apīta ityapi pravēśamātram। ‘svam’ iti dvitīyānirdēśāt। ēkībhāvavivakṣāyāṁ ‘svēna’ iti nirdēśaḥ syāt।
The expression “has entered” also denotes mere entry, because “one’s own” is specified in the accusative. If becoming one were intended, the wording would be “with one’s own.”
“svaṁ kulāyaṁ yathā’pītaḥ pakṣī syādēvamīśvaram। apyēti jīvaḥ prasvāpē muktau cānyō’pi san sadā॥”
“Just as a bird would have entered its own nest, so the jīva enters the Lord in deep sleep and in liberation, even while always remaining distinct.”
iti ca।
And thus:
“ēvamēva khalu sōmya ētanmanō diśaṁ diśaṁ patitvā’nyatrāyatanamalabdhvā prāṇamēvōpāśrayatē” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/2
“Just so indeed, dear one, this individual self, having flown in every direction and not found a resting place elsewhere, takes refuge in the Supreme Self alone.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/2
ityatrāpi mana iti jīvaḥ prāṇa iti paramātmā।
Here too, in the quoted passage, “mind” means the individual self, and “prāṇa” means the Supreme Self.
“yatrāyaṁ puruṣaḥ svapiti nāma” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/1
“When this person is said to sleep.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/1
iti tayōrēva prastutatvāt।
This is so because those two alone are under discussion.
“mananānmana uddiṣṭaḥ pudgalō nirayaṁ giran। karmānuśayanāccaiva saṁsāryanuśayī smr̥taḥ॥”
Because of thinking, the pudgala, swallowing hell, is designated “mind”; and precisely because of the persistence of karma, the transmigrating being is known as “anuśayin.”
iti ca paramōpaniṣadi।
Thus also in the Parama Upaniṣad.
“prāṇaḥ praṇayanādēṣa sādhutvāt san hariḥ smr̥taḥ”
This Hari is known as Prāṇa because he leads forth, and as the Good One because of his goodness.
iti ca।
And thus.
“sanmūlāḥ sōmyēmāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatanāḥ satpratiṣṭhāḥ“ - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/3
“O gentle one, all these beings are rooted in Being, have Being as their abode, and have Being as their foundation.” — Chāndogyopaniṣad 6/3/3
ityatrāpi bhēda ēva pratīyatē।
Here too, difference is indeed apprehended.
“sraṣṭr̥tvādāśrayatvācca muktānāṁ ca pratiprati। sthāpanācca vibhurviṣṇuranyaḥ saṁsāriṇō mataḥ॥”
Because he is the creator and the substratum, and because he establishes each of the liberated individually, the all-pervading Viṣṇu is held to be distinct from the transmigrating being.
iti ca।
And thus.
“anēna jīvēnātmanā’nupraviśya nāmarūpē vyākaravāṇi” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/2/2
“Having entered by means of this living self, may I differentiate name and form.” — Chandogya Upanishad 6/2/2
iti
Thus.
“sa ēṣa jīvēnātmanā’nuprabhūtaḥ pēpīyamānō mōdamānastiṣṭhati” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/10
“This very one, animated by the jīva-self, remains drinking deeply and rejoicing.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/10
ityatrāpi jīvaśabdēna paramātmā’bhihitaḥ।
Here too, the Supreme Self is denoted by the word jīva.
“jīva iti bhagavatō’niruddhasyākhyā”
“Jīva” is a name of the Lord Aniruddha.
iti śrutēḥ।
Thus, according to the śruti statement.
“viṣṇurjīva iti prōktaḥ satataṁ prāṇadhāraṇāt। sa praviśya śarīraṁ ca sthāvaraṁ jaṅgamaṁ tathā। mahābhūtāni ca vibhustrivr̥tkaraṇapūrvakam। saṁsāriṇaṁ bhrāmayati sadaivānyatvalakṣaṇam। tēnāyaṁ mōdatē nityaṁ vr̥kṣāvasthāṁ gatō’pi san॥”
“Viṣṇu is called jīva because he constantly sustains the vital breath. Having entered stationary and moving bodies, as well as the gross elements, following triplication, he, the all-pervading one, always causes the transmigrating being, characterized by otherness, to wander. Through him this one perpetually rejoices, even while in the state of a tree.”
iti ca।
And thus.
“tat tēja aikṣata” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/2/1
“That fire deliberated.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/2/1
“tā āpa aikṣanta” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/2/1
“Those waters thought.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/2/1
“imāstisrō dēvatāḥ” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/2/2
“These three deities.” — Chāndogyopaniṣat 6/2/2
iti pūrvamēva cētanatvasiddhēḥ
Since sentience has already been established earlier by these words...
“anēna jīvēnātmanā” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/2/2
“With this living self.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/2/2
iti saṁsāriṇaḥ punaḥ pravēśō na yuktaḥ। atastatra jīvaśabdēna paramātmaivābhihitaḥ।
Thus, the transmigrating self’s entering again is not tenable. Therefore, in that passage, the word jīva denotes the Supreme Self alone.
“jīvēnātmanā’nuprabhūtaḥ pēpīyamānō mōdamānastiṣṭhati” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/10
“Pervaded throughout by the living Self, he remains, drinking deeply and rejoicing.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/10
ityatrāpi jīvaśabdōditaḥ para ēva। pēpīyamānō mōdamānastu saṁsārī। nahi cētanādanyasya mōdabhōgādikaṁ yujyatē-
Here too, the Supreme alone is denoted by the word jīva. But the one drinking deeply and rejoicing is the transmigrating being. For delight, experience, and the like are not applicable to anything other than a conscious being.
“sukhasya cāpyāyatanaṁ śarīraṁ duḥkhasya cāpyāyatanaṁ śarīram। acētanaṁ prākr̥tamētadāhurbhōktā tayōścētanakaḥ śarīrī॥” - bhāratam 12/173/22
“The body is an abode of pleasure, and the body is also an abode of pain. They say that this is insentient and constituted of prakṛti; the experiencer of both is the conscious, embodied being.” — Bhārata 12/173/22
iti ca bhāratē।
Thus also in the Mahābhārata.
“jīvāpētaṁ vāva kilēdaṁ mriyatē na jīvō mriyatē” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/11
“Deprived of the Jīva, this indeed surely dies; the Jīva does not die.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/11
ityatrāpi jīvaśabdaḥ parē। nahi saṁsāriṇō mukhyataḥ prāṇadhārakatvaṁ yujyatē।
Here too, the word jīva denotes the Supreme. For being the sustainer of prāṇa in the primary sense is not tenable for the transmigrating soul.
“brahmaṇā tyaktadēhastu mr̥ta ityucyatē naraḥ” - bhāratam 14/17/23
“A man whose body has been abandoned by Brahman, however, is called ‘dead.’” — Bhārata 14/17/23
iti ca।
And thus.
“yaṁ vai sōmyaitamaṇimānaṁ na nibhālāyasē’sya sōmyaiṣō’ṇimna ēvaṁ mahān nyagrōdhastiṣṭhati” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/12
“Indeed, dear one, this subtle essence which you do not perceive—from its subtle essence, dear one, this great banyan tree stands thus.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/12
ityatrāpi aṇimaśabdēna para ēvābhihitaḥ।
In this passage too, the Supreme alone is denoted by the word aṇiman.
“sa ēṣō’ṇimaitadātmyamidaṁ sarvaṁ tat satyam sa ātmā’tattvamasi śvētakētō” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/12
“He is this subtle one. All this has this as its Self. That is real. He is the Self. You are not that, Śvetaketu.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/12
ityuktatvācca।
And because it is stated thus.
dhānāsu tu
But in the grains …
“aṇvya ivēmā dhānā” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/12
“These grains are as though minute.” — Chāndogyopaniṣat 6/3/12
iti strīliṅgaprayōgādivaśabdaprayōgācca nāṇimatvam। naca tā na nibhālayasē।
Thus, because of the use of the feminine gender and because of the use of the word iva, there is no minuteness. Nor is it the case that you do not perceive them.
aitadātmyamityētadīyam।
“The condition of having this as its self” means “that which belongs to this.”
“sa ātmā” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/5-16
“That is the Self.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/5-16
ityātmaśabdastu para ēva।
Thus, however, the word “ātman” refers exclusively to the Supreme.
“dyubhvādyāyatanaṁ svaśabdāt” - brahmasūtram 1/3/1
“The abode of heaven, earth, and the rest is Brahman, because of the word ‘Self.’” — Brahma Sūtra 1/3/1
“nānumānamatacchabdāt” - brahmasūtram 1/3/3
It is not that which is inferred, because no word denotes it. — Brahma-sūtra 1/3/3
“prāṇabhr̥cca” - brahmasūtram 1/3/4
“Nor the bearer of vital breath.” — Brahmasūtra 1/3/4
ityatra
Here, with regard to this passage...
“tamēvaikaṁ jānatha ātmānam” - ātharvaṇōpaniṣat 2/2/6
“Know him alone as the one Self.” — Ātharvaṇopaniṣat 2/2/6
iti svaśabdaparyāyātmaśabdānna prakr̥tijīvāvabhidhīyētē, kintu para ēvēti bhagavatā vyāsēnābhihitam। ata ātmaśabdastasminnēva mukhyaḥ।
Thus, because the term ātman is synonymous with the word sva, prakṛti and the individual self are not denoted, but rather the Supreme alone is denoted—so Bhagavān Vyāsa has stated. Therefore, the term ātman applies primarily to him alone.
“ātatatvācca mātr̥tvādātmēti paramō hariḥ। ātmābhāsāstadanyē yē nahyētēṣāṁ tatā guṇāḥ॥”
Supreme Hari is called the Self because he is all-pervasive and because he is the maker. Those who are other than him are semblances of the Self, for such qualities do not belong to them.
iti paramōpaniṣadi।
Thus, in the Parama Upaniṣad.
“tējaḥ parasyāṁ dēvatāyāṁ tāvanna jānāti” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/15
“For so long as the vital heat is in the supreme deity, he does not know.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/3/15
ityatra ca yadā’sya prāṇādīn parō grasati tadā na jānāti, yadā dadāti tadā jānātīti tadvaśatvamēvōktam।
And here, what is stated is precisely his being under His control: when the Supreme absorbs his vital breath and the other faculties, he does not know; when He gives them, he knows.
