Pramāṇalakṣaṇam (प्रमाणलक्षणम्)
pramāṇalakṣaṇam
The Definition of Pramāṇa
aśēṣagurumīśēśaṁ nārāyaṇamanāmayam । sampraṇamya pravakṣyāmi pramāṇānāṁ svalakṣaṇam ॥
Having bowed reverently to Nārāyaṇa, the teacher of all without exception, the Lord of lords, free from affliction, I shall set forth the intrinsic definition of pramāṇas.
yathārthaṁ pramāṇam । tad dvividham । kēvalamanupramāṇaṁ ca । yathārthajñānaṁ kēvalam । tatsādhanamanupramāṇam ।
Pramāṇa is veridical. It is twofold: kevala and anupramāṇa. Veridical cognition is kevala; the means to it is anupramāṇa.
kēvalaṁ caturvidham । īśa-lakṣmī-yōgi-ayōgibhēdēna । pūrvadvayam anādinityam । svātantrya-pāratantryābhyāṁ tadviśēṣāḥ । pūrvaṁ svaparagatākhilaviśēṣaviṣayam । dvitīyam īśē’nyēbhyō’dhikam । asārvatrikam । anyatra sarvaviṣayam । spaṣṭatvē bhēdaḥ ।
Valid cognition itself is fourfold, according to the distinction among the Lord, Lakṣmī, yogins, and non-yogins. The first two are beginningless and eternal. They are differentiated by independence and dependence. The first has as its object every particularity present in itself and others. With respect to the Lord, the second is greater than those of others. It is not universal in scope. With respect to all else, it has everything as its object. There is a difference in clarity.
yōgijñānam r̥jūnāmanādinityam । īśē jīvēbhyō’dhikam । anyatrā’lōcanē sarvaviṣayam । kramēṇa vardhamānam । ā muktēḥ । tatō’vyayam । tatō’rvāk kramēṇa hrasitam । sādi ca tāttvikēbhyō’nyatra । ayōgijñānam utpattivināśavat । alpam ॥
The cognition of yogins is beginningless and eternal in the case of the Ṛjus. With respect to the Lord, it is greater than with respect to individual souls. With respect to other things, when attention is directed, it has all as its objects. It increases progressively up to liberation. Thereafter it is undiminishing. Prior to that point, it is progressively diminished. Except in the case of the Tāttvikas, it also has a beginning. The cognition of non-yogins is subject to origination and destruction and is limited.
anupramāṇaṁ trividham । pratyakṣam anumānam āgama iti । nirdōṣārthēndriyasannikarṣaḥ pratyakṣam । nirdōṣōpapattiranumānam । nirdōṣaḥ śabda āgamaḥ । arthāpattyupamē anumāviśēṣaḥ । abhāvō’numā pratyakṣaṁ ca । parāmarśa-aparāmarśaviśēṣāt । sambhavapariśēṣāvanumā ।
The instrumental means of valid cognition is threefold: perception, inference, and verbal testimony. Defect-free contact between an object and a sense faculty is perception. Defect-free reasoning is inference. A defect-free verbal statement is verbal testimony. Postulation and comparison are particular forms of inference. Absence is both inference and perception, because of the distinction between inferential reflection and its absence. Inclusion and elimination are forms of inference.
ātmānyōnyāśraya-cakrakā-anavasthā-kalpanāgaurava-śrutadr̥ṣṭahānādayō dūṣaṇānumā । upakrama-upasaṁhāra-tadaikarūpya-abhyāsā-apūrvatā-phala-arthavādāśca upapattiviśēṣāḥ । ta ēva sōpapattayō liṅgāni । samākhyāvākyaprakaraṇasthānāni ca liṅgaviśēṣāḥ ।
Self-dependence, mutual dependence, circularity, infinite regress, burdensomeness of postulation, abandonment of what is heard and observed, and the like are refutative inferences. Uniformity between the commencement and conclusion, repetition, novelty, result, and commendatory statements are particular forms of reasoning. Those very features, when accompanied by reasoning, are indicators. Designation, sentence, context, and position are also particular kinds of indicators.
