Tattvōdyōtam (तत्त्वोद्योतः)
तत्त्वोद्योतम्
The Illumination of Reality
सर्वत्राखिलसच्छक्तिः स्वतन्त्रोऽशेषदर्शनः।
Whose power is everywhere complete and real, who is independent and all-seeing...
नित्यातादृशचिच्चेत्ययन्तेष्टो नो रमापतिः
The Lord of Ramā, controller of sentient beings and objects of cognition that are eternally unlike him, is beloved to us.
विमतो भिन्नो मुक्तत्वात्, यदित्थं तत्तथा, यथा सम्प्रतिपन्नः। न च भेदे विकल्पो युज्यते । अनिर्वचनीयस्य सर्वत्राप्रसिद्धत्वादेव । शशविषाणं गोविषाणं वोच्यते इतिवत्। न चानिर्वचनीये किञ्चिन्मानम् । मिथ्याशब्दोऽनिर्वचनीयं वदतीत्यत्र च । अनुमानस्य चाप्रसिद्धविशेषणः पक्षः । न च धूमत्ववत् मिथ्यात्वमित्युभयसम्प्रतिपन्नं सामान्यमस्ति । न च बाष्पारोपितधूमेन धूमवत्त्वं व्यभिचरति ।
The disputed subject is distinct because it is liberated: whatever is thus is so, as in the agreed-upon case. Nor is an alternative concerning difference tenable, precisely because the indefinable is nowhere established—as if a hare’s horn were called a cow’s horn. Nor is there any means of valid knowledge concerning the indefinable or for the claim that the word “false” denotes the indefinable. Moreover, the subject of the inference has an unestablished qualifier. Nor does there exist a universal accepted by both parties, namely “falsity,” comparable to smokehood. Nor does possession of smoke become inconstant because of smoke superimposed upon vapor.
न च भावाभावविलक्षणं क्वचिदागमो वक्ति ।
Nor does scripture anywhere assert anything distinct from existence and nonexistence.
‘नासदासीन्नो सदासीत् तदानीं नासीद्रजो नो व्योमापरो यत्’ (ऋ.१०.१२९.१)
‘Then non-being did not exist, nor did being exist; there was no atmosphere, nor the sky which was beyond.’
इत्यत्र च ।
And here also, with regard to this quoted statement…
पारिशेष्येणानिर्वचनीयत्वाङ्गीकारे
When indefinability is accepted by elimination …
‘आनीदवातं स्वधया तदेकम्’ (ऋ.१०.१२९.२)
That One breathed without wind by its own inherent power.
इति तदानीं परिशिष्टत्वाद् ब्रह्मण एवानिर्वचनीयत्वं स्यात् ।
Thus, at that time, because it was what remained, indefinability would pertain to Brahman alone.
‘मूर्तं सदिति सम्प्रोक्तम् अमूर्तमसदुच्यते । मूर्तामूर्तेतरद्ब्रह्म न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते ॥’
“The formed is declared to be existent; the formless is called nonexistent. Brahman is other than both the formed and the formless; it is called neither existent nor nonexistent.”
इति पैङ्गिश्रुतिः ।
Thus says the Paiṅgi scriptural text.
‘यदन्यद्वायोश्चान्तरिक्षाच्चैतत्सत्’
That which is other than Vāyu and the intermediate space—this is existent.
इति माध्यन्दिनश्रुतिः।
Thus says the revelation of the Mādhyandinas.
‘अद्भुतत्वादनिर्वाच्यं ब्रह्म चिच्चेत्यमेव च । अचिन्त्यं तत एवैतद् अतर्क्याज्ञेयमेव च ॥ ऋगतावितिधातोस्तु पूर्वावगतवत् सदा ।स्थितेः "ब्रह्मर्तम्" इत्युक्तमनृतं परिणामतः ॥’
Because of its wondrousness, Brahman is indescribable; it is consciousness and also that which is to be cognized. For that very reason, this is inconceivable, beyond reasoning, and indeed unknowable. From the verbal root meaning “to go,” however, Brahman is said to be “true” because it always remains just as previously apprehended, whereas the untrue is so called because of transformation.
‘प्रकृतिप्राकृतं प्रोक्तम् असत्तदशुभत्वतः । असतां बुद्धिगम्यत्वाद् असत्यमिति चोच्यते ॥ नियमेन बहिश्चित्तास्तेसन्तो ब्रह्मणि स्थिताः । विश्वं सत्यं वशे विष्णोः नित्यमेव प्रवाहतः ॥ न क्वाप्यनीदृशं विश्वं तत्तत्कालानुसारतः । असत्यमप्रतिष्ठं ते जगदाहुरनीश्वरम् ॥ त आसुरा स्वयं नष्टा जगतः क्षयकारिणः ॥’
Prakṛti and its products are declared asat because of their inauspiciousness. Because the universe is apprehensible to the intellects of the wicked, it is also called “asatya.” They are invariably outward-minded; the good are established in Brahman. The universe is real, under Viṣṇu’s control, and indeed eternal by continuity. Nowhere is the universe otherwise than such, in accordance with each respective time. They call the world unreal, without foundation, and without a Lord. Those demoniac persons, themselves ruined, bring about the destruction of the world.