“yadā prāṇān dadātīśastadā cētanakō’khilam। jānāti grastakaraṇastēna vētti na kiñcana॥”
When the Lord gives the vital powers, then the sentient being knows everything; with his faculties swallowed up by Him, he knows nothing at all.
iti ca।
And thus.
“apahārṣīt stēyamakārṣīt” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/3/16
“He stole it; he committed theft.” — Chāndogyopaniṣad 6/3/16
ityatra cānyābhimatasyaiva vastunō’pahāryatvād bhēda ēvāyaṁ dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ। anyaṁ santaṁ paramātmānaṁ svayamiti manyamānaḥ stēna ēvēti। nahi svakīyaṁ parityajaṁstēnō bhavati।
And here, since only an entity regarded as belonging to another can be stolen, this illustration is indeed one of difference. One who considers the Supreme Self, who is other than himself, to be himself is indeed a thief—such is the point. For one does not become a thief by abandoning what is one’s own.
“aikātmyaṁ nāma yadidaṁ kēcid brūyuranaipuṇāḥ। śāstratattvamavijñāyatathāvādabalā janāḥ। kāmakrōdhābhibhūtatvādahaṅkāravaśaṁ gatāḥ। yāthātathyamavijñāya śāstrāṇāṁ śāstradasyavaḥ। brahmastēnā nirānandā apakvamanasō’śivāḥ। vaiguṇyamēva paśyanti na guṇāni niyuñjatē। tēṣāṁ tamaḥśarīrāṇāṁ tama ēva parāyaṇam। ” - bhāratam 12/275/51-54
“Some unskilled people might proclaim this so-called identity of self—people whose strength lies in speaking thus, not having understood the truth of scripture; having come under the sway of egoism because they are overwhelmed by desire and anger; not having understood the true nature of the scriptures, robbers of scripture, thieves of Brahman, devoid of bliss, immature-minded, and inauspicious. They see deficiency alone and do not apply themselves to virtues. For those whose bodies consist of darkness, darkness alone is the ultimate destination.” — Bhāratam 12/275/51-54
“yataḥ svarūpataścānyō jātitaḥ śrutitō’rthataḥ। kathamasmi sa ityēva sambandhaḥ syādasaṁhitaḥ॥” - bhāratam 12/220/36
“Since he is distinct in intrinsic nature, in kind, according to scripture, and in import, and is unconnected, how could there be a relation precisely in the form ‘I am he’?” — Bhārata 12/220/36
iti mōkṣadharmē।
Thus, in the Mokṣadharma.
“yathā pakṣī ca sūtraṁ ca nānāvr̥kṣarasā yathā। yathā nadyaḥ samudraśca śuddhōdalavaṇē yathā। yathā cōrāpahāryau ca yathā puṁviṣayāvapi। tathā jīvēśvarau bhinnau sarvadaiva vilakṣaṇau। tathā’pi sūkṣmarūpatvānna jīvāt paramō hariḥ। bhēdēna mandadr̥ṣṭīnāṁ dr̥śyatē prērakō’pi san। vailakṣaṇyaṁ tayōrjñātvā mucyatē badhyatē’nyathā॥”
Just as a bird and a cord, just as the saps of various trees, just as rivers and the ocean, just as pure water and salt, just as a thief and what is to be stolen, and just as a person and an object, so the jīva and the Lord are different and indeed always dissimilar. Even so, because of his subtle form, Hari, though superior to the jīva and being the impeller, is not perceived as distinct by those of dull vision. Knowing the dissimilarity between the two, one is liberated; otherwise, one is bound.
iti ca paramōpaniṣadi।
And thus it is stated in the Paramopaniṣad.
“prērakaḥ sarvajīvānāṁ prāṇadhīcōditā ca saḥ। viṣṇuḥ saṁsāriṇō’nyō yastamavijñāya mūḍhadhīḥ। dēhēndriyaprāṇabuddhinētr̥tvaṁ manyatē tmanaḥ। ataḥ saṁsārapadavīṁ yāti jīvēśayōḥ sadā। vailakṣaṇyaṁ paraṁ jñātvā mucyatē badhyatē’nyathā॥”
“He is the impeller of all individual selves and the prompter of vital breath and intellect—Viṣṇu, who is distinct from the transmigrating self. Not knowing him, one of deluded intellect considers the direction of body, senses, vital breath, and intellect to belong to himself. Therefore, he always follows the path of transmigration. Having known the supreme distinctness between the individual self and the Lord, he is liberated; otherwise, he is bound.”
iti ca।
And thus.
“sarvān vēdānadhītya mahāmanā anūcānamānī stabdha ēyāya” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/1/1
“Having studied all the Vedas, he returned proud, regarding himself as learned, and arrogant.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/1/1
iti, ātmanō’nyamanūcānatvādiguṇapradaṁ paramavijñāya stabdhasya parādhīnatvajñāpanēna stabdhatāṁ nirasya tanniṣṭhā hyatrōpadiśyatē।
Thus, by making the arrogant man, who did not know the Supreme—other than himself and the bestower of qualities such as learnedness—understand his dependence on the Supreme, and by dispelling his arrogance, firm establishment in Him is indeed taught here.
“taddhaika āhurasadēvēdamagra āsīt” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/2/1
“Regarding that, some indeed say: ‘In the beginning, this was non-being alone.’” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/2/1
ityādi vādiprasiddhamapi nirākriyatē।
Even what is accepted among its proponents in this and similar statements is refuted.
“iṣṭāpūrtaṁ manyamānā variṣṭhaṁ nānyacchrēyō vēdayantē pramūḍhāḥ” - ātharvaṇōpaniṣat 1/2/10
“Considering sacrificial and charitable works to be the highest, the utterly deluded know no other higher good.” — Ātharvaṇopaniṣat 1/2/10
ityādivacchrutitātparyāparijñānaprāptaṁ ca। darśitaṁ ca
And this too, as in passages such as this, is arrived at through failure to understand the purport of scripture. And it is also shown…
“aikātmyaṁ nāma yadidaṁ kēcid brūyuranaipuṇāḥ” - bhāratam 12/275/51
“This which some unskilled persons might call ‘oneness of self.’” — Bhāratam 12/275/51
iti।
Thus.”
tadvaśatvajñāpanārthaṁ ca
and for the purpose of making known that subjection to it...
“sadēva sōmyēdamagra āsīt” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/2/1
“In the beginning, dear one, this was Being alone.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/2/1
ityādi sr̥ṣṭikathanam।
An account of creation beginning with this.
ēkavijñānēna sarvavijñānaṁ ca prādhānyāt, kiñcitsādr̥śyāt, kāraṇatvācca।
And knowledge of all through knowledge of one is due to primacy, to some similarity, and to being the cause.
natu tadanyasya mithyātvāt। nahi satyajñānēna mithyājñānaṁ bhavati। nahi śuktijñō rajatajña ityucyatē। virōdhāt tayōrjñānayōḥ – nēdaṁ rajatamityarajatajñō hi śuktijñō bhavati, rajatajñaścēnna śuktijñaḥ। nahi tajjñastadabhāvajñō bhavati। tadabhāvasya tajjñānapūrvakatvaṁ cānyatra tasya sattvādēva dr̥ṣṭam। tadanaṅgīkārē tadēva na yujyatē।
But not because what is other than that is false. For false cognition does not arise from true cognition. A cognizer of shell is not said to be a cognizer of silver, because those two cognitions are opposed: a cognizer of shell is indeed a cognizer of non-silver, judging, “This is not silver”; and if one is a cognizer of silver, one is not a cognizer of shell. For one who cognizes something is not one who cognizes its absence. Moreover, the fact that its absence is preceded by cognition of it is observed solely because it exists elsewhere. If that is not accepted, that very thing is untenable.
pradhānajñānādapradhānasya jñātavad vyapadēśō’styēva। yathā pradhānapuruṣāṇāṁ jñānāhvānanāśanaiḥ ‘grāmō jñātaḥ, āhūtaḥ, nāśitaḥ’ iti vyapadēśaḥ। kāraṇē ca pitari jñātē ‘putrō jñātaḥ’ iti, ‘jānāmyēnamasya putrō’yam’ iti vyapadēśa iti। ēvamatrāpi, ‘ētatsr̥ṣṭaṁ sarvam’ ityādi। sādr̥śyāccaikastrījñānādanyastrījñānamiti।
There is indeed designation of what is non-principal as though it were known, from knowledge of the principal. For example, through knowing, summoning, and destroying the principal men, there is the designation, “The village is known, summoned, and destroyed.” And when the father, who is the cause, is known, there is the designation, “The son is known”—“I know this man; this is his son.” Likewise here too: “All this is created,” and so forth. And owing to similarity, there is knowledge of another woman from knowledge of one woman.
tadēva sādr̥śyamatrāpi vivakṣitam
That very similarity is intended here too.
“yathā sōmyaikēna mr̥tpiṇḍēna sarvaṁ mr̥ṇmayaṁ vijñātaṁ syāt” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/1/2
“Just as, dear one, by one lump of clay everything made of clay would be known.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/1/2
ityādinā।
By this and similar passages.
anyathaikaśabdaḥ piṇḍaśabdaśca vyarthaḥ syāt। mr̥dā vijñātayētyētāvatā pūrṇatvāt। nahyēkamr̥tpiṇḍātmakānyanyamr̥ṇmayāni। sādr̥śyamēva hi tēṣām।
Otherwise, the word “one” and the word “lump” would be pointless, since the statement would be complete with merely “with clay being known.” For other clay objects are not constituted by the one lump of clay; indeed, there is only similarity among them.
