Upādhikhaṇḍanam (उपाधिखण्डनम्)
Refutation of the Limiting Adjunct
May Nārāyaṇa, whose form is the eternal and sole abode of innumerable qualities, who is free from every defect, and who is the abode of Kamalā, be pleased. (1)
Ignorance cannot in any way occur in the knower of all. If it is claimed that it occurs because of a difference in limiting adjuncts, then that difference is by its very nature… (2)
Or is it due to ignorance? If it is intrinsic, duality is real. There is either an infinite regress concerning the cause of ignorance or mutual establishment. (3)
Or else circularity would result. And how could difference arise from an adjunct? An adjunct is a revealer of an already existing difference, certainly not its producer. (4)
Indeed, even in space, a limiting adjunct has previously been observed as revealing another region; relative to a dull intellect, it reveals the distinction that already exists. (5)
If the connection with the limiting adjunct is not in one region, then it is all-pervading. If it is in one region, an infinite regress would result; if it is all-pervading, it does not differentiate. (6)
And when the essential nature is identical, the experience of pleasure, pain, and so forth is not differentiated on account of difference; for indeed, even when the limiting adjuncts differ, it is observed as occurring in the hands, feet, and so forth. (7)
Just as a yogin integrates experiences occurring in various bodies. If there were no integration of experiences, from where would the yogin’s desire for that arise? (8)
Otherwise, a plurality of bodies devoid of interconnected awareness is already established; indeed, on that position, whence would the yogin’s distinctive feature arise? (9)
For, upon the establishment of difference in karma, differentiation by limiting adjuncts would arise; and only upon the establishment of the latter would the former be established. Thus there is mutual dependence. (10)
This position is plainly defective in its entirety, both because difference in the intrinsic natures of selves is faultless and because the position conflicts with perception and the like. (11)
When another body’s possession of a self is established by activity as an inferential mark, that self’s distinctness from one’s own self is therefore experienced by everyone indeed. (12)
And ignorance, possession of limited power, being subject to suffering, and limited agency are indeed found in experience and are opposed to the Lord’s qualities, such as omniscience. (13)
The qualities of Viṣṇu beginning with omniscience are taught in the Śrutis; and, on the basis of statements such as “That greatness of his is real,” they are not false. (14)
Nor is there any valid means of knowledge establishing the falsity of what the Veda states, nor would that have the status of a valid means of knowledge. Therefore, precisely because an ignorant person is impossible, there is no qualified aspirant for the proponents of identity. (15)
Therefore, too, there is no object characterized as “unknown” with respect to another object. Since no ignorant person exists, whose is the result? The conjunction is that of a hare’s horn and a man’s horn. (16)
If incoherence were an ornament, the self’s being ignorance would be one; even blind darkness would be an adornment, and eternal suffering a crest-jewel. (17)
Therefore, he is indicated by the preceding śruti as “beyond measure.” By the śruti, “the other, the Lord,” he has come into the sight of the individual self distinct from him. Remaining distinct, he always grants similarity to himself, according to the śruti, “When …” (भिन्नत्वेनात्मसादृश्यदो ‘यदे’ (आथ.उ.3.1.3) ति श्रुतेः सदा ॥18)
Thus the world, pervaded by the darkness of Māyāvāda, was illuminated by the omniscient sun, the seer of reality, always for the pleasure of the Lord of Śrī. (19)
Homage to him whose beautiful form is dense with his own intense bliss, to the Lord of Indirā, the giver of the enjoyment of eternal bliss. (20)
Thus, the Refutation of Upādhi, composed by the illustrious Ānandatīrtha Bhagavatpādācārya, is complete.