इत्यादि व्यासस्मृतौ ।
Such passages and others occur in the Vyāsa-smṛti.
‘असत्यमप्रतिष्ठं ते जगदाहुरनीश्वरम् । अपरस्परसम्भूतं किमन्यत् कामहैतुकम् ॥ एतां दृष्टिमवष्टभ्य नष्टात्मानोल्पबुद्धयः । प्रभवन्त्युग्रकर्माणः क्षयाय जगतोऽहिताः ॥’ (भ.गी.१६.८,९)
“They say, ‘The world is unreal, without foundation, and without a Lord. It has not been produced through mutual union; what else could it be but caused by desire?’ Holding fast to this view, those whose selves are ruined and whose understanding is slight arise, malevolent and of fierce deeds, for the destruction of the world.”
इत्यादि च गीतासु ।
And so forth also in the Bhagavad Gītā.
‘विश्वं सत्यं मघवाना युवोरिदापश्च न प्रमिनन्ति व्रतं वाम् ।’ (ऋ.सं.२.२४.१२)
All truth is indeed yours, O bounteous ones, and the waters do not transgress your ordinance.
‘प्रघान्वस्य महतो महानि सत्या सत्यस्य करणानि वोचम्’ (ऋ.सं.२.१५.१)
Let me now indeed proclaim the great deeds of this great one—the true accomplishments of the true one.
‘सत्यः सो अस्य महिमा गृणे शवो यज्ञेषु विप्ररातज्ये’ (ऋ.सं.८.३.४)
That greatness of his is true; I praise his might in sacrifices, in the sovereignty of the inspired sage.
‘कविर्मनीषी परिभूः स्वयम्भूर्याथातथ्यतोऽर्थान् व्यदधात् शाश्वतीभ्यः समाभ्यः’ (ईशावास्य.८)
The seer, the discerning one, the all-surpassing one, the self-existent one, ordered the entities according to their true nature for eternal years.
इत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यश्च ।
and also from śruti passages such as this.
न चार्थापत्त्यानिर्वचनीयसिद्धिः । असतः प्रतीतिं विना सद्वैलक्षण्यज्ञानानुपपत्तेः। न च
Nor is indefinability established by postulation, because knowledge of difference from the existent is impossible without apprehension of the nonexistent. Nor …
‘बाध्यं जगद्’
“The world is sublatable.”
इत्यत्र किञ्चिन्मानम्।
Some valid means of knowledge for this claim.
बाध्यत्वमपि हि तेषां मिथ्या । तस्य च मिथ्यात्वेऽबाध्यत्वमेव सत्यं स्यात् ।
Indeed, even their sublatability is false. And if that is false, non-sublatability alone would be true.
सद्विलक्षणत्वं च सज्जातिविलक्षणत्वम्, सन्मात्रविलक्षणत्वं वा । जात्यङ्गीकारे सद्बहुत्वम् । सन्मात्रविलक्षणत्वं चेत् सिद्धसाधनता । ब्रह्मवैलक्षण्याङ्गीकारात् ।
And being distinct from what is existent is either being distinct from the genus of existent things or being distinct from mere being. If a genus is admitted, there is a plurality of existent things. If it means being distinct from mere being, this merely proves what is already established, because difference from Brahman is admitted.
