Pramāṇalakṣaṇam (प्रमाणलक्षणम्)
प्रमाणलक्षणम्
The Definition of Pramāṇa
अशेषगुरुमीशेशं नारायणमनामयम् । सम्प्रणम्य प्रवक्ष्यामि प्रमाणानां स्वलक्षणम् ॥
Having bowed reverently to Nārāyaṇa, the teacher of all without exception, the Lord of lords, free from affliction, I shall set forth the intrinsic definition of pramāṇas.
यथार्थं प्रमाणम् । तद् द्विविधम् । केवलमनुप्रमाणं च । यथार्थज्ञानं केवलम् । तत्साधनमनुप्रमाणम् ।
Pramāṇa is veridical. It is twofold: kevala and anupramāṇa. Veridical cognition is kevala; the means to it is anupramāṇa.
केवलं चतुर्विधम् । ईश-लक्ष्मी-योगि-अयोगिभेदेन । पूर्वद्वयम् अनादिनित्यम् । स्वातन्त्र्य-पारतन्त्र्याभ्यां तद्विशेषाः । पूर्वं स्वपरगताखिलविशेषविषयम् । द्वितीयम् ईशेऽन्येभ्योऽधिकम् । असार्वत्रिकम् । अन्यत्र सर्वविषयम् । स्पष्टत्वे भेदः ।
Valid cognition itself is fourfold, according to the distinction among the Lord, Lakṣmī, yogins, and non-yogins. The first two are beginningless and eternal. They are differentiated by independence and dependence. The first has as its object every particularity present in itself and others. With respect to the Lord, the second is greater than those of others. It is not universal in scope. With respect to all else, it has everything as its object. There is a difference in clarity.
योगिज्ञानम् ऋजूनामनादिनित्यम् । ईशे जीवेभ्योऽधिकम् । अन्यत्राऽलोचने सर्वविषयम् । क्रमेण वर्धमानम् । आ मुक्तेः । ततोऽव्ययम् । ततोऽर्वाक् क्रमेण ह्रसितम् । सादि च तात्त्विकेभ्योऽन्यत्र । अयोगिज्ञानम् उत्पत्तिविनाशवत् । अल्पम् ॥
The cognition of yogins is beginningless and eternal in the case of the Ṛjus. With respect to the Lord, it is greater than with respect to individual souls. With respect to other things, when attention is directed, it has all as its objects. It increases progressively up to liberation. Thereafter it is undiminishing. Prior to that point, it is progressively diminished. Except in the case of the Tāttvikas, it also has a beginning. The cognition of non-yogins is subject to origination and destruction and is limited.
अनुप्रमाणं त्रिविधम् । प्रत्यक्षम् अनुमानम् आगम इति । निर्दोषार्थेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षः प्रत्यक्षम् । निर्दोषोपपत्तिरनुमानम् । निर्दोषः शब्द आगमः । अर्थापत्त्युपमे अनुमाविशेषः । अभावोऽनुमा प्रत्यक्षं च । परामर्श-अपरामर्शविशेषात् । सम्भवपरिशेषावनुमा ।
The instrumental means of valid cognition is threefold: perception, inference, and verbal testimony. Defect-free contact between an object and a sense faculty is perception. Defect-free reasoning is inference. A defect-free verbal statement is verbal testimony. Postulation and comparison are particular forms of inference. Absence is both inference and perception, because of the distinction between inferential reflection and its absence. Inclusion and elimination are forms of inference.
आत्मान्योन्याश्रय-चक्रका-अनवस्था-कल्पनागौरव-श्रुतदृष्टहानादयो दूषणानुमा । उपक्रम-उपसंहार-तदैकरूप्य-अभ्यासा-अपूर्वता-फल-अर्थवादाश्च उपपत्तिविशेषाः । त एव सोपपत्तयो लिङ्गानि । समाख्यावाक्यप्रकरणस्थानानि च लिङ्गविशेषाः ।
Self-dependence, mutual dependence, circularity, infinite regress, burdensomeness of postulation, abandonment of what is heard and observed, and the like are refutative inferences. Uniformity between the commencement and conclusion, repetition, novelty, result, and commendatory statements are particular forms of reasoning. Those very features, when accompanied by reasoning, are indicators. Designation, sentence, context, and position are also particular kinds of indicators.
