Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍanam (मिथ्यात्वानुमानखण्डनम्)
mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍanam
Refutation of the inference of falsity
‘vimataṁ mithyā dr̥śyatvāt, yaditthaṁ tattathā, yathā sampratipannam(śuktirajatam) ’
“The disputed subject is false, because it is an object of cognition. Whatever is such is so, as in the agreed-upon instance of shell-silver.”
ityuktē jagatō’bhāvādāśrayāsiddhaḥ pakṣaḥ । anirvacanīyāsiddhēraprasiddhaviśēṣaṇaḥ । sadasadvailakṣaṇyē mithyātvē siddhasādhanatā । dr̥śyatvābhāvādasiddhō hētuḥ । anirvacanīyāsiddhērēva sapakṣābhāvādviruddhaḥ । ātmanō’pi dr̥śyatvādanaikāntikaḥ । jagatō’bhāvē’numānasyāpyabhāva iti tarkabādhitatvēnānadhyavasitaḥ ।
When it is stated thus, because the world is nonexistent, the subject of inference is unestablished as to its locus. Since indefinability is unestablished, the subject has an unestablished qualifier. If falsity consists in being distinct from both the real and the unreal, there is the fault of proving what is already established. Since being an object of cognition is absent, the reason is unestablished. Precisely because indefinability is unestablished, the reason is contradictory, since there is no similar instance. Since the self too is an object of cognition, it is inconclusive. It is unascertained, being refuted by the counter-reasoning: “If the world is nonexistent, the inference too is nonexistent.”
pratyakṣādiviruddhatvād
Because it contradicts perception and the other means of valid knowledge...
‘viśvaṁ satyam’
“The universe is real.”
ityādivākyaviruddhatvācca kālātyayāpadiṣṭaḥ ।
And because it is contradicted by statements such as this, it is a reason precluded by prior proof.
‘rajataṁ dr̥ṣṭam’
“Silver was seen”
iti bhramamātratvāt
because what is stated thus is nothing but an error
‘vimataṁ satyaṁ dr̥śyatvāt, ātmavat’
“The subject under dispute is real, because it is an object of cognition, like the self.”
ityapi prayōjyatvāt prakaraṇasamaḥ ।
Because an argument can also be adduced in this form, the reason is equal to the issue.
‘vimataṁ satyaṁ pramāṇadr̥ṣṭatvāt, yaditthaṁ tattathā, yathātmā’
“The disputed subject is real because it is cognized by a valid means of knowledge. Whatever is thus is so, as in the case of the self.”
iti prayōgāt sapratisādhanaḥ । śuktirajatasyāpyanirvacanīyatvābhāvāt sādhyavikalō dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ । uktaprakārēṇa dr̥śyatvābhāvāt sādhanavikalaḥ । pramāṇaviruddhatvamupādhiḥ ।
Because it is formulated thus, it has a counter-proof. Since even shell-silver lacks indefinability, the example lacks the property to be proved. Since shell-silver lacks perceptibility in the stated manner, the example lacks the probans. Being contradicted by a valid means of knowledge is the limiting condition.
sādhyadharmaviśiṣṭaḥ pakṣaḥ । sādhyasamānadharmaviśiṣṭaḥ sapakṣaḥ । sādhyaviparītadharmaviśiṣṭaḥ vipakṣaḥ । pakṣavacanaṁ pratijñā । liṅgaṁ hētuḥ । nidarśanaṁ dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ ॥
The inferential subject is qualified by the probandum-property. The positive instance is qualified by a property concordant with the probandum. The negative instance is qualified by a property contrary to the probandum. A statement concerning the inferential subject is the thesis. The inferential mark is the reason. An illustration is the example.
yō dr̥śyatē sadānandanityavyaktacidātmanā । nirdōṣākhilakalyāṇaguṇaṁ vandē ramāpatim ॥
I bow to the Lord of Ramā, who is perceived as being by nature perpetual bliss and eternally manifest consciousness, free from defects and possessing all auspicious qualities.
iti śrīmadānandatīrthabhagavatpādācāryaviracitaṁ prapañcamithyātvānumānakhaṇḍanam ॥
Thus, the Refutation of the Inference of the Falsity of the World, composed by the illustrious Ānandatīrtha Bhagavatpādācārya.
