Tattvōdyōtam (तत्त्वोद्योतः)
The Illumination of Reality
Whose power is everywhere complete and real, who is independent and all-seeing...
The Lord of Ramā, controller of sentient beings and objects of cognition that are eternally unlike him, is beloved to us.
The disputed subject is distinct because it is liberated: whatever is thus is so, as in the agreed-upon case. Nor is an alternative concerning difference tenable, precisely because the indefinable is nowhere established—as if a hare’s horn were called a cow’s horn. Nor is there any means of valid knowledge concerning the indefinable or for the claim that the word “false” denotes the indefinable. Moreover, the subject of the inference has an unestablished qualifier. Nor does there exist a universal accepted by both parties, namely “falsity,” comparable to smokehood. Nor does possession of smoke become inconstant because of smoke superimposed upon vapor.
Nor does scripture anywhere assert anything distinct from existence and nonexistence.
‘Then non-being did not exist, nor did being exist; there was no atmosphere, nor the sky which was beyond.’
And here also, with regard to this quoted statement…
When indefinability is accepted by elimination …
That One breathed without wind by its own inherent power.
Thus, at that time, because it was what remained, indefinability would pertain to Brahman alone.
“The formed is declared to be existent; the formless is called nonexistent. Brahman is other than both the formed and the formless; it is called neither existent nor nonexistent.”
Thus says the Paiṅgi scriptural text.
That which is other than Vāyu and the intermediate space—this is existent.
Thus says the revelation of the Mādhyandinas.
Because of its wondrousness, Brahman is indescribable; it is consciousness and also that which is to be cognized. For that very reason, this is inconceivable, beyond reasoning, and indeed unknowable. From the verbal root meaning “to go,” however, Brahman is said to be “true” because it always remains just as previously apprehended, whereas the untrue is so called because of transformation.
Prakṛti and its products are declared asat because of their inauspiciousness. Because the universe is apprehensible to the intellects of the wicked, it is also called “asatya.” They are invariably outward-minded; the good are established in Brahman. The universe is real, under Viṣṇu’s control, and indeed eternal by continuity. Nowhere is the universe otherwise than such, in accordance with each respective time. They call the world unreal, without foundation, and without a Lord. Those demoniac persons, themselves ruined, bring about the destruction of the world.
Such passages and others occur in the Vyāsa-smṛti.
“They say, ‘The world is unreal, without foundation, and without a Lord. It has not been produced through mutual union; what else could it be but caused by desire?’ Holding fast to this view, those whose selves are ruined and whose understanding is slight arise, malevolent and of fierce deeds, for the destruction of the world.”
And so forth also in the Bhagavad Gītā.
All truth is indeed yours, O bounteous ones, and the waters do not transgress your ordinance.
Let me now indeed proclaim the great deeds of this great one—the true accomplishments of the true one.
That greatness of his is true; I praise his might in sacrifices, in the sovereignty of the inspired sage.
The seer, the discerning one, the all-surpassing one, the self-existent one, ordered the entities according to their true nature for eternal years.
and also from śruti passages such as this.
Nor is indefinability established by postulation, because knowledge of difference from the existent is impossible without apprehension of the nonexistent. Nor …
“The world is sublatable.”
Some valid means of knowledge for this claim.
Indeed, even their sublatability is false. And if that is false, non-sublatability alone would be true.
And being distinct from what is existent is either being distinct from the genus of existent things or being distinct from mere being. If a genus is admitted, there is a plurality of existent things. If it means being distinct from mere being, this merely proves what is already established, because difference from Brahman is admitted.
Difference is not negated by any reasoning whatsoever or by any means of valid knowledge, since it is being admitted and since the indefinable is unestablished. If being different from the real and being different from the unreal are false, non-difference alone would be true. In precisely this way, the alternatives regarding the reason and the rest are also to be refuted. These very defects also occur in inferences from cognizability, and the reason is inconclusive since the self too is an object of cognition. Nor can there be cognition of the self without the self’s being the object of cognition. The ignorance of it is removed by that cognition. Nor does that cognition have its form, precisely because it does not have it as its object. For having it as one’s object is precisely what it is to have its form. Cognition and the cognized object do not have identity of form. For ignorance has neither a pot nor Brahman as its locus. Only the darkness of ignorance present in a person is removed by cognition. If ignorance having the object as its locus is removed, then a pot known by one person would not be unknown to others. If ignorance of it were removed by a cognition not having it as its object, it would also be removed by cognition of a pot. Precisely because it has no object, it would not be cognition, like a pot.