व्याप्तिरुपपत्तिमूलम् । सा प्रतिज्ञा-हेतु-दृष्टान्तरूपा । हेतुगर्भा प्रतिज्ञा केवलाऽपि । सिद्धौ प्रतिज्ञायां हेतुमात्रं च । दृष्टान्तः सप्रतिज्ञो हेतुगर्भः ।
Invariable concomitance is the basis of reasoned justification. Such justification has the form of a proposition, a reason, and an example. A proposition alone, when containing a reason, also constitutes a justification; and when the proposition is established, the reason alone does so. An example accompanied by a proposition and containing a reason also constitutes a justification.
उपपत्तिदोषौ विरोध-असङ्गती । न्यूनाधिके वाचनिके । संवादानुक्तियुता निग्रहाः ।
The two defects of reasoning are contradiction and incoherence. Deficiency and excess are verbal defects. Forms of defeat are characterized by concession and failure to reply.
प्रत्यक्षं सप्तविधम् । साक्षिषडिन्द्रियभेदेन । मानसप्रत्यक्षजा स्मृतिः । स्मृत्यनुवादयोर्नाप्रामाण्यम् । यथार्थत्वानुभवात् । अहानेश्च । विरोधो मानस्ववाक्याभ्याम् । स्ववाक्यविरोधोऽपसिद्धान्तजातिरूपेण । जातिः
Direct perception is sevenfold, through the distinction between the witness and the six sense faculties. Memory arises from mental perception. Memory and reiteration do not lack epistemic validity, because their veridicality is experienced and because they are not rejected. Contradiction is either with a valid means of knowledge or with one's own statement. Contradiction with one's own statement takes the forms of apasiddhānta and jāti. A jāti objection is …
‘न मेये मानापेक्षा’
“The object of knowledge does not depend on a means of valid cognition.”
इत्यादिका ।
—and the like.
‘मेये मानापेक्षाऽस्ति’
“The object of knowledge depends upon a valid means of knowledge.”
इति च तेनैव न्यायेन सिद्धत्वात् । मानविरोधश्च । छलम् असङ्गतम् । अन्यच्च । गृष्टिविवक्षया
And because this is established by precisely the same reasoning. There is also conflict with a means of valid knowledge. The quibble is inapplicable. And another point: when a cow that has calved once is intended…
‘गाम् आनय’
“Bring a cow,”
इत्युक्ते पृथिवीविवक्षया
when it is said thus with the intention of referring to the earth …
‘गवानयनम् अशक्यम्’
“Bringing a cow is impossible”
इतिवत् ।
As in the statement just cited.
त्रिविधो विरोधः । प्रतिज्ञा-हेतु-दृष्टान्तभेदेन । प्रमाणविरुद्धार्थप्रतिज्ञा प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः । हेतुस्वरूपासिद्धिरव्याप्तिश्चेति हेतुविरोधः । साध्यस्य साधनस्य वा अननुगमो दृष्टान्तविरोधः । प्रतिज्ञायाः समबलविरोध एव सप्रतिसाधनः । स एवोपाधिदोषोऽपि ।
Contradiction is threefold, according to the distinction among thesis, reason, and example. Asserting a content contradicted by a valid means of knowledge is contradiction in the thesis. Nonestablishment of the reason itself and underpervasion are contradiction in the reason. Failure of either the probandum or the probans to occur concomitantly is contradiction in the example. Opposition to the thesis that is of equal force is precisely that furnished with a counterproof. That very same thing is also the defect of an upādhi.
सर्व एते दृश्यत्वानुमाने द्रष्टव्याः ।
All these are to be observed in the inference from perceptibility.
प्रत्यक्षागमादिभिर्जगतः सत्यत्वात् । तत्पक्षे दृश्यत्वस्य च मिथ्यात्वात् । अनिर्वचनीयस्य प्रतिवादिनोऽसिद्धत्वात् । आत्मनोऽपि दृश्यत्वात् । शुक्तिरजतादेरनिर्वचनीयत्वाभावात् । अनिर्वचनीयदृश्यत्वाभावात् । मानसिद्धत्वादिति सप्रतिसाधनत्वाच्च । जगत्सत्यत्वग्राहिप्रत्यक्षस्य वर्तमानग्राहित्वे अनुमानागमप्रामाण्यग्राहिणोऽपि प्रत्यक्षत्वाविशेषाद् उत्तरक्षणे प्रामाण्यं न सेत्स्यति इति भेदादिवाक्यानामेव प्रामाण्यं स्यात् । तस्य साक्षिसिद्धत्वं चेत्, जगत्सत्यत्वमपि साक्षिसिद्धम् ।
Because the reality of the world is established by perception, scripture, and the like; because, on that position, perceptibility too is unreal; because an indefinable entity is unestablished for the opponent; because the self too is perceptible; because nacre-silver and the like are not indefinable; because no indefinable entity is perceptible; and because it is met by a counterproof on the ground of being established by valid means of knowledge. If the perception apprehending the reality of the world apprehends only the present, then, since the perception apprehending the validity of inference and scripture is likewise no different in being perception, that validity will not be established in the next moment. Thus, only statements of difference and the like would be valid. If that validity is established by the witness-consciousness, the reality of the world too is established by the witness-consciousness.