न च कयापि युक्त्या मानेन वा भेदनिराकरणं भवति । अङ्गीक्रियमाणत्वात् । अनिर्वचनीयासिद्धेश्च । सद्विलक्षणत्वमसद्विलक्षणत्वं च मिथ्येत्यविलक्षणत्वमेव सत्यं स्यात् । एवमेव हेत्वादिष्वपि विकल्पो निराकरणीयः । दृश्यत्वानुमानेष्वपि एते एव दोषाः । आत्मनोऽपि दृश्यत्वादनैकान्तिकता च । न चात्मनो दृक्कर्मत्वं विना तज्ज्ञानत्वम् । तदज्ञाननिवृत्तिश्च तेन भवति । न च तदाकारम् । अतद्विषयत्वादेव । तद्विषयत्वमेव हि तदाकारत्वम् । न हि ज्ञानज्ञेययोरेकाऽकारता । न ह्यज्ञानस्य घटाश्रयत्वं ब्रह्माश्रयत्वं वाऽस्ति । पुङ्गतमेव हि तमः ज्ञानेन निवर्तते । विषयाऽश्रयं चेदज्ञानं निवर्तते तर्ह्येकेन ज्ञातस्य घटस्यान्यैरज्ञातत्वं न स्यात् । अतद्विषयज्ञानेन तदज्ञाननिवृत्तौ घटज्ञानेनापि निवर्तेत । अविषयत्वादेव तस्य ज्ञानत्वं न स्याद् घटवत् ।
Difference is not negated by any reasoning whatsoever or by any means of valid knowledge, since it is being admitted and since the indefinable is unestablished. If being different from the real and being different from the unreal are false, non-difference alone would be true. In precisely this way, the alternatives regarding the reason and the rest are also to be refuted. These very defects also occur in inferences from cognizability, and the reason is inconclusive since the self too is an object of cognition. Nor can there be cognition of the self without the self’s being the object of cognition. The ignorance of it is removed by that cognition. Nor does that cognition have its form, precisely because it does not have it as its object. For having it as one’s object is precisely what it is to have its form. Cognition and the cognized object do not have identity of form. For ignorance has neither a pot nor Brahman as its locus. Only the darkness of ignorance present in a person is removed by cognition. If ignorance having the object as its locus is removed, then a pot known by one person would not be unknown to others. If ignorance of it were removed by a cognition not having it as its object, it would also be removed by cognition of a pot. Precisely because it has no object, it would not be cognition, like a pot.
जडत्वं चाप्रमातृत्वमेव । न च प्रमातृत्वमात्मनस्तैरङ्गीक्रियते । अतस्तदप्यनैकान्तिकम् । मिथ्याप्रमातृत्वं चानिर्वचनीयनिरासादेव निरस्तम् । यदि जडत्वं नामाप्रकाशत्वं तदप्यात्मनः स्वविषयप्रकाशत्वाभावात् परविषयप्रकाशत्वाभावाच्च अनैकान्तिकमेव । स्वविषयत्वं हि कर्तृकर्मविरोधात् तैर्नाङ्गीक्रियते । मिथ्याभूतपरविषयत्वं चानिर्वचनीयनिरासादेव निरस्तम् । विषयवर्जितः प्रकाश एव न भवति घटवत् । तत्प्रमाणाभावात् ।
And insentience is nothing but the absence of cognizerhood. They do not accept cognizerhood of the self. Therefore, that too is inconclusive. Unreal cognizerhood is also refuted simply through the rejection of the indefinable. If “insentience” means non-luminosity, that too is indeed inconclusive, since the self lacks both luminosity having itself as its object and luminosity having another as its object. For they do not accept its being its own object, because agency and objecthood are incompatible. Its having something unreal as another object is also refuted simply through the rejection of the indefinable. Luminosity devoid of an object is not luminosity at all, like a pot, because there is no valid means of knowledge for it.
देशतः कालतः परिच्छिन्नत्वं प्रकृतिकालादिष्वभावात् भागासिद्धम् । वस्तुतः परिच्छिन्नत्वमात्मनोऽपि भेदाङ्गीकारादनैकान्तिकम् ।
Limitation with respect to place and time is partially unestablished, because it is absent in prakṛti, time, and the like. Limitation with respect to entity is inconclusive, because difference is admitted even for the self.
प्रत्यक्षबाधितञ्च जगन्मिथ्यात्वम् । सदिति प्रतीयमानत्वात् । न च प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमन्येन केनापि बाध्यं दृष्टम् । चन्द्रप्रादेशत्वादिविषयं तु दूरस्थत्वादिदोषयुक्तत्वात् अपटु । न च जगत्प्रत्यक्षस्यापटुत्वे किञ्चिन्मानम् । न च जगतोऽज्ञानजन्यत्वे किञ्चिन्मानम् ।
And the falsity of the world is contradicted by direct perception, because the world is apprehended as existent. Nor is anything established by direct perception seen to be sublated by anything else whatsoever. The perception whose object is such things as the moon’s being span-sized, however, is non-acute because it is affected by defects such as remoteness. There is no valid means of knowledge whatsoever for the non-acuity of the direct perception of the world. Nor is there any valid means of knowledge whatsoever for the world’s being produced by ignorance.
‘न च मायाविना माया दृश्यते विश्वमीश्वरः । सदा पश्यति तेनेदं न मायेत्यवधार्यताम् ॥ अपरोक्षदृशो मिथ्यादर्शनं न क्वचिद्भवेत् । सर्वापरोक्षविद्विष्णुर्विश्वदृक्तन्न तन्मृषा ॥’
Nor is an illusion perceived by the illusionist. The Lord always perceives the universe; for that reason, let it be ascertained that this is not an illusion. False perception could never occur for one who perceives directly. Viṣṇu knows everything directly and perceives the universe; therefore it is not unreal.
इति ब्रह्माण्डे ॥
Thus, in the Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa.