“yathā sōmyaikēna lōhamaṇinā sarvaṁ lōhamayaṁ vijñātaṁ syāt” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/1/3
“Just as, dear one, by a single lump of copper, everything made of copper would be known.” — Chāndogyopaniṣad 6/1/3
“yathā sōmyaikēna nakhanikr̥ntanēna sarvaṁ kārṣṇāyasaṁ vijñātaṁ syāt” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/1/4
“Just as, dear one, through one nail-cutter, everything made of black iron would become known.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/1/4
ityādikamapi vyarthaṁ syāt। nahyēkamaṇyātmakamanyallōhamayam। nacaikanakhanikr̥ntanātmakaṁ sarvaṁ kārṣṇāyasam।
This and similar statements too would be pointless. For one thing is not constituted by another, while the other is made of iron. Nor is all black iron constituted by a single nail-cutter.
“vācā’’rambhaṇaṁ vikārō nāmadhēyaṁ mr̥ttikētyēva satyam” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 6/1/2,3,4
“A modification is the basis for names in speech; the designation is indeed ‘clay’—this statement is true.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6/1/2,3,4
ityatra, vācā = nāmnām ārambhaṇaṁ vikāraḥ, avikr̥taṁ nityaṁ nāmadhēyaṁ mr̥ttikētyēva, ityētadvacanaṁ satyamiti śrutyarthaḥ। naca vācārambhaṇaśabdō’pi mithyātvē prasiddhaḥ। vācārambhaṇamātramiti cāśrutakalpanam। tasmin pakṣē nāmadhēyaśabda itiśabdaśca vyarthaḥ syāt।
Here, a modification is the basis for names through speech, while the permanent, unmodified designation is precisely “clay.” The meaning of the śruti is that this statement is true. Nor is even the expression “speech-based” established in the sense of falsity. And the phrase “merely speech-based” is a supposition not stated in the śruti. On that position, the word “designation” and the word iti would be pointless.
atō na kutrāpi jagatō mithyātvamucyatē।
Therefore, the falsity of the world is not stated anywhere.
“kavirmanīṣī paribhūḥ svayambhūryāthātathyatō’rthān vyadadhācchāśvatībhyaḥ samābhyaḥ” - īśāvāsyōpaniṣat 8
“The seer, the thinker, the one who surpasses all, the self-existent, ordered the objects in accordance with their true nature for eternal ages.” — Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad 8
“yaccikēta satyamit tanna mōghaṁ vasu spārhamuta jētōta dātā” - r̥gvēdasaṁhitā 10/55/6
“What he has discerned is indeed true; that is not vain. He is both the winner and the giver of desirable wealth.” — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 10/55/6
“viśvaṁ satyaṁ maghavānā yuvōridāpaścana praminanti vrataṁ vām” - r̥gvēdasaṁhitā 2/24/12
“All that is true, O bounteous pair, is indeed yours; not even the waters violate your ordinance.” — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 2/24/12
“pra ghā nvasya mahatō mahāni satyā satyasya karaṇāni vōcam” - r̥gvēdasaṁhitā 2/15/1
“Now indeed I shall proclaim the great, true deeds of this great one, of the true one.” — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 2/15/1
“anādyanantaṁ jagadētadīdr̥k pravartatē nātra vicāryamasti। nacānyathā kvāpi ca kasya cēdamabhūt purā nāpi tathā bhaviṣyat॥“,
This world, such as it is, beginningless and endless, continues; there is nothing here to deliberate. Nor was it ever otherwise, anywhere or for anyone, in the past, nor will it be so in the future.
"asatyamāhurjagadētadajñāḥ śaktiṁ harēryē na viduḥ parāṁ hi। yaḥ satyarūpaṁ jagadētadīdr̥k sr̥ṣṭvā tvabhūt satyakarmā mahātmā॥”,
The ignorant who do not know Hari’s supreme power indeed call this world unreal. But the great-souled one who, having created this world of such a kind, real in nature, became one whose deed is real.
“asatyamapratiṣṭhaṁ tē jagadāhuranīśvaram। aparasparasambhūtaṁ kimanyat kāmahaitukam। ētāṁ dr̥ṣṭimavaṣṭabhya naṣṭātmānō’lpabuddhayaḥ। prabhavantyugrakarmāṇaḥ kṣayāya jagatō’hitāḥ॥” - bhagavadgītā 16/8-9
“They say that the world is unreal, without foundation, without a Lord, and not arisen through mutual causation—what else could it be but caused by desire? Holding fast to this view, those whose selves are ruined and whose understanding is slight come forth, performing fierce deeds, hostile to the world and bent on its destruction.” — Bhagavad Gītā 16/8-9
ityādēśca।
and of passages beginning in this way...
“anityatvavikāritvapāratantryādirūpataḥ। svapnādisāmyaṁ jagatō natu bōdhanivartyatā। sarvajñasya yatō viṣṇōḥ sarvadaitat pratīyatē। bōdhāsahaṁ tatō naitat kintvājñāvaśamasya hi॥”
The world resembles dreams and the like in respect of impermanence, susceptibility to modification, dependence, and similar characteristics, but not in being dispelled by cognition. For, because all this is always cognized by omniscient Viṣṇu, it is not incompatible with cognition; rather, it is indeed subject to his command.
iti paramōpaniṣadi।
Thus, in the Parama Upaniṣad.
“prajñāvinirmitaṁ yasmādatō māyāmayaṁ jagat। anēnānugataṁ yasmādanr̥taṁ tēna kathyatē। bōdhānivartyamapi tu nityamēva pravāhataḥ। a ityuktaḥ parō dēvastēna satyamidaṁ jagat। tadadhīnasvarūpatvādasatyaṁ tēna kathyatē। satyasya satyaḥ sa vibhurindracāpasya sūryavat॥”
Since the world is fashioned by intelligence, it is therefore made of māyā. Since it is pervaded by him, it is for that reason called untrue. Yet it is not sublatable by cognition and is indeed eternal in respect of continuity. The supreme deity is designated by the syllable “a”; through him this world is real. Because its nature is dependent on him, it is for that reason called not real. He, the all-pervading one, is the reality of the real, as the sun is of the rainbow.
iti ca।
And thus.
“tasyōpaniṣat satyasya satyamiti॥prāṇā vai satyaṁ tēṣāmēṣa satyam॥” - br̥hadāraṇyakōpaniṣat 4/1/20
“Its secret designation is ‘the Truth of truth.’ The vital breaths are indeed truth; this is their truth.” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4/1/20
iti ca।
And thus.
“mahāmāyētyavidyēti niyatirmōhinīti ca। prakr̥tirvāsanētyēvaṁ tavēcchā’nanta kathyatē॥”,
Your will, O Infinite One, is thus called “Mahāmāyā,” “Avidyā,” “Niyati,” “Mohinī,” “Prakṛti,” and “Vāsanā.”
“prakr̥tiḥ prakr̥ṣṭakaraṇād vāsanā vāsayēd yataḥ। a ityuktō haristasya vidyā’vidyēti sañjñitā। māyētyuktā prakr̥ṣṭatvāt prakr̥ṣṭaṁ hi mayābhidham॥viṣṇōḥ prajñaptirēvaikā śabdairētairudīryatē। prajñaptirūpō hi hariḥ sā ca svānandalakṣaṇā॥”
She is Prakṛti because of excellent activity and Vāsanā because she causes to dwell. Hari is denoted by “A”; his knowledge is designated “Avidyā.” She is called Māyā because of excellence, for what is excellent is called maya. The one consciousness of Viṣṇu alone is expressed by these words. For Hari is of the nature of consciousness, and that consciousness is characterized by his own bliss.
iti ca।
And thus also.
“sarvē vēdā harērbhēdaṁ sarvasmājjñāpayanti hi। bhēdaḥ svātantryasārvajñasarvaiśvaryādikaśca saḥ। svarūpamēva bhēdō’yaṁ vyāvr̥ttiśca svarūpatā। sarvavyāvr̥ttayē yasmāt svaśabdō’yaṁ prayujyatē। sarvavyāvr̥ttatāmēva nētinētyādikā śrutiḥ। viṣṇōratō vadēdanyā api sarvā na saṁśayaḥ॥”
All the Vedas indeed make known Hari’s difference from everything. That difference consists of independence, omniscience, lordship over all, and other such attributes. This difference is the essential nature itself, and being an essential nature is exclusion from others, since the word sva is used to exclude everything. The Śruti beginning “not this, not this” states precisely Viṣṇu’s distinctness from everything. Therefore, every other Śruti too would state it, without doubt.
iti nārāyaṇaśrutiḥ।
Thus says the Nārāyaṇa Śruti.
“ahaṁ brahmāsmi” - br̥hadāraṇyakōpaniṣat 3/5/4
“I am Brahman.” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3/5/4
“tadyō’haṁ sō’sau yō’sau sō’ham” - aitarēyāraṇyakam 2/2/4
“Thus, he who is I is that one yonder; he who is that one yonder is I.” — Aitareya Āraṇyaka 2/2/4
“yō’sāvādityē puruṣaḥ sō’hamasmi sa ēvāhamasmi” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 4/3/2
“I am that person who is in the sun; I am indeed he.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 4/3/2
ityādi tvantaryāmyapēkṣayā।
This and similar statements, however, are with reference to the Inner Controller.
“sa yaścāyaṁ puruṣē yaścāsāvādityē sa ēkaḥ” - taittirīyōpaniṣat 2/8
“He who is here in the person and he who is there in the sun—he is one.” — Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2/8
“a iti brahma tatrāgatamahamiti” - aitarēyāraṇyakam 2/3/8
“The syllable ‘A’ is Brahman; ‘aham’ occurs there.” — Aitareya Āraṇyaka 2/3/8
“tasyōpaniṣadahamiti” - br̥hadāraṇyakōpaniṣat 7/7/2
“Its secret designation is ‘I.’” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 7/7/2
“ahaṁnāmā harirnityamahēyatvāt prakīrtitaḥ। tvaṁ cāsau pratiyōgitvāt parōkṣatvāt sa ityapi। sarvāntaryāmiṇi harāvasmacchabdavibhaktayaḥ। yuṣmacchabdagatāścaiva sarvāstacchabdagā api। sarvaśabdagatāścaiva vacanānyakhilānyapi। svatantratvāt pravartantē vyāvr̥ttē’pyakhilāt sadā। tatsambandhāt tu jīvēṣu tatsambandhādacitsvapi। vartanta upacārēṇa tiṅpadānyakhilānyapi। tasmāt sarvagatō viṣṇurēkō bhicca tatō bahuḥ॥”
Hari is always proclaimed as bearing the name “I,” because he cannot be relinquished. That same one is also “you” because he is the correlate, and “he” because he is beyond perception. All the inflected forms of the word denoting “I,” all those belonging to the word denoting “you,” those belonging to the word denoting “he,” those occurring in every word, and all grammatical numbers apply to Hari, the inner controller of all, because of his independence, although he is always distinct from everything. But in living beings, because of relation to him, and in insentient entities too, because of relation to him, all finite verbal forms operate by secondary usage. Therefore Viṣṇu is all-pervading, one, the differentiator, and consequently manifold.
iti nārāyaṇaśrutiḥ।
Thus says the Nārāyaṇa Śruti.