व्यभिचारश्चेद् आगमार्थानुमा निर्दोषत्वाध्यवसाये च समः । अत उत्तरदिवसे अभेदवाक्यस्य भेदोऽर्थः स्यात् । निर्दोषानुमायाः सदोषत्वम् । सदोषानुमाया निर्दोषत्वम् इत्यव्यवस्था ।
If there is deviation, it applies equally also to the ascertainment that an inference concerning the meaning of scripture is faultless. Consequently, on the following day, difference could be the meaning of a statement of non-difference; a faultless inference could be defective, and a defective inference faultless—thus there would be no fixed order.
आश्रयसाध्यव्यधिकरणासिद्धयो न दूषणम्, अतिप्रसङ्गाभावात् । अतिप्रसङ्गेन हि दोषत्वादोषत्वे कल्प्ये । व्याप्तिरेव हि प्रयोजिका । असत्यपि व्याप्तिरस्त्येव ।
Non-establishment of the locus and non-establishment through occurrence in a locus different from that of the probandum are not defects, because there is no overextension. For whether something is or is not a defect is to be determined on the basis of overextension. Pervasion alone is the operative factor. Even when the locus is nonexistent, pervasion certainly exists.
‘असदाश्रयस्य साधकत्वं न’
“That which has a nonexistent locus has no capacity to establish.”
इत्यपि व्याप्तिं विना कथं निवार्यते ।
How is even this claim ruled out without an invariable concomitance?
असदाश्रयम् इत्यादिविशेषणत्वसम्भवे कथमव्याप्तिः । न चात्यन्ताभावोऽपि सर्वधर्मरहितः । प्रमेयत्वाद्यनुभवात् । परिशेषार्थापत्तिप्रामाण्याभ्युपगमाच्च ।
When expressions such as “having what is nonexistent as its substratum” can serve as qualifiers, how is there under-pervasion? Nor is even absolute absence devoid of all properties, since its knowability and the like are experienced, and because the validity of elimination by remainder and postulation is accepted.
‘विमतं सकर्तृकम्’
“The disputed subject has a maker.”
इत्यत्र सर्वज्ञत्वस्य पक्षधर्मताबलेन सिध्यङ्गीकारात् ।
because, in this case, the establishment of omniscience is accepted by the force of its being a property of the subject.
परिशेषोऽर्थापत्तिरनुमानमित्यविशेषः । उपपत्तिमात्रत्वात् । उपपत्तेश्च व्याप्त्यपेक्षा सर्वथाङ्गीकार्येत्याग्रहमात्रेण भेदः । उपमानस्यापि व्याप्तिरूपत्वात् । न हि स्वसदृशेनासदृशं क्वचिद् दृष्टम् । योग्यानुपलब्धेश्च लिङ्गत्वम्, अविशेषात् ।
There is no distinction among elimination by remainder, postulation, and inference, because each is nothing but explanatory justification. And the dependence of explanatory justification on invariable concomitance must be accepted in every case; the distinction is due merely to insistence. Comparison too has the form of invariable concomitance, for something dissimilar from what is similar to it is never observed anywhere. Non-apprehension of what is apprehensible also has the status of an inferential sign, because it is not distinct from one.
उक्तदोषेष्वेव अशेषानुमानदोषाणामन्तर्भावः । साध्याविशिष्टोऽसिद्धः । सिद्धसाधकोऽसङ्गतः । न प्रमासाधनं प्रमाणम् । ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तायां प्रमायां प्रमाणाभावात् । न चाज्ञातपरिच्छित्तिरेव प्रमा इत्यत्र किञ्चिन्मानम् । याथार्थ्यमेव प्रामाण्यमित्यङ्गीकारात् ।
All defects of inference are subsumed under the faults already stated alone. A reason not distinct from the probandum is unestablished; one that proves what is already established is irrelevant. A valid means of knowledge is not an instrument producing valid cognition, since there is no valid means of knowledge for a valid cognition distinct from cognition. Nor is there any warrant for the claim that valid cognition is exclusively the determination of what is unknown, since validity is accepted to be accordance with reality alone.