‘ईशोनीशो जगन्मिथ्या न पूज्यो गुरुरित्यपि । एक आत्मा परब्रह्मभावो मुक्तिरिति ह्यपि ॥ एवमादि विरुद्धानि वचनान्यथ युक्तयः । प्रमाणैर्बहुभिः ज्ञेया आभासा इति वैदिकैः ॥ वेदवेदानुसारेषु विरोधेन्यार्थकल्पना । इतराणि विरुद्धानि प्रलम्भभ्रमजान्यपि ॥’
“The Lord is not sovereign; the world is unreal; the guru is not to be worshipped”; also, “The self is one; the state of being Supreme Brahman is liberation.” Such contradictory statements and, furthermore, arguments are indeed to be recognized by Vedic adherents, through many means of valid knowledge, as mere semblances. In the Veda and works conforming to the Veda, when there is contradiction, another meaning is to be construed; the other contradictory statements are also born of deception and error.
इति व्यासस्मृतिः ॥
Thus says the Vyāsa-smṛti.
‘नासतो दृष्टत्वात्’ (ब्रह्मसूत्रम् - २.२.२६),
Not from the nonexistent, because it is observed.
‘नाभाव उपलब्धेः’ (ब्रह्मसूत्रम् -२.२.२८),
Non-existence is not the case, because of apprehension.
‘वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्’ (ब्रह्मसूत्रम् - २.२.२९)
And because of the dissimilarity, not as with dreams and the like.
इत्यादि भगवद्वचनेनापि निरस्ताः ।
They are refuted also by the Lord’s statement beginning thus.
न च शून्यवादिसकाशात् वैलक्षण्यं मायावादिनः । व्यावहारिकसत्त्वस्य तेनाप्यङ्गीकारात् ।
Nor is the Māyāvādin distinct from the Śūnyavādin, since the latter too accepts empirical existence.
‘सत्यं तु द्विविधं प्रोक्तं सांवृतं पारमार्थिकम् । सांवृतं व्यावहार्यं स्यान्निवृत्तौ पारमार्थिकम् ॥ विचार्यमाणे नो सत्त्वं सत्त्वं चापि प्रतीयते । यस्य तत्सांवृतं ज्ञेयं व्यवहारपदञ्च यत् ॥’
“Truth, however, is said to be of two kinds: conventional and ultimate. The conventional would be fit for practical dealings; upon cessation, truth would be ultimate. That of which there is no existence when it is examined, though existence is nevertheless apprehended, and which is a basis for practical dealings, is to be known as conventional.”
इत्यादिना ।
By this and similar statements.
न च निर्विशेषब्रह्मवादिनः शून्यात् कश्चित् विशेषस्तस्य ।
And for the proponent of Brahman devoid of distinctions, there is no distinction whatsoever between it and the void.
‘निर्विशेषं स्वयं भातं निर्लेपमजरामरम् । शून्यं तत्त्वम् अविज्ञेयं मनोवाचामगोचरम् ॥ जाड्यसंवृतिदुःखान्तपूर्वदोषविरोधि यत् । नित्यभावनया भातं तद्भावं योगिनं नयेत् ॥ भावार्थप्रतियोगित्वं भावत्वं वा न तत्त्वतः । विश्वाकारं च संवृत्त्या यस्य तत्पदमक्षयम् ॥’
The distinctionless, self-manifest, stainless, undecaying and immortal, void, unknowable reality inaccessible to mind and speech—which is opposed to defects headed by insentience, concealment, suffering, and perishability, and is manifested through constant contemplation—may lead the yogin to its state. Its imperishable state is in reality neither counterpositive status relative to a positive entity nor positive entityhood, and through phenomenal manifestation it has the form of the universe.
इत्यादि तद्वचः ।
Such are their words, and so forth.
‘अनृतजडविरोधिरूपमन्तत्रयमलबन्धनदुःखताविरुद्धम्’
Of a nature opposed to unreality and insentience, and contrary to threefold limitation, impurity, bondage, and the condition of suffering.
इति च मायावादी
And thus says the proponent of Māyāvāda.
‘नास्य सत्त्वमसत्त्वं वा न दोषो गुण एव वा । हेयोपादेयरहितं तच्छून्यं पदमक्षयम् ॥’
It has neither existence nor nonexistence, neither defect nor indeed quality. That imperishable state, devoid of what is to be rejected or accepted, is empty.
इति च शून्यवादी ।
And thus says the proponent of emptiness.
सत्त्वादयो धर्माः परमार्थतो मायावादिनाऽपि नाङ्गीक्रियन्ते । सर्वविशेषविनिर्मुक्तत्वाङ्गीकारात् ।
Even the Māyāvādin does not accept attributes such as existence as ultimately real, because he accepts the state of being devoid of every distinguishing characteristic.