“sarvabhūtēṣu yēnaikaṁ bhāvamavyayamīkṣatē। avibhaktaṁ vibhaktēṣu tajjñānaṁ viddhi sāttvikam॥” - bhagavadgītā 18/20
“Know as sāttvic that knowledge by which one sees in all beings the one imperishable being, undivided among the divided.” — Bhagavad Gītā 18/20
iti bhagavadvacanam।
Thus states the Lord.
nacāsatyō bhēdaḥ।
And difference is not unreal.
“satyamēnamanu viśvē madanti rātiṁ dēvasya gr̥ṇatō maghōnaḥ” - r̥gvēdasaṁhitā 4/17/5
“Truly, all rejoice along with him at Maghavan’s bounty for one who praises the god.” — Ṛgvedasaṃhitā 4/17/5
“satyaḥ sō asya mahimā gr̥ṇē śavō yajñēṣu viprarājyē” - r̥gvēdasaṁhitā 8/3/4
“That greatness of his is true; I proclaim his might at sacrifices, in the inspired poet’s sovereignty.” — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 8/3/4
“satya ātmā satyō jīvaḥ satyaṁ bhidā satyaṁ bhidā satyaṁ bhidā। maivāruvaṇyō maivāruvaṇyō maivāruvaṇyaḥ”,
The Self is real; the individual self is real; difference is real, difference is real, difference is real. It must certainly not be gainsaid, it must certainly not be gainsaid, it must certainly not be gainsaid.
“ātmā hi paramasvatantraḥ sarvavit sarvaśaktiḥ paramasukhaḥ paramō jīvastu tadvaśō’lpajñō’lpaśaktirārtō’lpakaḥ”
“The Self indeed is supremely independent, all-knowing, possessed of all power, supremely blissful, and supreme; but the individual self is under his control, of little knowledge, of little power, afflicted, and small”—thus.
ityādiśrutibhyaḥ।
From revealed texts such as these.
nacāvāntarasatyatvamidam।
Nor is this an intermediate order of reality.
“yō vēda nihitaṁ guhāyāṁ paramē vyōman। sō’śnutē sarvān kāmān sahabrahmaṇā vipaścitā” - taittirīyōpaniṣat 2/1
“He who knows that which is hidden in the cave, in the highest space, enjoys all objects of desire together with the all-knowing Brahman.” — Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2/1
“ētamānandamayamātmānamupasaṅkramya। imān lōkān kāmānnī kāmarūpyanusañcaran। ētat sāma gāyannāstē” - taittirīyōpaniṣat 3/10
“Having attained this self consisting of bliss, traversing these worlds, eating food at will and assuming forms at will, he remains singing this Sāman chant.” — Taittirīya Upaniṣad 3/10
“r̥cāṁ tvaḥ pōṣamāstē pupuṣvān gāyatraṁ tvō gāyati śakvarīṣu। brahmā tvō vadati jātavidyāṁ yajñasya mātrāṁ vimimīta u tvaḥ॥” - r̥gvēdasaṁhitā 10/71/11
“One sits amid the flourishing of the ṛc verses, having fully flourished; another sings a Gāyatra chant among the Śakvarī verses. Another, the Brahman priest, speaks the knowledge of origins, while yet another measures out the measure of the sacrifice.” — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 10/71/11
“parañjyōtirupasampadya svēna rūpēṇābhiniṣpadyatē” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 8/4/2
“Having attained the supreme light, he becomes fully manifest in his own form.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8/4/2
“sa tatra paryēti jakṣan krīḍan ramamāṇaḥ strībhirvā yānairvā jñātibhirvā’jñātibhirvā” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 8/4/3
“There he moves about, eating, playing, and delighting himself, whether with women, conveyances, relatives, or strangers.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8/4/3
“yatra tvasya sarvamātmaivābhūt tat kēna kaṁ paśyēt tat kēna kaṁ jighrēt tat kēna kaṁ vijānīyāt yēnēdaṁ sarvaṁ vijānāti taṁ ca kēna vijānīyād vijñātāramarē kēna vijānīyāt” - br̥hadāraṇyakōpaniṣat 6/5/15
“But when everything for him has become the Self alone, then by what should he see whom? Then by what should he smell whom? Then by what should he know whom? And by what should he know that by which he knows all this? By what, my dear, should he know the knower?” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 6/5/15
“yathōdakaṁ śuddhē śuddhamāsiktaṁ tādr̥gēva bhavati” - kāṭhakōpaniṣat 2/1/15
“Just as pure water poured into pure water becomes exactly like it…” — Kaṭhopaniṣat 2/1/15
“tadā vidvān puṇyapāpē vidhūya nirañjanaḥ paramaṁ sāmyamupaiti” - ātharvaṇōpaniṣat 3/1/3
“Then the knower, having shaken off merit and demerit, stainless, attains supreme similarity.” — Ātharvaṇa Upaniṣad 3/1/3
“amr̥tasyaiṣa sētuḥ” - ātharvaṇōpaniṣat 2/2/6
“This is the bridge to immortality.” — Ātharvaṇopaniṣat 2/2/6
“akṣaṇvantaḥ karṇavantaḥ sakhāyō manōjavēṣvasamā babhūvuḥ। ādaghnāsa upakakṣāsa u tvē hradā iva snātvā u tvē dadr̥śrē॥” - r̥gvēdasaṁhitā 10/71/7
Possessing eyes and possessing ears, the companions became unequal in mental quickness. Some appeared mouth-deep, some armpit-deep, and yet others like pools suitable for bathing. — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 10/71/7
“īśamāśritya tiṣṭhanti muktāḥ saṁsārasāgarāt। yathēṣṭabhōgabhōktārō brahmāntā uttarōttaram॥”
Having taken refuge in the Lord, those liberated from the ocean of saṃsāra abide, enjoying pleasures as desired, in successively higher gradation up to Brahmā.
iti mōkṣānantaraṁ bhēdaśrutibhyaḥ।
Thus, after liberation, according to the scriptural statements of difference.
“idaṁ jñānamupāśritya mama sādharmyamāgatāḥ। sargē’pi nōpajāyantē pralayē na vyathanti ca॥” - bhagavadgītā 14/2
“Taking recourse to this knowledge, those who have attained similarity of nature to me are not born even at creation and are not afflicted at dissolution.” — Bhagavad Gītā 14/2
iti bhagavadvacanam।
Thus says the Lord.
“jagadvyāpāravarjam” - brahmasūtram 4/4/17
“Except for activity concerning the universe.” — Brahma-sūtra 4/4/17
“prakaraṇādasannihitatvācca” - brahmasūtram 4/4/18
“Because of the context and because of non-proximity.” — Brahmasūtram 4/4/18
ityādi ca।
And so forth.
“avināśī vā arē’yamātmā’nucchittidharmā” - br̥hadāraṇyakōpaniṣat 6/5/14
“This Self, dear one, is indeed imperishable, whose nature is non-annihilation.” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 6/5/14
iti taddharmāṇāmapyanucchittēḥ prastutatvāt,
Thus, because the non-cessation even of its attributes is under discussion, …
“atraiva mā bhagavān mōhāntamāpipanna prētya sañjñā’sti” - br̥hadāraṇyakōpaniṣat 6/5/14
“Right here Your Reverence has plunged me into utter bewilderment: there is no consciousness after death.” — Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat 6/5/14
iti sañjñānāśasya dōṣatvēnōktatvāt,
Since the loss of consciousness has thus been stated to be a defect, …
“yatra tvasya sarvamātmaivābhūt tat kēna kaṁ paśyēt” - br̥hadāraṇyakōpaniṣat 6/5/15
“But where, for him, everything has become the Self alone, then by what could one see whom?” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 6/5/15
iti hyākṣēpa ēva।
For this statement is indeed merely a rhetorical challenge.
nahi bhōgābhāvō
For it is not the absence of experience…
“vijñātāramarē kēna vijānīyāt” - br̥hadāraṇyakōpaniṣat 6/5/15
“By what, dear one, should one know the knower?” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 6/5/15
iti vijñāturavijñānaṁ cāpēkṣitam।
Thus, non-cognition of the knower is also intended.
“ahamityēva yō vēdyaḥ sa jīva iti kīrtitaḥ। sa duḥkhī sa sukhī caiva sa pātraṁ bandhamōkṣayōḥ॥”
“He who is to be known precisely as ‘I’ is designated the jīva. He experiences suffering, he experiences happiness, and indeed he is the subject of bondage and liberation.”
iti paramaśrutiḥ।
Thus says the supreme revealed text.
“magnasya hi parē’jñānē kiṁ na duḥkhataraṁ bhavēt” - bhāratam 12/307/83
“For one immersed in profound ignorance, what indeed would not be more painful?” — Bhārata 12/307/83
iti mōkṣadharmē।
Thus in the Mokṣadharma.
“natu taddvitīyamasti” - br̥hadāraṇyakōpaniṣat 6/3/23-30
“But there is no second to it.” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 6/3/23-30
iti ca yat tad brahma dvaitatvēna na paśyati tadēva dvitīyaṁ nētyāha।
And with these words, it says that precisely that Brahman which one does not see as dual is not a second.
“yat tatō’nyad vibhaktatvēnaiva paśyēt”
“What it might see as other than that, precisely as separate…”
iti vākyaśēṣāt।
Thus, from the remainder of the sentence.