न चानुभूतिरेव प्रमाणम् । स्मृत्यादावव्याप्तेः । वेदानुमानादिप्रामाण्यप्रसिद्धेश्च ।
Nor is presentative cognition alone a pramāṇa, because this would under-extend to memory and the like, and because the validity of Veda, inference, and the like as pramāṇas is well established.
‘स्मृतिः प्रत्यक्षमैतिह्यमनुमानं चतुष्टयम् ।प्रमाणमिति विज्ञेयं धर्माद्यर्थे बुभूषुभिः ॥’
“The four—memory, perception, traditional testimony, and inference—are to be understood as valid means of knowledge by those who seek attainment of dharma and the other ends.”
इति श्रुतेश्च ।
And because of the śruti statement to this effect.
ऐतिह्यमागमभेदः । न च सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणम् । ईश्वरज्ञानादावव्याप्तेः । अप्रामाण्ये प्रमाणाभावाच्च । प्रामाण्यज्ञाने च । तत्राप्यङ्गीकारेऽनवस्थितेः । स्वप्रकाशात्माङ्गीकारे तत्राव्याप्तेः । स्मृतेश्च प्रामाण्यानङ्गीकारे
Traditional report is a kind of testimony. Nor is a valid means of knowledge “that which produces veridical cognition,” since this definition fails to apply to God's cognition and the like, and since, if that cognition were not valid, no valid means of knowledge would exist. It also fails to apply to cognition of validity: if a further valid means of knowledge is admitted there too, an infinite regress results; if that cognition is accepted as self-luminous by nature, the definition fails to apply there. And if the validity of memory is not accepted…
‘अनुभूतं मया’
“It was experienced by me”
इत्यत्र प्रमाणाभावात् । लिङ्गत्वेन प्रामाण्ये कल्पनागौरवात् । दृष्टहानिश्च ।
Because there is no valid means of knowledge for this statement; if validity is posited on the basis of its being an inferential sign, because of the cumbersomeness of that postulation; and there is abandonment of what is observed.
स्मृतिप्रमाणद्वैविध्यमात्रकल्पने मिथ्याज्ञानादेर्निरासादनुभवविरोधः ।
If only a twofold classification into memory and valid cognition is posited, it conflicts with experience because false cognition and the like are excluded.
‘तदनुभवाभावः’
“There is no experience of that”
इत्युक्ते
When it is said thus…
‘अनुभवः स्मृतिश्च नास्ति’
“There is neither experience nor memory.”
इत्युक्ते किमुत्तरम् ?
When this is said, what is the reply?
स्वसिद्धैः साधनं परसिद्धैर्दूषणम् । अतो न दूषणे अपसिद्धान्तादि । इष्टापत्तिः सिद्धसाधनत्वादसङ्गतमेव ॥
Proof is by what is established for oneself; refutation, by what is established for the opponent. Therefore, in refutation there is no deviation from an established tenet or the like. Acceptance of the desired consequence is altogether inapplicable, since it would amount to proving what is already established.
आनन्दतीर्थमुनिना ब्रह्मतर्कोक्तिमार्गतः । मानलक्षणमित्युक्तं सङ्क्षेपाद् ब्रह्मसिद्धये ॥
Thus the characterization of valid means of knowledge has been stated concisely by the sage Ānandatīrtha, following the line of exposition of the Brahmatarka, for the establishment of Brahman.
अशेषमानमेयैकसाक्षिणेऽक्षयमूर्तये । अजेशपुरुहूतेड्य नमो नारायणाय ते ॥
O you who are worthy of praise by Brahmā, Śiva, and Indra, homage to you, Nārāyaṇa—the sole witness of all means of valid knowledge and all objects of knowledge, whose form is imperishable.
इति श्रीमदानन्दतीर्थभगवत्पादाचार्यविरचितं प्रमाणलक्षणम् ॥
Thus ends the Pramāṇalakṣaṇa, composed by the venerable Ānandatīrtha Bhagavatpādācārya.