‘अवाच्यं सर्वशब्दैस्तल्लक्ष्यते चाखिलैः पदैः । अज्ञेयं ज्ञानलक्ष्यं च तच्छून्यं पदमक्षयम् ॥’
That is not denotable by any word, yet is indicated by every expression; it is unknowable, yet the object of knowledge—that void, imperishable state.
इति च शून्यवादी ।
Thus also says the proponent of emptiness.
न चाखण्डत्वेन कश्चिद्विशेषः ।
And there is no differentiating feature by virtue of indivisibility.
‘यदखण्डपदं लक्ष्यं सर्वैरपि विशेषणैः । सर्वैर्विशेषणैर्मुक्तं तच्छून्यं पदमक्षयम् ॥’
“That indivisible state which is indicated by all qualifiers without exception, being free from all qualifiers, is the void state that is imperishable.”
इति च शून्यवादी ।
Thus also says the proponent of emptiness.
एवमेव मायावादिराद्धान्तः । न च मायावादिनो भावत्वं नाम धर्मः । न च शून्यवादिनः शून्यत्वं नाम धर्मः ।
Precisely likewise is the established position of the Māyāvādin. Nor does the Māyāvādin have a property called existence, nor does the Śūnyavādin have a property called emptiness.
‘मय्यनन्तगुणेनन्ते गुणतोनन्तविग्रहे । यदासीत् तत एवाद्यः स्वयम्भूः समभूदजः ॥’ (भाग.६.४.४८)
From that which existed in me—possessed of infinite attributes, infinite in respect of qualities, and possessing an infinite form—the primal, self-born, unborn one arose.
‘उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः । यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य बिभर्त्यव्यय ईश्वरः’ (भ.गी.२४.१७)
The Supreme Person, however, is other, designated as the Supreme Self—the immutable Lord who, having entered the three worlds, sustains them.
इति भगवद्राद्धान्तः ।
Thus is the Lord’s established conclusion.
‘पराऽस्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च’ (श्वेत.उ.६.८)
His supreme power is indeed heard to be manifold, and His knowledge, strength, and action are intrinsic.
इत्यादि श्रुतिः ।
Thus reads this and similar Śruti passages.
प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्रः इत्यादिषु प्रकृष्टत्वादिविशेषणानि सन्त्येवेति न तत्साम्यम् । अनित्यदेशकालसम्बन्धित्वस्य सत्त्वात्, न
Since qualifications such as intensity do indeed exist in statements such as “The moon possesses intense luminosity,” there is no similarity to that. Because non-permanent relatedness to place and time exists, not…
‘सोऽयं देवदत्तः’
This is that Devadatta.
इत्याद्युपमा च । देवदत्तादिस्वरूपमात्रस्य सिद्धत्वान्न स्वरूपमात्रे प्रश्नः । नक्षत्राऽदिव्यतिरेकमात्रस्यापि सिद्धत्वान्न व्यतिरेकमात्रे । अन्यथा प्रश्नस्यैवासम्भवात् । अतः
There is also an analogy and the like stated in this way. Since the mere identity of Devadatta and the like is established, the question does not concern mere identity. Since mere difference from stars and the like is also established, it does not concern mere difference. Otherwise, the very question would be impossible. Therefore…
‘कैर्विशेषणैर्विशिष्टः?’
“Qualified by which attributes?”
इति प्रश्ने
When the question is posed thus, …
‘प्रकृष्टप्रकाशतद्देशकालादिविशिष्ट’
“Qualified by intense illumination, that place, time, and so forth”
एव वाक्यार्थः । अङ्गीक्रियमाणत्वाद्विशिष्टादेः, अनिर्वचनीयाभावाच्च सत्यत्वञ्च सिद्धम् ।
… alone is the meaning of the sentence. Since the qualified entity and the rest are accepted, and since the indeterminable is absent, reality too is established.
दृष्टस्य वस्तुनो बलवद्दृष्टिं विना नान्यद्बाधकमिति दुर्घटत्वे सुघटत्वे वा नानिर्वचनीयसिद्धिः । सर्ववैलक्षण्याङ्गीकारात् दुर्घटमपि ब्रह्म प्रमाणादङ्गीक्रियत एव । जगतो भिन्नमभिन्नम्, भिन्नाभिन्नं वा इत्यादिविकल्पस्तत्रापि युज्यते । भिन्नं चेद्भेदादिविशिष्टाच्छुद्धं भिन्नमभिन्नं वा इत्याद्यनवस्था । अभिन्नं चेन्मिथ्यारूपेण जगता ब्रह्मापि मिथ्यैव स्यात् । भिन्नाभिन्नं चेद्दोषद्वयमपि । उभयविलक्षणं चेदनिर्वचनीयत्वं ब्रह्मण एवापतितम् । यद्येवमपि नानिर्वचनीयत्वं ब्रह्मणस्तर्हि जगतोऽपि न स्यात् ।
For an object that has been cognized, nothing other than a stronger cognition is a sublator; thus, whether there is incoherence or coherence, indeterminability is not established. Because absolute distinctness is admitted, even an incoherent Brahman is indeed accepted on the basis of a valid means of knowledge. The alternatives as to whether Brahman is different from the world, non-different from it, or both different and non-different apply in that case as well. If it is different, there is an infinite regress as to whether pure Brahman is different from or non-different from Brahman qualified by difference and so on. If it is non-different from the world, which has a false nature, Brahman too would itself be false. If it is both different and non-different, both defects follow. If it is distinct from both, indeterminability has resulted for Brahman itself. If, even so, Brahman’s indeterminability does not follow, then it would not follow for the world either.