“nahi draṣṭudr̥rṣṭērviparilōpō vidyatē” - br̥hadāraṇyakōpaniṣat 6/3/23
“For there is no cessation of the seer’s seeing.” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 6/3/23
iti hētōśca।
and because of the reason stated thus.
“karmāṇi vijñānamayaśca ātmā parē’vyayē sarva ēkībhavanti” - ātharvaṇōpaniṣat 3/2/7
“Actions and the self consisting of cognition all become one in the supreme imperishable.” — Ātharvaṇopaniṣat 3/2/7
ityatrāpyēkībhāvō matyaikyaṁ kṣīrābdhyādisthitatadrūpāpēkṣayā sānaikyaṁ vā।
Here too, “becoming one” is unity of understanding, or, with reference to his forms situated in the Ocean of Milk and elsewhere, a unity accompanied by nonidentity.
“kāmēna mē kāma āgāddhr̥dayāddhr̥dayaṁ mr̥tyōḥ। yadamīṣāmadaḥ priyaṁ tadaitūpa māmabhi॥” - taittirīyāraṇyakam 3/15
“Through desire, desire has come to me, from the heart to the heart of Death. Whatever dear thing of these is yonder, may that come near, toward me.” — Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 3/15
“brahmamatyanukūlā mē matirmuktau bhaviṣyati। ataḥ prāyō’nukūlatvamidānīmapisaṁsthitam॥”,
In liberation, my mind will be exceedingly favorably disposed toward Brahman. Therefore, even now, this favorable disposition is for the most part established.
“yēnākramantyr̥ṣayō hyāptakāmā yatra tat satyasya paramaṁ nidhānam” - ātharvaṇōpaniṣat 3/1/6
“By which, indeed, the seers whose desires are fulfilled ascend to where that supreme abode of truth is.” — Ātharvaṇopaniṣad 3/1/6
“ētamānandamayamātmānamupasaṅkrāmati” - taittirīyōpaniṣat 2/8
“He attains this Self consisting of bliss.” — Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2/8
ityādiśrutibhyaḥ।
From scriptural passages beginning thus...
svarūpaikyābhiprāyē
when identity of essential nature is intended…
“karmāṇi vijñānamayaśca” - ātharvaṇōpaniṣat 3/2/7
“Actions, and the one consisting of cognition…” — Ātharvaṇa Upaniṣad 3/2/7
iti na yujyatē। nahi tatpakṣē’pi karmaṇāṁ brahmaikyaṁ muktāvasti। nivr̥ttyabhiprāyē ca pañcadaśakalānāmapi samatvāt,
Thus, this is not tenable. For even on that position, the actions have no identity with Brahman in liberation; and if cessation is intended, because the same applies to the fifteen parts as well…
“gatāḥ kalāḥ pañcadaśa pratiṣṭhā dēvāśca sarvē pratidēvatāsu” - ātharvaṇōpaniṣat 3/2/7
“The fifteen parts have gone to their foundations, and all the gods to their respective deities.” — Ātharvaṇa Upaniṣad 3/2/7
ityanyāsāṁ kalānāṁ gamanamuktvā karmaṇāṁ vijñānātmanaścaikībhāvakathanaṁ vyarthaṁ syāt। viśēṣābhāvāt। naca jñānanivr̥ttasya rajatasya śuktyaikībhāvavyavahārō’sti।
Having thus stated the going of the other parts, the statement that the karmas and the cognitive self become one would be pointless, because there is no distinction. Nor is there any usage according to which silver sublated by knowledge becomes one with nacre.
“parē’vyayē” - ātharvaṇōpaniṣat 3/2/7
“In the supreme, imperishable.” — Ātharvaṇa Upaniṣad 3/2/7
ityadhikaraṇatvakathanaṁ ca bhēdajñāpakam। anyathā
And this statement of being a locus indicates difference. Otherwise…
“para ēva bhavanti”
“They exist in the Supreme alone.”
iti nirdēśaḥ syāt।
The statement would be thus.
“jīvasya paramaikyaṁ tu buddhisārūpyamēva tu। ēkasthānanivāsō vā vyaktisthānamapēkṣya saḥ। na svarūpaikatā tasya muktasyāpi virūpataḥ। svātantryapūrṇatē’lpatvapāratantryē virūpatā॥”
“The jīva’s unity with the Supreme, however, is indeed only similarity in cognition, or that unity is dwelling in the same location with reference to the locus of manifestation. It is not identity of essential nature for that jīva, even when liberated, because of dissimilarity. Independence and completeness, and finitude and dependence, constitute the dissimilarity.”
iti paramaśrutiḥ।
Thus declares the supreme revelation.
“brahma vēda brahmaiva bhavati” - ātharvaṇōpaniṣat 3/2/9
“The one who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself.” — Ātharvaṇopaniṣat 3/2/9
ityādi ca
And so forth.
“sampūjya brāhmaṇaṁ bhaktyā śūdrō’pi brāhmaṇō bhavēt”
“Having worshipped a Brahmin with devotion, even a Śūdra may become a Brahmin.”
itivat।
As in the preceding statement.
br̥ṁhitō bhavatītyarthaḥ। nahi brāhmaṇapūjakaḥ sa ēva brāhmaṇō bhavati।
The meaning is, “He becomes magnified.” For a worshipper of a Brāhmaṇa does not himself become a Brāhmaṇa.
“brahmāṇi jīvāḥ sarvē’pi parabrahmāṇi muktigāḥ। prakr̥tiḥ paramaṁ brahma paramaṁ mahadacyutaḥ। tasmānna muktā naca sā na kvacid viṣṇuvaibhavam। prāpnuvanti sa ēvaikaḥ svatantraḥ pūrṇaṣaḍguṇaḥ॥”
“All souls too are Brahmans; those who attain liberation are higher Brahmans. Prakṛti is the highest Brahman; Acyuta is the highest Great One. Accordingly, neither the liberated souls nor she ever attain Viṣṇu’s majesty. He alone is the one who is independent and possesses the six attributes in full.”
iti paramaśrutiḥ।
Thus says the Parama Śruti.
“parō mātrayā tanvā vr̥dhāna na tē mahitvamanvaśnuvanti” - r̥gvēdasaṁhitā 7/99/1
“They do not attain your greatness, O one growing beyond measure in bodily form.” — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 7/99/1
“brahmēśānādibhirdēvairyat prāptuṁ naiva śakyatē। tad yatsvabhāvaḥ kaivalyaṁ sa bhavān kēvalō harē॥”
O Hari, You are that one whose intrinsic nature is what cannot at all be attained by the gods beginning with Brahmā and Īśāna—absolute uniqueness itself, the sole one.
iti ca।
And thus.
“yathā’piyanti tējāṁsi mahātējasi bhāskarē। pr̥thakpr̥thaksthitānyahni svarūpairapi sarvaśaḥ। parē brahmaṇi jīvākhyabrahmāṇyapyapiyanti hi। muktau pr̥thaksthitānyēva tadanyēṣāmadarśanam। apyayō’yaṁ samuddiṣṭō na svarūpaikatā kvacit॥”
Just as luminous bodies enter the greatly radiant sun by day while each remains separate in every respect, even with its own form, so indeed the Brahmans called jīvas also enter the Supreme Brahman at liberation while remaining separate. That is their non-perception by others. This is designated “mergence,” never identity of essential nature.
iti nārāyaṇaśrutiḥ।
Thus says the Nārāyaṇa Śruti.
ataḥ sarvāgamaviruddhamēva jīvēśvaraikyam।
Therefore, the identity of the individual self and the Lord is indeed contrary to all scripture.
tathaiva sarvayuktiviruddhaṁ ca।
And in just the same way, it is contrary to all reasoning.
na tāvadēkajīvavādō yujyatē।
To begin with, the doctrine that there is only one individual self is not tenable.
ēkājñānaparikalpitatvē ca sarvasya sarvamidaṁ parikalpitamiti jānataḥ punaḥ śiṣyādibōdhanaṁ na yujyatē। nahi svapnō’yamiti niścitya svāpnaputradāyārthaṁ yatatē। svapnē tu svāpnatvājñānādēva yatatē।
Moreover, if everything is projected by a single ignorance, then instruction of disciples and others is not tenable for one who knows, “All this is projected.” For, having ascertained, “This is a dream,” one does not make an effort for the sake of a gift to a dream-son. In a dream, however, one makes an effort solely from ignorance of its being a dream.
naca bahūnāṁ dr̥śyamānatvādasyājñānaparikalpitamidamiti niścayō yujyatē। svapnē tu prabōdhānantaramēkasyāvaśiṣṭatvānniścayaḥ। nacātra tathā’sti।
Nor, since many are observed, is the ascertainment, “This is imagined by the ignorance of this one,” tenable. In a dream, however, there is ascertainment because, after awakening, one remains. But here it is not so.
tasyatasya tathātathā pratipattavyamityaṅgīkārē vastuni vikalpāsambhavādakalpitamityēva syāt। naca tathā pratipattavyamityatra pramāṇamasti।
If it is accepted that each respective one must be understood in its respective manner, then, because alternatives are impossible with regard to the entity, it would be precisely unimagined. And there is no valid means of knowledge for the claim that it must be understood in that manner.
śiṣyājñānaparikalpitamityaṅgīkārē tasyaivācāryabhāvē svayamēva kalpitō bhavatīti samyaggranthādhigamasyaivānarthahētutvaṁ syāt। naca kasyacinmuktiḥ। granthādhigamē tasyaiva śiṣyājñānaparikalpitatvaprāptēḥ।
If it is accepted that it is imagined by a disciple’s ignorance, then, when that very person becomes a teacher, he himself becomes imagined. Thus, correct comprehension of the text itself would be a cause of harm, and no one would attain liberation, because, upon comprehension of the text, it follows that that very person is imagined by a disciple’s ignorance.
sa caikajīvō yadi bhēdavādī bhavati tasya tatraiva dārḍhyānna kadācid bhēdanivr̥ttiriti na kasyāpi muktiḥ syāt। tēna yathā kalpitaṁ tathaiva bhavatīti tēnaikajīvavādināṁ nityanirayakalpanē sa ēva syāt।
And if that single jīva asserts difference, then, because of his firm conviction in that very position, difference would never cease; thus there would be no liberation for anyone. Since things become exactly as imagined by him, when the proponents of the one-jīva doctrine conceive eternal hell, for that reason that very hell would exist.
nacaikajīvājñānaparikalpitaṁ samastamityatra kiñcinmānam।
And there is no valid means of knowledge whatsoever for the claim that everything is imagined by the ignorance of a single individual self.