And insentience is nothing but the absence of cognizerhood. They do not accept cognizerhood of the self. Therefore, that too is inconclusive. Unreal cognizerhood is also refuted simply through the rejection of the indefinable. If “insentience” means non-luminosity, that too is indeed inconclusive, since the self lacks both luminosity having itself as its object and luminosity having another as its object. For they do not accept its being its own object, because agency and objecthood are incompatible. Its having something unreal as another object is also refuted simply through the rejection of the indefinable. Luminosity devoid of an object is not luminosity at all, like a pot, because there is no valid means of knowledge for it.
Limitation with respect to place and time is partially unestablished, because it is absent in prakṛti, time, and the like. Limitation with respect to entity is inconclusive, because difference is admitted even for the self.
And the falsity of the world is contradicted by direct perception, because the world is apprehended as existent. Nor is anything established by direct perception seen to be sublated by anything else whatsoever. The perception whose object is such things as the moon’s being span-sized, however, is non-acute because it is affected by defects such as remoteness. There is no valid means of knowledge whatsoever for the non-acuity of the direct perception of the world. Nor is there any valid means of knowledge whatsoever for the world’s being produced by ignorance.
Nor is an illusion perceived by the illusionist. The Lord always perceives the universe; for that reason, let it be ascertained that this is not an illusion. False perception could never occur for one who perceives directly. Viṣṇu knows everything directly and perceives the universe; therefore it is not unreal.
Thus, in the Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa.
“The Lord is not sovereign; the world is unreal; the guru is not to be worshipped”; also, “The self is one; the state of being Supreme Brahman is liberation.” Such contradictory statements and, furthermore, arguments are indeed to be recognized by Vedic adherents, through many means of valid knowledge, as mere semblances. In the Veda and works conforming to the Veda, when there is contradiction, another meaning is to be construed; the other contradictory statements are also born of deception and error.
Thus says the Vyāsa-smṛti.
Not from the nonexistent, because it is observed.
Non-existence is not the case, because of apprehension.
And because of the dissimilarity, not as with dreams and the like.
They are refuted also by the Lord’s statement beginning thus.
Nor is the Māyāvādin distinct from the Śūnyavādin, since the latter too accepts empirical existence.
“Truth, however, is said to be of two kinds: conventional and ultimate. The conventional would be fit for practical dealings; upon cessation, truth would be ultimate. That of which there is no existence when it is examined, though existence is nevertheless apprehended, and which is a basis for practical dealings, is to be known as conventional.”
By this and similar statements.
And for the proponent of Brahman devoid of distinctions, there is no distinction whatsoever between it and the void.
The distinctionless, self-manifest, stainless, undecaying and immortal, void, unknowable reality inaccessible to mind and speech—which is opposed to defects headed by insentience, concealment, suffering, and perishability, and is manifested through constant contemplation—may lead the yogin to its state. Its imperishable state is in reality neither counterpositive status relative to a positive entity nor positive entityhood, and through phenomenal manifestation it has the form of the universe.
Such are their words, and so forth.
Of a nature opposed to unreality and insentience, and contrary to threefold limitation, impurity, bondage, and the condition of suffering.
And thus says the proponent of Māyāvāda.
It has neither existence nor nonexistence, neither defect nor indeed quality. That imperishable state, devoid of what is to be rejected or accepted, is empty.
And thus says the proponent of emptiness.
Even the Māyāvādin does not accept attributes such as existence as ultimately real, because he accepts the state of being devoid of every distinguishing characteristic.
That is not denotable by any word, yet is indicated by every expression; it is unknowable, yet the object of knowledge—that void, imperishable state.