‘विश्वं सत्यम्’
“The universe is real”
इत्यादिवचनमत्राप्युक्तम् ।
A statement beginning thus has been cited here too.
‘न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते’,
“That is said to be neither being nor non-being.”
‘असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्’,
This was indeed non-being in the beginning.
‘नासदासीन्नो सदासीत् तदानीम्’
At that time, neither non-being nor being existed.
इत्यादि ब्रह्मणोऽपि मिथ्यात्वे प्रमाणमस्ति ।
Statements such as this are evidence for the unreality even of Brahman.
न हि दृष्टेर्बलवत् किञ्चित्प्रमाणम् । न हि युक्तिपराजितोऽपि क्षुधितो नान्नमत्ति । बलवद्दृष्ट्यबाधे । न चान्नत्वे दुर्घटे तस्यानन्नत्वं भवति । दृष्ट्यबाधितदृष्टस्य । न चान्नानन्नवैलक्षण्यमनुभूयते । न च तथा व्यवहारः । न च तत्र किञ्चिन्मानम् । अतो विशिष्टादिनिराकरणयुक्तीनामपि विशिष्टाद्यपेक्षत्वात् जात्युत्तरमिति न युक्तिबाधाऽपि । अतो निखिलगुणगणाढ्यमेव ब्रह्म श्रुत्यभिप्रेतम् ।
Indeed, there is no means of knowledge stronger than perception. Even one defeated by reasoning does not fail to eat food when hungry, when powerful perception remains unsublated. Nor does what is seen through unsublated perception become non-food when its being food is untenable. Nor is a distinction between food and non-food experienced. Nor does practical conduct proceed in that manner. Nor is there any means of knowledge for it. Thus, because even the reasonings that negate the qualified and the like depend on the qualified and the like, they amount to a jāti-rejoinder; there is no sublation by reasoning either. Therefore, it is precisely Brahman replete with the entire host of attributes that is intended by Śruti.
अनिर्वचनीयासिद्धेरेवानुमानस्याप्यसिद्धिः । वाचारम्भणं विविधप्रकारः । नाम धेयम् नित्यं धार्यं नाम मृत्तिकेत्यादि वैदिकमेव इत्येतद् वचनं सत्यमिति श्रुत्यर्थः। अनित्यत्वात् साङ्केतिकं नामाप्रधानं नित्यत्वात् मृत्तिकादिनामैव प्रधानम् । प्रधानज्ञानादप्रधानं ज्ञातार्थमिव भवति । एवं प्रधानस्य परमात्मनो ज्ञानादप्रधानं ज्ञातमिव भवति । प्राधान्यज्ञापनार्थमेव सृष्ट्यादिकथनम् ।
Precisely because the indefinable entity is not established, the inference too is unestablished. The meaning of the śruti is that this statement is true: “Origination through speech is of various kinds. A name is to be assigned—a name to be borne eternally. The word ‘clay’ and the like are exclusively Vedic.” Because it is impermanent, a conventional name is subordinate; because it is permanent, a name such as “clay” alone is principal. From knowledge of the principal, the subordinate becomes as though its meaning were known. In the same way, from knowledge of the principal, the Supreme Self, the subordinate becomes as though known. The account of creation and the like is solely for making his principal status known.
‘यथा सोम्य’
“Just as, dear one …”
इत्याद्यपि सादृश्यकथनम् । न चैकनखनिकृन्तनविकारः सर्वकार्ष्ण्यायसम् । प्रधानपुरुषज्ञानाद्
Even the passage beginning thus is a statement of similarity. Nor is the modification consisting of a single nail-cutter all black iron. From knowledge of the chief person …
‘ग्रामो ज्ञातः’
‘A village is known’
इति व्यपदेशोऽस्ति ।
There is the designation “thus.”