“prapañcō yadi vidyēta nivartēta na saṁśayaḥ। māyāmātramidaṁ dvaitamadvaitaṁ paramārthataḥ॥” - māṇḍūkōpaniṣat 2/9
“If the phenomenal manifold were to exist, it would cease—there is no doubt. This duality is mere illusion; ultimately, there is nonduality.” — Māṇḍūkopaniṣat 2/9
ityasya cāyamarthaḥ।
And this is the meaning of this passage:
prapañcō yadi vidyēta bhavēta utpadyēta, tarhi nivartēta, naca nivartatē, tasmādanādirēvāyam। prakr̥ṣṭaḥ pañcavidhō bhēdaḥ prapañcaḥ। nacāvidyamānō’yam, māyāmātratvāt। māyēti bhagavatprajñā, saiva mānatrāṇakartrī yasya tanmāyāmātram। paramēśvarēṇa jñātatvād rakṣitatvācca na dvaitaṁ bhrāntikalpitamityarthaḥ। nahīśvarasya bhrāntiḥ। tarhi
If the manifold world were to come into existence—to come to be, to arise—then it would cease; and it does not cease. Therefore, this is indeed beginningless. Prapañca is the preeminent fivefold difference. Nor is this nonexistent, because it is māyā-mātra. Māyā means the Lord’s cognition. That of which it alone is the agent of cognition and protection is māyā-mātra. Since duality is cognized and protected by the Supreme Lord, it is not imagined through delusion—this is the meaning. For Īśvara certainly has no delusion. Then…
“advaitaḥ sarvabhāvānām”
“The non-dual one among all entities”
iti vyapadēśaḥ katham? ityata āha- advaitaṁ paramārthata iti। paramārthāpēkṣayā hyadvaitam। sarvasmāduttamō’rthaḥ sa ēka ēvētyarthaḥ। anyathā
How can there be such a designation? In response to this, he says: “Non-dual with respect to the supreme entity.” For it is non-dual with reference to the supreme entity. The meaning is: “The entity superior to everything is he alone.” Otherwise …
“advaitaḥ sarvabhāvānām”
“Without an equal among all beings.”
iti vyarthaṁ syāt। sarvabhāvānāṁ madhyē tasyaikasyaivādvaitatvamityuktē samādhikarāhityamēvōktaṁ syāt। anyēṣāṁ samādhikabhāvaḥ।
Thus, it would be pointless. If it were stated that, among all entities, that one alone possesses non-duality, only the absence of equals or superiors would have been stated. For the others, there is the presence of equals or superiors.
“vikalpō vinivartēta kalpitō yadi kēnacit” - māṇḍūkōpaniṣat 2/10
“Conceptual differentiation would cease if it were imagined by someone.” — Māṇḍūkopaniṣat 2/10
iti vākyaśēṣācca na kalpitatvamasyēti jñāyatē। nivartata ityaṅgīkārē nivartēta vidyētēti ca prasaṅgarūpēṇa kathanaṁ yadiśabdau ca na yujyantē। vidyētētyasya cōtpattyarthānaṅgīkārē yadyadasti tattannivartata iti vyāptyabhāvānnivartētēti na yujyatē। ataḥ prapañcasyānādisatyatvaparamidaṁ vākyam। ata upadēśādayaṁ vādō’jñātē dvaitaṁ na vidyata ityāha। ajñāta ēva dvaitaṁ na vidyatē। ajñānināṁ pakṣa ēva dvaitaṁ na vidyata ityarthaḥ।
Thus, from the remainder of the sentence too, it is understood that this is not imagined. If “it ceases” is accepted, the statements “it would cease” and “it would come into being” in the form of hypothetical consequences, as well as the two occurrences of “if,” are inappropriate. And if “it would come into being” is not accepted as having the sense of origination, “it would cease” is inappropriate, since there is no invariable concomitance that whatever exists ceases. Therefore, this statement has the beginningless reality of the world as its purport. Hence, on the basis of this instruction, he states this thesis: “When it is unknown, duality does not exist.” Only when it is unknown does duality not exist. The meaning is that duality does not exist only from the standpoint of the ignorant.
“jīvēśvarabhidā caiva jaḍēśvarabhidā tathā। jīvabhēdō mithaścaiva jaḍajīvabhidā tathā। mithaśca jaḍabhēdō’yaṁ prapañcō bhēdapañcakaḥ। sō’yaṁ satyō hyanādiśca sādiścēnnāśamāpnuyāt। naca nāśaṁ prayātyēṣa nacāsau bhrāntikalpitaḥ। kalpitaścēnnivartēta nacāsau vinivartatē। dvaitaṁ na vidyata iti tasmādajñānināṁ matam। mataṁ hi jñānināmētanmitaṁ trātaṁ ca viṣṇunā। tasmāt satyamiti prōktaṁ paramō harirēva tu॥”
“The difference between the individual self and Īśvara, the difference between the insentient and Īśvara, likewise the mutual difference among individual selves, the difference between the insentient and individual selves, and the mutual difference among insentient entities—this world is the fivefold difference. This very world is indeed real and beginningless; if it had a beginning, it would undergo destruction. This world does not undergo destruction, nor is it imagined through error. If it were imagined, it would be sublated, yet it is not sublated. Therefore, ‘duality does not exist’ is the view of the ignorant. For this is acknowledged by those who know, and is measured and protected by Viṣṇu. Therefore it has been declared real. But Hari alone is supreme.”
iti paramaśrutiḥ।
Thus says the supreme revealed scripture.
maitrēyīśākhāyāṁ ca
And in the Maitreyī branch …
“atha jñānōpasargāḥ” - maitrāyaṇyupaniṣat 7/8
“Now, the impediments to knowledge.” — Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad 7/8
ityuktvā
Having said thus…
“atha yē cānyē mithyātarkairdr̥ṣṭāntaiḥ kuhakēndrajālairvaidikēṣu paristhātumicchanti taiḥ saha na saṁvasēt prākāśyā hyētē taskarā arsvagyāiti hyāha- ‘nairātmyavādakuhakairmithyādr̥ṣṭāntahētubhiḥ। bhrāmyalm̐lōkō na jānāti vēdavidyāntaraṁ tu yat॥' iti।” - maitrāyaṇyupaniṣat 7/8
“Now, as for those others who wish to establish themselves among Vedic adherents by false reasonings, examples, deceptions, and magical illusions, one should not live in company with them. For these are manifest thieves, unfit for heaven; for it says: ‘The world, wandering in error through the deceptions of the doctrine of no-self and through false examples and reasons, does not, however, know what the distinction from Vedic knowledge is.’” — Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad 7/8
ātmasambandhi kimapi nāstīti vādō nairātmyavādaḥ।
The doctrine that nothing whatsoever related to the self exists is the doctrine of no-self.
bhrāntikalpitatvē ca jagataḥ, satyaṁ jagad dvayamapēkṣitam। nahi satyaśuktēḥ, satyarajatasya, tayōḥ sādr̥śyasya cābhāvē bhrāntirbhavati।
And if the world is imagined through illusion, a real pair of worlds is required. For illusion does not arise in the absence of a real shell, real silver, and similarity between the two.
svapnē’pi vāsanārūpaṁ satyamēva jaganmanasi sthitaṁ bahiḥṣṭhatvēna dr̥śyatē। dēhātmanōrapyēkadēśasthatvādisādr̥śyamastyēva। ‘śaṅkhaḥ pītaḥ’, ‘nabhō nīlam’ ityādiṣvapi pītādayō’nyatra vidyanta ēva। tatsādr̥śyaṁ ca dravyatvādikaṁ kiñcicchaṅkhādīnāṁ cāstyēva। atō na kutrāpi sadr̥śasatyavastudvayaṁ vinā bhramaḥ।
Even in a dream, the real world, present in the mind in the form of latent impressions, is perceived as being externally situated. The body and the self too certainly have a resemblance such as being located in the same place. Even in such cases as “The conch is yellow” and “The sky is blue,” yellow objects and the like certainly exist elsewhere. And conches and the like too certainly have some resemblance to those, such as being substances. Thus, nowhere is there an illusion without a pair of similar real objects.
nacātmanyanātmabhramaḥ kvāpi dr̥ṣṭaḥ। nahi kaścid “ahamahaṁ na bhavāmi” iti bhrāntō dr̥śyatē। ātmanyanātmabhrama ēvāyaṁ prapañca iti tairucyatē। taṁ vinaivānātmanyātmabhramakalpanē’nātmanaḥ satyatvaṁ syāt। tadā cādvitīyatvakalpanē’nātmaivāsti, nātmēti bhavati। ātmājñānātmakatvē ca jagata ātmanō bhinnatvēna na dr̥śyēta। nahi śuktērbhēdēna rajataṁ dr̥śyatē bhrāntau। nacaikamēva yugapad bahudhā dr̥śyatē bhrāntau। nacātmani bhēdabhramaḥ kvāpi dr̥ṣṭaḥ। naca kutrāpi mithyōpādhikr̥tō bhēdō dr̥ṣṭaḥ।
Nor is a delusion of the non-self in the self ever observed. For no one is observed to be deluded with the thought, “I am not I.” They say that this world is precisely a delusion of the non-self in the self. If, entirely without that, a delusion of the self in the non-self is posited, the non-self would be real. Then, in positing nonduality, it follows that only the non-self exists, not the self. And if the world consisted in ignorance of the self, it would not be perceived as different from the self. For in an illusion, silver is not perceived as different from nacre. Nor, in an illusion, is one and the same thing perceived simultaneously as manifold. Nor is a delusion of difference in the self ever observed. Nor is a difference produced by a false adjunct observed anywhere.
naca jñānājñānayōrapi mithyākalpitatvaṁ dr̥ṣṭam। tadviṣayasyaivānyathātvaṁ bhrāntau।
Nor is even cognition or ignorance observed to be falsely imagined. In an erroneous cognition, only its object is observed to be otherwise.