vyāptirupapattimūlam । sā pratijñā-hētu-dr̥ṣṭāntarūpā । hētugarbhā pratijñā kēvalā’pi । siddhau pratijñāyāṁ hētumātraṁ ca । dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ sapratijñō hētugarbhaḥ ।
Invariable concomitance is the basis of reasoned justification. Such justification has the form of a proposition, a reason, and an example. A proposition alone, when containing a reason, also constitutes a justification; and when the proposition is established, the reason alone does so. An example accompanied by a proposition and containing a reason also constitutes a justification.
upapattidōṣau virōdha-asaṅgatī । nyūnādhikē vācanikē । saṁvādānuktiyutā nigrahāḥ ।
The two defects of reasoning are contradiction and incoherence. Deficiency and excess are verbal defects. Forms of defeat are characterized by concession and failure to reply.
pratyakṣaṁ saptavidham । sākṣiṣaḍindriyabhēdēna । mānasapratyakṣajā smr̥tiḥ । smr̥tyanuvādayōrnāprāmāṇyam । yathārthatvānubhavāt । ahānēśca । virōdhō mānasvavākyābhyām । svavākyavirōdhō’pasiddhāntajātirūpēṇa । jātiḥ
Direct perception is sevenfold, through the distinction between the witness and the six sense faculties. Memory arises from mental perception. Memory and reiteration do not lack epistemic validity, because their veridicality is experienced and because they are not rejected. Contradiction is either with a valid means of knowledge or with one's own statement. Contradiction with one's own statement takes the forms of apasiddhānta and jāti. A jāti objection is …
‘na mēyē mānāpēkṣā’
“The object of knowledge does not depend on a means of valid cognition.”
ityādikā ।
—and the like.
‘mēyē mānāpēkṣā’sti’
“The object of knowledge depends upon a valid means of knowledge.”
iti ca tēnaiva nyāyēna siddhatvāt । mānavirōdhaśca । chalam asaṅgatam । anyacca । gr̥ṣṭivivakṣayā
And because this is established by precisely the same reasoning. There is also conflict with a means of valid knowledge. The quibble is inapplicable. And another point: when a cow that has calved once is intended…
‘gām ānaya’
“Bring a cow,”
ityuktē pr̥thivīvivakṣayā
when it is said thus with the intention of referring to the earth …
‘gavānayanam aśakyam’
“Bringing a cow is impossible”
itivat ।
As in the statement just cited.
trividhō virōdhaḥ । pratijñā-hētu-dr̥ṣṭāntabhēdēna । pramāṇaviruddhārthapratijñā pratijñāvirōdhaḥ । hētusvarūpāsiddhiravyāptiścēti hētuvirōdhaḥ । sādhyasya sādhanasya vā ananugamō dr̥ṣṭāntavirōdhaḥ । pratijñāyāḥ samabalavirōdha ēva sapratisādhanaḥ । sa ēvōpādhidōṣō’pi ।
Contradiction is threefold, according to the distinction among thesis, reason, and example. Asserting a content contradicted by a valid means of knowledge is contradiction in the thesis. Nonestablishment of the reason itself and underpervasion are contradiction in the reason. Failure of either the probandum or the probans to occur concomitantly is contradiction in the example. Opposition to the thesis that is of equal force is precisely that furnished with a counterproof. That very same thing is also the defect of an upādhi.
sarva ētē dr̥śyatvānumānē draṣṭavyāḥ ।
All these are to be observed in the inference from perceptibility.
pratyakṣāgamādibhirjagataḥ satyatvāt । tatpakṣē dr̥śyatvasya ca mithyātvāt । anirvacanīyasya prativādinō’siddhatvāt । ātmanō’pi dr̥śyatvāt । śuktirajatādēranirvacanīyatvābhāvāt । anirvacanīyadr̥śyatvābhāvāt । mānasiddhatvāditi sapratisādhanatvācca । jagatsatyatvagrāhipratyakṣasya vartamānagrāhitvē anumānāgamaprāmāṇyagrāhiṇō’pi pratyakṣatvāviśēṣād uttarakṣaṇē prāmāṇyaṁ na sētsyati iti bhēdādivākyānāmēva prāmāṇyaṁ syāt । tasya sākṣisiddhatvaṁ cēt, jagatsatyatvamapi sākṣisiddham ।
Because the reality of the world is established by perception, scripture, and the like; because, on that position, perceptibility too is unreal; because an indefinable entity is unestablished for the opponent; because the self too is perceptible; because nacre-silver and the like are not indefinable; because no indefinable entity is perceptible; and because it is met by a counterproof on the ground of being established by valid means of knowledge. If the perception apprehending the reality of the world apprehends only the present, then, since the perception apprehending the validity of inference and scripture is likewise no different in being perception, that validity will not be established in the next moment. Thus, only statements of difference and the like would be valid. If that validity is established by the witness-consciousness, the reality of the world too is established by the witness-consciousness.