न हि सत्यज्ञानेन मिथ्याज्ञानं भवति । मुक्तामुक्तयोर्भेदाभावे मुक्तस्य संसारः संसारिणो वा मुक्तत्वं स्यात् । यद्यज्ञानकृतो भेदस्तर्हीश्वरस्याज्ञानाभावात् संसारिणैक्यं तेनानुभूयेत । ततश्च दुःखित्वं स्यात् ।
For false cognition does not arise from true cognition. If there were no difference between the liberated and the unliberated, transmigration would belong to the liberated one, or liberation to the transmigrating being. If the difference were produced by ignorance, then, because Īśvara is free from ignorance, identity with the transmigrating being would be experienced by him. He would consequently be subject to suffering.
‘तान्यहं वेद सर्वाणि न त्वं वेत्थ परन्तप ॥’ (भ.गी ४.५)
“I know all of them; you do not know them, O scorcher of foes.”
‘सुखं दुःखं भवोभावो भयं चाभयमेव च ॥ अहिंसा समता तुष्टिस्तपो दानं यशोऽयशः । भवन्ति भावा भूतानां मत्त एव पृथग्विधाः ॥’ (भ.गी १०.४,५ )
Pleasure and pain, being and non-being, fear and indeed fearlessness, nonviolence, equanimity, contentment, austerity, giving, fame, and infamy—these various states of beings arise from me alone.
‘यस्माद् क्षरमतीतोहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः । अतोऽस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः ॥’ (भ.गी १५.१८ )
Because I have transcended the perishable and am higher even than the imperishable, I am therefore renowned in the world and in the Veda as the Supreme Person.
इत्यादिनेश्वरेणापि भेदस्यैवानुभूयमानत्वाच्च ।
and because difference itself is experienced even by the Lord through statements such as this.
तत एवाभ्रान्तत्वान्न मुक्तस्यापि भेदनिवृत्तिः । न चोपाधिभेदमात्रेणेश्वरस्य दुःखाभावः । हस्तपादाद्युपाधिभेदेपि भोक्तुरेकत्वानुभवात् ।
For precisely that reason, because that experience is non-erroneous, difference does not cease even for the liberated one. Nor is the Lord’s absence of suffering due merely to a difference of adjuncts. For the experiencer is experienced as one even when adjuncts such as hands and feet differ.
‘उद्यतायुधदोर्दण्डाः पतितास्वशिरोक्षिभिः । पश्यन्तः पातयन्ति स्म कबन्धा अप्यरीन् युधि ॥’
Even the fallen headless trunks, with upraised weapons in their staff-like arms, struck down enemies in battle while seeing with the eyes in their own heads.
इति भारतवचनान्न विश्लेषाद्विशेषः । अतोऽनौपाधिकत्वादेव भेदस्य न मुक्तस्येश्वरैक्यम् ।
From this statement in the Bhārata, distinctness is not due to separation. Therefore, precisely because difference is not based on a limiting adjunct, there is no identity of the liberated one with the Lord.
‘इदं ज्ञानमुपाश्रित्य मम साधर्म्यमागताः । सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रलये न व्यथयन्ति च ॥’ (भ.गी १४.२)
Having resorted to this knowledge and attained similarity of nature with me, they are not born even at creation, nor do they cause distress at dissolution.
‘यदा पश्यः पश्यते रुक्मवर्णं कर्तारमीशं पुरुषं ब्रह्मयोनिम् । तदा विद्वान् पुण्यपापे विधूय निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति ॥’ (आथर्वण.४.३.३)
When the seer beholds the golden-hued Creator—the Lord, the Person, the source of Brahmā—then the knower, having shaken off merit and demerit and become stainless, attains supreme likeness.
इत्यादिमुक्तभेदवचनेभ्यश्च ।
and from statements such as this declaring the liberated soul’s difference.
एवं प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमविरुद्धत्वादभेदविषयवत् प्रतीयमानान्यपि वाक्यानि सादृश्याद्यर्थान्येव योजनीयानि ।
Thus, because of conflict with perception, inference, and scripture, even statements appearing as though non-difference were their subject matter must be construed only as having similarity and the like as their meanings.
‘विरुद्धवत्प्रतीयन्त आगमा यत्र वै मिथः । तत्र दृष्टानुसारेण तेषामर्थोऽन्ववेक्ष्यते ॥’
Where scriptural texts indeed appear mutually contradictory, their meaning is to be ascertained there, in accordance with what is observed.
इति ब्राह्मवचनाच्च ।
Also because of the statement concerning Brahman thus.
भेदाद्यनुभवस्य भ्रान्तित्वाङ्गीकारे तदपलापयुक्तेर्नितरां भ्रान्तित्वाद् भेदाद्यनुभवस्याभ्रान्तित्वमेव भवति । परस्परविरुद्धयोरन्यतरनिषेधस्य अन्यतरविधिनान्तरीयकत्वात् ।
If the erroneousness of the experience of difference and the like is admitted, then, because the reasoning that denies it is far more erroneous, the experience of difference and the like proves to be non-erroneous alone, since denial of either of two mutually contradictory alternatives necessarily entails affirmation of the other.