ēvamādyanantayuktiviruddhō’yaṁ pakṣaḥ। granthabahutvaṁ syādityēvōparamyatē।
This position is contradicted by innumerable arguments such as these. One desists only because the text would become excessively long.
naca satyatvāṅgīkārē kaścid dōṣaḥ।
And there is no defect in accepting it as true.
bahujīvavādipakṣē’pi bhēdasya mithyātvāṅgīkārē, ētē dōṣā bhavantyēva।
In the position of those who maintain a plurality of individual selves as well, if the falsity of difference is accepted, these defects do indeed arise.
mithyōpādhikr̥taṁ hi tēṣāmapi bahutvam। naca mithyōpādhikr̥tō bhēdaḥ kvāpi dr̥ṣṭaḥ।
For even their plurality is produced by an unreal adjunct. And a difference produced by an unreal adjunct is not observed anywhere.
ātmanyanātmakalpanārūpatvānmithyōpādhirēva na yujyatē।
A false limiting adjunct itself is not tenable, because it consists in the superimposition of the non-self upon the self.
māyāmayī sr̥ṣṭirapi tatsadr̥śasyānyasya vidyamānatva ēva dr̥ṣṭā। dravyatvādisādr̥śyayutaṁ kiñcidadhiṣṭhānamāśrityaiva ca।
Even a creation constituted by māyā is observed only when another thing resembling it exists, and only by relying upon some substratum possessing similarity in substantiality and the like.
“adhiṣṭhānaṁ ca sadr̥śaṁ tathyavastudvayaṁ vinā। na bhrāntirbhavati kvāpi svapnamāyādikēṣvapi। mānasyāṁ vāsanāyāṁ tu bahirvastutvakalpanam। svāpnō bhramaśca māyāyāṁ kartr̥dēhādivastuṣu। caturaṅgabalatvādikalpanaṁ bhrama iṣyatē। na bhrāntikalpitaṁ viśvamatō viṣṇubalāśrayam॥”
Without a substrate and a similar entity—the pair being real entities—misapprehension does not arise anywhere, even in dreams, magical displays, and the like. Dream-error, however, is the imagining of external objecthood in a mental latent impression; and in a magical display, error is held to be the imagining of being a fourfold army and the like in entities such as the performer's body. Therefore, the universe is not imagined through misapprehension; it rests upon Viṣṇu's power.
iti brahmavaivartē।
Thus, in the Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa.
“naca māyāvinā māyā dr̥śyatē viśvamīśvaraḥ। sadā paśyati tēnēdaṁ na māyētyavadhāryatām ॥”
Nor is an illusion perceived by the illusionist. Īśvara always sees the universe; on that account, let it be ascertained that this universe is not an illusion.
iti ca।
And thus.
“aparōkṣadr̥śō mithyā-darśanaṁ na kvacid bhavēt। sarvāparōkṣavid viṣṇurviśvadr̥k tanna tanmr̥ṣā ॥”
False cognition could never occur in one who sees directly. Viṣṇu directly knows all and sees the universe; therefore, the universe is not unreal.
iti ca।
And thus.
yadicaikamēva brahmōpādhibhēdāt saṁsarati mucyatē ca, tadā saṁsāriṇāṁ sarvadā vidyamānatvāt sarvadā saṁsāryēva brahma, atastadbhāvō’pi na muktiḥ। sarvadōpādhisambaddhatvāt tasya।
And if the one Brahman alone transmigrates and is liberated because of differences among adjuncts, then, since transmigrators always exist, Brahman is always nothing but a transmigrator. Consequently, even becoming that is not liberation, because it is always connected with an adjunct.
naca śuddhasya nōpādhisambandha iti vācyam। upādhisambaddhasyōpādhisambandhakalpanē’navasthāprasaṅgāt। naca tēnaiva sambandhēna sambaddhasya। ātmāśrayaprasaṅgāt।
Nor should it be said that the pure has no relation to an adjunct. For if a relation to an adjunct is postulated for what is related to an adjunct, an infinite regress would follow. Nor can it be postulated for what is related by that very relation, since self-dependence would follow.
itaśca mithyōpādhirna yujyatē। ajñānasiddhau mithyōpādhisiddhiḥ, ajñānaṁ vinā mithyātvāsiddhēḥ। naca mithyōpādhiṁ vinā’jñānasiddhiḥ, mithyōpādhibhinnasyaivājñatvāt।
For this further reason, a false limiting adjunct is not tenable: the false limiting adjunct is established upon the establishment of ignorance, since without ignorance its falsity is not established. Nor is ignorance established without the false limiting adjunct, since only what is distinct from the false limiting adjunct is ignorant.
śuddhasyaivājñatvē muktasyāpyajñatvaprasaktēḥ।
Because, if the pure one itself were ignorant, ignorance would follow even for the liberated one.
svābhāvikatvāt satyatvāt sadvitīyatvaprasaktēśca।
Because of being intrinsic, because of being real, and because of the implication of having a second.
svābhāvikasya cānivr̥ttyaṅgīkārādanivr̥ttiprasaktēśca। satyasya cānivr̥ttiriti hi tatpakṣaḥ।
And because of accepting that what is intrinsic does not cease, and because non-cessation would follow. For their position, indeed, is also that what is real does not cease.
ataścānyōnyāśrayatā। ajñānasiddhau mithyōpādhisiddhiḥ, mithyōpādhisiddhau jīvasiddhiḥ, jīvasiddhau tadāśrayājñānasiddhiḥ – iti cakrakaṁ vā।
From this there is also mutual dependence: upon the establishment of ignorance comes the establishment of a false limiting adjunct; upon the establishment of the false limiting adjunct, the establishment of the individual self; and upon the establishment of the individual self, the establishment of ignorance having that self as its locus—thus, alternatively, there is circularity.
naca śuddhamēva bhrāntyā’jñamiti yuktam। ajñānasiddhau bhramasiddhiḥ, tatsiddhāvajñānasiddhiḥ – ityanyōnyāśrayatvāt।
Nor is it tenable that pure Brahman itself is ignorant through error: error is established upon the establishment of ignorance, and ignorance is established upon the establishment of that error, because of mutual dependence.
“anāgatā atītāśca yāvantaḥ sahitāḥ kṣaṇāḥ। atītānāgatāścaiva yāvantaḥ paramāṇavaḥ। tatō’pyanantaguṇitā jīvānāṁ rāśayaḥ pr̥thak॥”
As many future and past moments as there are, taken together, and as many past and future atoms as there are, the multitudes of souls are, each separately, infinitely many times more numerous than even that.
iti vatsaśrutērna saṁsāriṇāṁ parisamāptirasmatpakṣē।
Thus, because of the Vatsa Śruti, there is no complete exhaustion of transmigrating beings in our position.
“paramāṇupradēśē’pi hyanantāḥ prāṇirāśayaḥ। sūkṣmatvādīśaśaktyaiva sthūlā api hi saṁsthitāḥ। sahasrayōjanasabhāṁ prabhāvād viśvakarmaṇaḥ। anantā rāśayō’nantāḥ prajānāmadhisaṁsthitāḥ॥”
“Indeed, even within an atom-sized region there are infinitely many hosts of living beings. Even gross beings are indeed situated there owing to subtlety, solely through the Lord’s power. Through the power of Viśvakarman, infinite, endless hosts of creatures occupy a hall a thousand yojanas in extent.”
iti skāndē।
Thus, in the Skānda.
naca mithyāvastunō durghaṭatvamēva bhūṣaṇam।
Nor is impossibility itself an excellence of an unreal entity.
dr̥ṣṭasya vastunō mithyātvakalpanasya dr̥ṣṭisakāśād balavatpramāṇayuktyapēkṣatvāt। tadabhāvē satyatvaṁ dr̥ṣṭyaiva siddhyati। nahyannādikaṁ bhōgyaṁ dr̥ṣṭvā bhōktuṁ satyatvē pramāṇāntaramapēkṣatē। kintu? nēdamannamiti kēnaciduktē kathamidamannatvēna dr̥śyamānamannaṁ na bhavatīti pramāṇāntaramapēkṣatē।
Because supposing that a perceived object is false requires reasoning grounded in a means of knowledge stronger than perception, in the absence of such reasoning its reality is established by perception itself. For surely, having perceived food and the like as fit for consumption, one does not require another means of knowledge regarding its reality in order to consume it. When, then? When someone says, “This is not food,” one requires another means of knowledge showing how this food, which is perceived as food, is not food.
naca pratyakṣadr̥ṣṭasya tatō balavatpratyakṣamāgamaṁ vinā’numānādinaiva bādhō dr̥ṣṭaḥ। dūrasthavr̥kṣahrasvatvādau pratyakṣāpaṭutvasya niścitatvād yuktyā tatra dīrghatvaniścayaḥ। pratyakṣasya hi dūrē mandagrāhitvaṁ parimāṇādāvanyathātvaṁ ca tatō balavatpratyakṣēṇaiva niścitam। naca jagatpratyakṣasya mithyātvaṁ kēnāpi pramāṇēna niścitam। viśēṣataśca jñānājñānasukhaduḥkhātmabhēdādiviṣayasyānubhavasya na mithyātvaṁ dr̥ṣṭam।
Nor is the sublation of what is seen by perception observed through inference and the like alone, without the occurrence of a perception stronger than it. In cases such as the shortness of a distant tree, because perception’s lack of acuity has been ascertained, its tallness is ascertained there by reasoning. For it has been ascertained only by a perception stronger than it that perception at a distance apprehends weakly and presents magnitude and the like otherwise. Nor has the falsity of perception of the world been established by any valid means of knowledge. In particular, the falsity of experience whose objects are knowledge, ignorance, pleasure, pain, the self, difference, and the like has not been observed.
ataśca saṁsārasya satyatvāt satyasya cānivr̥ttyaṅgīkārānna mōkṣaḥ syāt।
And for this reason, because saṃsāra is real and because it is accepted that what is real does not cease, there would be no liberation.
anubhavasiddhasya balavadanubhavaṁ vinā yuktita ēva mithyātvāṅgīkārē, ātmanō’pi mithyātvaṁ syāt। yuktiśca – sarvasyānyasya mithyātvāṅgīkārāt, dvidhā kalpanē kalpanāgauravamiti।
If the unreality of what is established by experience is accepted solely through reasoning, without a stronger experience, then even the self would be unreal. And the reasoning is as follows: since the unreality of everything else is accepted, making a twofold supposition entails a burdensome multiplication of suppositions.