vyabhicāraścēd āgamārthānumā nirdōṣatvādhyavasāyē ca samaḥ । ata uttaradivasē abhēdavākyasya bhēdō’rthaḥ syāt । nirdōṣānumāyāḥ sadōṣatvam । sadōṣānumāyā nirdōṣatvam ityavyavasthā ।
If there is deviation, it applies equally also to the ascertainment that an inference concerning the meaning of scripture is faultless. Consequently, on the following day, difference could be the meaning of a statement of non-difference; a faultless inference could be defective, and a defective inference faultless—thus there would be no fixed order.
āśrayasādhyavyadhikaraṇāsiddhayō na dūṣaṇam, atiprasaṅgābhāvāt । atiprasaṅgēna hi dōṣatvādōṣatvē kalpyē । vyāptirēva hi prayōjikā । asatyapi vyāptirastyēva ।
Non-establishment of the locus and non-establishment through occurrence in a locus different from that of the probandum are not defects, because there is no overextension. For whether something is or is not a defect is to be determined on the basis of overextension. Pervasion alone is the operative factor. Even when the locus is nonexistent, pervasion certainly exists.
‘asadāśrayasya sādhakatvaṁ na’
“That which has a nonexistent locus has no capacity to establish.”
ityapi vyāptiṁ vinā kathaṁ nivāryatē ।
How is even this claim ruled out without an invariable concomitance?
asadāśrayam ityādiviśēṣaṇatvasambhavē kathamavyāptiḥ । na cātyantābhāvō’pi sarvadharmarahitaḥ । pramēyatvādyanubhavāt । pariśēṣārthāpattiprāmāṇyābhyupagamācca ।
When expressions such as “having what is nonexistent as its substratum” can serve as qualifiers, how is there under-pervasion? Nor is even absolute absence devoid of all properties, since its knowability and the like are experienced, and because the validity of elimination by remainder and postulation is accepted.
‘vimataṁ sakartr̥kam’
“The disputed subject has a maker.”
ityatra sarvajñatvasya pakṣadharmatābalēna sidhyaṅgīkārāt ।
because, in this case, the establishment of omniscience is accepted by the force of its being a property of the subject.
pariśēṣō’rthāpattiranumānamityaviśēṣaḥ । upapattimātratvāt । upapattēśca vyāptyapēkṣā sarvathāṅgīkāryētyāgrahamātrēṇa bhēdaḥ । upamānasyāpi vyāptirūpatvāt । na hi svasadr̥śēnāsadr̥śaṁ kvacid dr̥ṣṭam । yōgyānupalabdhēśca liṅgatvam, aviśēṣāt ।
There is no distinction among elimination by remainder, postulation, and inference, because each is nothing but explanatory justification. And the dependence of explanatory justification on invariable concomitance must be accepted in every case; the distinction is due merely to insistence. Comparison too has the form of invariable concomitance, for something dissimilar from what is similar to it is never observed anywhere. Non-apprehension of what is apprehensible also has the status of an inferential sign, because it is not distinct from one.
uktadōṣēṣvēva aśēṣānumānadōṣāṇāmantarbhāvaḥ । sādhyāviśiṣṭō’siddhaḥ । siddhasādhakō’saṅgataḥ । na pramāsādhanaṁ pramāṇam । jñānavyatiriktāyāṁ pramāyāṁ pramāṇābhāvāt । na cājñātaparicchittirēva pramā ityatra kiñcinmānam । yāthārthyamēva prāmāṇyamityaṅgīkārāt ।
All defects of inference are subsumed under the faults already stated alone. A reason not distinct from the probandum is unestablished; one that proves what is already established is irrelevant. A valid means of knowledge is not an instrument producing valid cognition, since there is no valid means of knowledge for a valid cognition distinct from cognition. Nor is there any warrant for the claim that valid cognition is exclusively the determination of what is unknown, since validity is accepted to be accordance with reality alone.