Thus also says the proponent of emptiness.
And there is no differentiating feature by virtue of indivisibility.
“That indivisible state which is indicated by all qualifiers without exception, being free from all qualifiers, is the void state that is imperishable.”
Thus also says the proponent of emptiness.
Precisely likewise is the established position of the Māyāvādin. Nor does the Māyāvādin have a property called existence, nor does the Śūnyavādin have a property called emptiness.
From that which existed in me—possessed of infinite attributes, infinite in respect of qualities, and possessing an infinite form—the primal, self-born, unborn one arose.
The Supreme Person, however, is other, designated as the Supreme Self—the immutable Lord who, having entered the three worlds, sustains them.
Thus is the Lord’s established conclusion.
His supreme power is indeed heard to be manifold, and His knowledge, strength, and action are intrinsic.
Thus reads this and similar Śruti passages.
Since qualifications such as intensity do indeed exist in statements such as “The moon possesses intense luminosity,” there is no similarity to that. Because non-permanent relatedness to place and time exists, not…
This is that Devadatta.
There is also an analogy and the like stated in this way. Since the mere identity of Devadatta and the like is established, the question does not concern mere identity. Since mere difference from stars and the like is also established, it does not concern mere difference. Otherwise, the very question would be impossible. Therefore…
“Qualified by which attributes?”
When the question is posed thus, …
“Qualified by intense illumination, that place, time, and so forth”
… alone is the meaning of the sentence. Since the qualified entity and the rest are accepted, and since the indeterminable is absent, reality too is established.
For an object that has been cognized, nothing other than a stronger cognition is a sublator; thus, whether there is incoherence or coherence, indeterminability is not established. Because absolute distinctness is admitted, even an incoherent Brahman is indeed accepted on the basis of a valid means of knowledge. The alternatives as to whether Brahman is different from the world, non-different from it, or both different and non-different apply in that case as well. If it is different, there is an infinite regress as to whether pure Brahman is different from or non-different from Brahman qualified by difference and so on. If it is non-different from the world, which has a false nature, Brahman too would itself be false. If it is both different and non-different, both defects follow. If it is distinct from both, indeterminability has resulted for Brahman itself. If, even so, Brahman’s indeterminability does not follow, then it would not follow for the world either.
“The universe is real”
A statement beginning thus has been cited here too.
“That is said to be neither being nor non-being.”
This was indeed non-being in the beginning.
At that time, neither non-being nor being existed.
Statements such as this are evidence for the unreality even of Brahman.
Indeed, there is no means of knowledge stronger than perception. Even one defeated by reasoning does not fail to eat food when hungry, when powerful perception remains unsublated. Nor does what is seen through unsublated perception become non-food when its being food is untenable. Nor is a distinction between food and non-food experienced. Nor does practical conduct proceed in that manner. Nor is there any means of knowledge for it. Thus, because even the reasonings that negate the qualified and the like depend on the qualified and the like, they amount to a jāti-rejoinder; there is no sublation by reasoning either. Therefore, it is precisely Brahman replete with the entire host of attributes that is intended by Śruti.
Precisely because the indefinable entity is not established, the inference too is unestablished. The meaning of the śruti is that this statement is true: “Origination through speech is of various kinds. A name is to be assigned—a name to be borne eternally. The word ‘clay’ and the like are exclusively Vedic.” Because it is impermanent, a conventional name is subordinate; because it is permanent, a name such as “clay” alone is principal. From knowledge of the principal, the subordinate becomes as though its meaning were known. In the same way, from knowledge of the principal, the Supreme Self, the subordinate becomes as though known. The account of creation and the like is solely for making his principal status known.
“Just as, dear one …”
Even the passage beginning thus is a statement of similarity. Nor is the modification consisting of a single nail-cutter all black iron. From knowledge of the chief person …
‘A village is known’
There is the designation “thus.”
For false cognition does not arise from true cognition. If there were no difference between the liberated and the unliberated, transmigration would belong to the liberated one, or liberation to the transmigrating being. If the difference were produced by ignorance, then, because Īśvara is free from ignorance, identity with the transmigrating being would be experienced by him. He would consequently be subject to suffering.