ātmādhiṣṭhānabhramasyaivādr̥ṣṭēstasyādhiṣṭhānatvamapi na yujyatē।
Because an error whose substratum is the self is itself not observed, even that self's status as a substratum is not tenable.
durghaṭatvasya bhūṣaṇatvē durghaṭamapyātmamithyātvaṁ syādēva। pratītērapyavidyākāryatvāṅgīkārāt, tasyāśca durghaṭatvasya bhūṣaṇatvāt, satyasya ca yuktyapēkṣatvāt, ghaṭādīnāṁ draṣṭr̥tvam, ātmanaśca jaḍatvam, draṣṭurabhāvē ca pratītiḥ, adhiṣṭhānaṁ vinaiva bhrama ityādi viruddhaṁ sarvamapi syāt।
If impossibility were an ornament, even the Self’s unreality, though impossible, would indeed be the case. Since even cognition is accepted as an effect of ignorance, since the impossibility of that ignorance is an ornament, and since truth depends on reasoning, everything contradictory—such as pots and the like being cognizers, the Self being insentient, cognition in the absence of a cognizer, and illusion even without a substratum—would also be the case.
upādhibhēdāṅgīkārē hastapādādyupādhibhēdē’pi tadgatasukhaduḥkhādibhōkturyathā bhēdō na pratīyatē, ēvamēva śarīrādibhēdē bhōkturbhēdō na dr̥śyēta। sarvadēhagatasukhaduḥkhādikamēkēnaiva bhujyēta।
If difference among limiting adjuncts is accepted, then, just as no difference is cognized in the experiencer of the pleasure, pain, and the like located in the differing limiting adjuncts such as hands and feet, so too no difference in the experiencer would be perceived when bodies and the like differ. The pleasure, pain, and the like present in all bodies would be experienced by one alone.
yathācaikāṅgulyādyapagamē’pi na muktiḥ, ēvamēkōpādhyapagamē’pi tasyaivānantōpādhisambaddhatvānna muktiḥ syāt।
And just as there is no liberation even upon the removal of one finger or the like, similarly, even upon the removal of one limiting adjunct, there would be no liberation, because that very one is connected with infinitely many limiting adjuncts.
“udyatāyudhadōrdaṇḍāḥ patitasvaśirōkṣibhiḥ। paśyantaḥ pātayanti sma kabandhā apyarīnyudhi॥”
Even the headless trunks, whose staff-like arms bore upraised weapons, seeing with the eyes in their own fallen heads, felled enemies in battle.
iti bhāratavacanānna viślēṣād viśēṣaḥ।
Thus, from the statement in the Bhārata, no distinction arises from separation.
kiñcōpādhirātmana ēkadēśaṁ grasati, uta sarvamātmānam? ēkadēśāṅgīkārē sāvayavatvam। sāvayavasya cānityatvaṁ tairaṅgīkr̥tam। sarvagrāsē ca nōpādhirbhēdakaḥ syāt। upādhikr̥tāṁśakalpanē tadupādhikr̥tatvē, ātmāśrayatvam। upādhyantarakalpanē, anavasthā।
Moreover, does the limiting adjunct engulf one part of the self, or the whole self? If one part is accepted, the self possesses parts; and they accept that what possesses parts is impermanent. If the whole is engulfed, the limiting adjunct would not be a differentiator. If a part produced by the limiting adjunct is posited, then, if it is produced by that limiting adjunct, there is self-dependence. If another limiting adjunct is posited, there is an infinite regress.
nacēśvarasya sarvagatatvādaupādhikabhēdō brahmaṇā bhavati। nahi dēśataḥ kālataścāparicchinnayōraupādhikabhēdō dr̥ṣṭaḥ।
Nor, because Īśvara is omnipresent, does a difference from Brahman due to limiting adjuncts arise. For no difference due to limiting adjuncts is observed between two entities unlimited with respect to both space and time.
sarvōpādhigatatvāccaikasyaivēśvarasya, bhēdasya mithyātvāt, hastapādādibhēdē’pi bhōkturēkatvavat sarvasukhaduḥkhādibhōktr̥tvamīśvarasyaiva syāt।
Because the one and same Lord is present in all limiting adjuncts, and because difference is false, just as the experiencer is one even amid differences of hands, feet, and the like, the Lord alone would be the experiencer of all pleasure, pain, and the like.
dēśataḥ kālataścāparicchinnayōraupacārikabhēdābhāvādēva duḥkhinō’nyacchuddhaṁ brahma na siddhyati। ataḥ svābhāvikaḥ saṁsāra ityanivr̥ttirēva syāt।
Precisely because there is no figurative distinction between the two, both unlimited with respect to space and time, a pure Brahman other than the suffering one is not established. Hence saṃsāra would be intrinsic, and thus there would be no cessation at all.
kiñca। viśiṣṭasya śuddhasya vā saṁsāraḥ? śuddhasya saṁsāra ityuktē svavyāhatiḥ। viśiṣṭasyētyuktē viśiṣṭō’nyaḥ, sa ēva vā? sa ēva cēt, uktō dōṣaḥ। anyaścēt, nityō’nityō vā? anityaścēt, nāśa ēva tasya na mōkṣaḥ। nityatvē ca, bhēdasya satyatvam, mōkṣē’pi tasya bhāvāt। svarūpamātrasyābhēda upādhibhinna ēvētyaṅgīkārē svarūpamēvōpādhisambaddhamiti na tasya śuddhatvam। aśuddhasvabhāvasya na kadācicchuddhatvamiti ca tatpakṣaḥ।
Moreover, does transmigration belong to the qualified one or to the pure one? If it is said that transmigration belongs to the pure one, there is self-contradiction. If it is said that it belongs to the qualified one, is the qualified one different, or is it that very one? If it is that very one, the defect already stated follows. If it is different, is it eternal or non-eternal? If it is non-eternal, its destruction alone occurs, not liberation. And if it is eternal, difference is real, because that difference is present even in liberation. If it is accepted that there is non-difference merely as to intrinsic nature, while the qualified one is different precisely through an adjunct, then intrinsic nature itself is connected with an adjunct, so it is not pure. And that position is that what has an impure nature is never pure.
upādhimithyātvāṅgīkārē cānyōnyāśrayatvādidōṣā uktāḥ।
And, in accepting the unreality of the limiting adjunct, defects such as mutual dependence have been stated.
nacānādikarmabhēdād bhēdaḥ। aupādhikabhēdasiddhau karmabhēdasiddhiḥ, tatsiddhau ca tatsiddhirityanyōnyāśrayatvāt।
Nor is difference due to difference in beginningless karma, because difference in karma is established upon the establishment of difference based on limiting adjuncts, and the latter is established upon the establishment of the former, thus involving mutual dependence.
atō’nantadōṣaduṣṭatvād granthabahutvaṁ syādityēvōparamyatē।
Therefore, [the discussion] is brought to a close solely with the consideration that, since [it] is vitiated by innumerable defects, the treatise would become too extensive.
ataḥ sarvapramāṇaviruddhatvānnābhēdē śrutitātparyam।
Therefore, because it is contrary to every valid means of knowledge, the purport of śruti does not lie in non-difference.
sarvaśabdāvācyasya lakṣaṇā’pi na dr̥ṣṭēti na tasya śāstragamyatvam।
Since even secondary signification is not observed for that which is not denoted by any word, it is not knowable through scripture.
atō’vācyatvādajñēyatvācchūnyamēva taditi prāptam।
Therefore, because it is inexpressible and unknowable, it follows that it is nothing whatsoever.
naca svēnāpi jñēyatvaṁ tairucyatē। kartr̥karmavirōdha iti hi tē vadanti।
Nor do they assert that it is knowable even by itself. For they say that agent and object are incompatible.
naca svarūpamanyad vā jñēyaṁ jñātāraṁ ca vinā jñānaṁ dr̥ṣṭam। atō jñātr̥jñēyābhāvājjñānasyāpi śūnyataiva। ataḥ śūnyavādānna kaścid viśēṣaḥ। naca jñātr̥jñēyarahitaṁ jñānaṁ kvāpi dr̥ṣṭam।
Nor is cognition observed without a knower and an object of knowledge, whether its own nature or something else. Thus, because of the absence of a knower and an object of knowledge, cognition too is nothingness alone. Thus, there is no difference whatsoever from the doctrine of emptiness. Nor is cognition devoid of a knower and an object of knowledge observed anywhere.
aprāptatvāccēśvarabhēdasya nābhēdē śrutitātparyaṁ yujyatē।
And because difference from the Lord is not already established, it is not tenable that the purport of śruti lies in non-difference.
“sarvōttamaṁ sarvadōṣavyapētaṁ guṇairaśēṣaiḥ pūrṇamanyaṁ samastāt। vailakṣaṇyājjñāpayituṁ pravr̥ttāḥ sarvē vēdā mukhyatō naiva cānyat॥”
All the Vedas are primarily engaged in making known the one who is supreme over all, free from every defect, full of all attributes without exception, and distinct from everything on account of his distinctiveness—and certainly not anything else.
iti mahōpaniṣadi।
Thus in the Mahopaniṣad.
ataḥ sadāgamairēva sarvasmād bhinnatvēna sarvasmād viśiṣṭatvēna ca jñēyō bhagavān nārāyaṇa iti siddham।
Therefore, it is established that the Lord Nārāyaṇa is to be known through authoritative scriptures alone as different from everything and superior to everything.
॥ iti śrīmadānandatīrthabhagavatpādaviracitaśrīmadviṣṇutattvanirṇayē prathamaḥ paricchēdaḥ॥
Thus ends the First Section of the Śrī Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya, composed by the venerable Ānandatīrtha Bhagavatpāda.