na cānubhūtirēva pramāṇam । smr̥tyādāvavyāptēḥ । vēdānumānādiprāmāṇyaprasiddhēśca ।
Nor is presentative cognition alone a pramāṇa, because this would under-extend to memory and the like, and because the validity of Veda, inference, and the like as pramāṇas is well established.
‘smr̥tiḥ pratyakṣamaitihyamanumānaṁ catuṣṭayam ।pramāṇamiti vijñēyaṁ dharmādyarthē bubhūṣubhiḥ ॥’
“The four—memory, perception, traditional testimony, and inference—are to be understood as valid means of knowledge by those who seek attainment of dharma and the other ends.”
iti śrutēśca ।
And because of the śruti statement to this effect.
aitihyamāgamabhēdaḥ । na ca samyaganubhavasādhanaṁ pramāṇam । īśvarajñānādāvavyāptēḥ । aprāmāṇyē pramāṇābhāvācca । prāmāṇyajñānē ca । tatrāpyaṅgīkārē’navasthitēḥ । svaprakāśātmāṅgīkārē tatrāvyāptēḥ । smr̥tēśca prāmāṇyānaṅgīkārē
Traditional report is a kind of testimony. Nor is a valid means of knowledge “that which produces veridical cognition,” since this definition fails to apply to God's cognition and the like, and since, if that cognition were not valid, no valid means of knowledge would exist. It also fails to apply to cognition of validity: if a further valid means of knowledge is admitted there too, an infinite regress results; if that cognition is accepted as self-luminous by nature, the definition fails to apply there. And if the validity of memory is not accepted…
‘anubhūtaṁ mayā’
“It was experienced by me”
ityatra pramāṇābhāvāt । liṅgatvēna prāmāṇyē kalpanāgauravāt । dr̥ṣṭahāniśca ।
Because there is no valid means of knowledge for this statement; if validity is posited on the basis of its being an inferential sign, because of the cumbersomeness of that postulation; and there is abandonment of what is observed.
smr̥tipramāṇadvaividhyamātrakalpanē mithyājñānādērnirāsādanubhavavirōdhaḥ ।
If only a twofold classification into memory and valid cognition is posited, it conflicts with experience because false cognition and the like are excluded.
‘tadanubhavābhāvaḥ’
“There is no experience of that”
ityuktē
When it is said thus…
‘anubhavaḥ smr̥tiśca nāsti’
“There is neither experience nor memory.”
ityuktē kimuttaram ?
When this is said, what is the reply?
svasiddhaiḥ sādhanaṁ parasiddhairdūṣaṇam । atō na dūṣaṇē apasiddhāntādi । iṣṭāpattiḥ siddhasādhanatvādasaṅgatamēva ॥
Proof is by what is established for oneself; refutation, by what is established for the opponent. Therefore, in refutation there is no deviation from an established tenet or the like. Acceptance of the desired consequence is altogether inapplicable, since it would amount to proving what is already established.
ānandatīrthamuninā brahmatarkōktimārgataḥ । mānalakṣaṇamityuktaṁ saṅkṣēpād brahmasiddhayē ॥
Thus the characterization of valid means of knowledge has been stated concisely by the sage Ānandatīrtha, following the line of exposition of the Brahmatarka, for the establishment of Brahman.
aśēṣamānamēyaikasākṣiṇē’kṣayamūrtayē । ajēśapuruhūtēḍya namō nārāyaṇāya tē ॥
O you who are worthy of praise by Brahmā, Śiva, and Indra, homage to you, Nārāyaṇa—the sole witness of all means of valid knowledge and all objects of knowledge, whose form is imperishable.
iti śrīmadānandatīrthabhagavatpādācāryaviracitaṁ pramāṇalakṣaṇam ॥
Thus ends the Pramāṇalakṣaṇa, composed by the venerable Ānandatīrtha Bhagavatpādācārya.