“I know all of them; you do not know them, O scorcher of foes.”
Pleasure and pain, being and non-being, fear and indeed fearlessness, nonviolence, equanimity, contentment, austerity, giving, fame, and infamy—these various states of beings arise from me alone.
Because I have transcended the perishable and am higher even than the imperishable, I am therefore renowned in the world and in the Veda as the Supreme Person.
and because difference itself is experienced even by the Lord through statements such as this.
For precisely that reason, because that experience is non-erroneous, difference does not cease even for the liberated one. Nor is the Lord’s absence of suffering due merely to a difference of adjuncts. For the experiencer is experienced as one even when adjuncts such as hands and feet differ.
Even the fallen headless trunks, with upraised weapons in their staff-like arms, struck down enemies in battle while seeing with the eyes in their own heads.
From this statement in the Bhārata, distinctness is not due to separation. Therefore, precisely because difference is not based on a limiting adjunct, there is no identity of the liberated one with the Lord.
Having resorted to this knowledge and attained similarity of nature with me, they are not born even at creation, nor do they cause distress at dissolution.
When the seer beholds the golden-hued Creator—the Lord, the Person, the source of Brahmā—then the knower, having shaken off merit and demerit and become stainless, attains supreme likeness.
and from statements such as this declaring the liberated soul’s difference.
Thus, because of conflict with perception, inference, and scripture, even statements appearing as though non-difference were their subject matter must be construed only as having similarity and the like as their meanings.
Where scriptural texts indeed appear mutually contradictory, their meaning is to be ascertained there, in accordance with what is observed.
Also because of the statement concerning Brahman thus.
If the erroneousness of the experience of difference and the like is admitted, then, because the reasoning that denies it is far more erroneous, the experience of difference and the like proves to be non-erroneous alone, since denial of either of two mutually contradictory alternatives necessarily entails affirmation of the other.
Under the position of the one-jīva doctrine, since the world does not cease even after the death of those committed to that doctrine, it follows that the sole jīva is indeed one committed to difference. And because of his insistence precisely on that difference, difference never ceases; thus only non-cessation results. Nor is there any valid evidence for the claim that all beings are imagined by the ignorance of the sole jīva. Therefore, it is established that Lord Viṣṇu, complete in all attributes, is indeed distinct even from liberated beings.
That which cannot at all be attained by the gods beginning with Brahmā and Īśāna—that is kaivalya; Your Lordship, whose intrinsic nature is that, belongs exclusively to Hari.
Growing beyond measure in bodily form, you are such that they do not attain your greatness.
Obeisance to you, Nārāyaṇa, the Lord of the cognizable, whose consciousness is true, who is supreme over the liberated and the unliberated, and whose pair of feet is venerated by the assembly of noble ones.
Ānandatīrtha, the lion among men, shines forth unopposed, having torn apart the sons of the Māyāvādins’ Diti with the claws of reasoning.
Flee, flee with haste, O illusionist demons! All-knowing Hari approaches, bearing logic and scripture as his conch and discus.
Flee, flee quickly, illusionists; enter the caves without drowsiness. The all-knowing sun rises, having as his abode the sky that is the garment of Kamalā’s Lord.
Nṛhari, named Sakalajña, is indeed approaching the deceitful Dānavas. That being so, it is fitting for you to flee from here in haste and dwell in caves.
Victorious is the Man-Lion, Ānandatīrtha’s chosen deity, whose exceedingly mighty roar has torn apart the door consisting of the darkness of ignorance.
The Lord of Śrī triumphs—of immeasurable prowess, the beloved wish-fulfilling gem of his own people, venerated by those headed by Brahmā and Śiva, and an ocean of hosts of qualities.
The unconquered Lord of Śrī triumphs—omniscient, lord of the true sages, dwelling in the mind-lotuses of the exalted virtuous, and the support of Ramā’s vine-like arms.
Thus ends the Tattvodyota, composed by the venerable Ānandatīrtha Bhagavatpādācārya.