एकजीववादपक्षे तन्निष्ठानां मृत्यनन्तरमपि विश्वस्यानिवृत्तत्वात् भेदनिष्ठ एवैकजीव इत्यापतति । तस्य च तत्रैवाग्रहान्न कदाचिद्भेदनिवृत्तिरित्यनिवृत्तिरेव भवति । न चैकजीवाज्ञानपरिकल्पितास्समस्ता इत्यत्र किञ्चिन्मानम् । अतो मुक्तेभ्योऽप्यन्य एव समस्तगुणपरिपूर्णो भगवान् विष्णुरिति सिद्धम् ।
Under the position of the one-jīva doctrine, since the world does not cease even after the death of those committed to that doctrine, it follows that the sole jīva is indeed one committed to difference. And because of his insistence precisely on that difference, difference never ceases; thus only non-cessation results. Nor is there any valid evidence for the claim that all beings are imagined by the ignorance of the sole jīva. Therefore, it is established that Lord Viṣṇu, complete in all attributes, is indeed distinct even from liberated beings.
‘ब्रह्मेशानादिभिर्देवैर्यत्प्राप्तुं नैव शक्यते । तद्यत्स्वभावः कैवल्यं स भवान् केवलो हरेः ॥’
That which cannot at all be attained by the gods beginning with Brahmā and Īśāna—that is kaivalya; Your Lordship, whose intrinsic nature is that, belongs exclusively to Hari.
‘परो मात्रया तन्वा वृधान न ते महित्वमन्वश्नुवन्ति ।’ (ऋ.सं.७.९९)
Growing beyond measure in bodily form, you are such that they do not attain your greatness.
सत्यचिच्चेत्यपतये मुक्तामुक्तोत्तमाय ते । नमो नारायणायार्यवृन्दवन्दितपद्द्वय ॥
Obeisance to you, Nārāyaṇa, the Lord of the cognizable, whose consciousness is true, who is supreme over the liberated and the unliberated, and whose pair of feet is venerated by the assembly of noble ones.
आनन्दतीर्थपुंसिहो मायावादिदितेः सुतान् । विदार्य युक्तिनखरैरप्रतीपोऽभिभासते ॥
Ānandatīrtha, the lion among men, shines forth unopposed, having torn apart the sons of the Māyāvādins’ Diti with the claws of reasoning.
पलायध्वं पलायध्वं त्वरया मायिदानवाः । सर्वज्ञहरिरायाति तर्कागमदरारिभृत् ॥
Flee, flee with haste, O illusionist demons! All-knowing Hari approaches, bearing logic and scripture as his conch and discus.
द्रवत द्रवताऽशु मायिनः प्रविशध्वमतन्द्रिता गुहाः । कमलारमणाम्बराश्रयः समुदेत्यखिलज्ञभास्करः ॥
Flee, flee quickly, illusionists; enter the caves without drowsiness. The all-knowing sun rises, having as his abode the sky that is the garment of Kamalā’s Lord.
नृहरिः सकलज्ञनामकः समुपैति हि मायिदानवान् । प्रपलायनमत्र तत्क्षमं त्वरया (वो) वसतिर्गुहासु च ॥
Nṛhari, named Sakalajña, is indeed approaching the deceitful Dānavas. That being so, it is fitting for you to flee from here in haste and dwell in caves.
जयत्यानन्दतीर्थेष्टदेवता नरकेसरी । विपाटिताज्ञानतमःकपाटात्युरुहुङ्कृतः ॥
Victorious is the Man-Lion, Ānandatīrtha’s chosen deity, whose exceedingly mighty roar has torn apart the door consisting of the darkness of ignorance.
जयत्यमितपौरुषः स्वजनतेष्टचिन्तामणिः । अजेशमुखवन्दितो गुणगणार्णवः श्रीपतिः ॥
The Lord of Śrī triumphs—of immeasurable prowess, the beloved wish-fulfilling gem of his own people, venerated by those headed by Brahmā and Śiva, and an ocean of hosts of qualities.
सर्वज्ञसन्मुनीन्द्रोच्चसन्मनःपङ्कजालयः(पङ्कजाश्रयः) । अजितो जयति श्रीशो रमाबाहुलताश्रयः ॥
The unconquered Lord of Śrī triumphs—omniscient, lord of the true sages, dwelling in the mind-lotuses of the exalted virtuous, and the support of Ramā’s vine-like arms.
इति श्रीमदानन्दतीर्थभगवत्पादाचार्यविरचितः तत्त्वोद्योतः
Thus ends the Tattvodyota, composed by the venerable Ānandatīrtha Bhagavatpādācārya.
