2. Introduction (उपोद्घातः)
2.1. mahānāmnīśabdārthaḥ
2.1 The meaning of the term “Mahānāmnī”
mahānāmnīnām r̥cām upasargāḥ= yē upasarjanabhūtāḥ, tān upasr̥jati saṁyōjayati। mahannāma yāsvr̥kṣu vidyatē tā mahānāmnyaḥ। parasya brahmaṇō yannāmēndrādikaṁ tanmahārthatvānmahat। mahaddhi tat paraṁ brahma। aśēṣaguṇapūrtēḥ।
The additions to the Mahānāmnī ṛcs are those which function as subordinate elements; one adds them, that is, joins them. Those ṛcs in which a great name occurs are Mahānāmnīs. Whatever name of the Supreme Brahman begins with Indra is great because its referent is great. For that Supreme Brahman is great, because of the fullness of all qualities without exception.
2.2. brahmaṇaḥ saguṇatvasamarthanam
2.2. Demonstration that Brahman is endowed with attributes.
tatraika āhuraguṇaṁ brahmēti। na tad yuktam। śrutiyuktivirōdhāt।
On this matter, some say, “Brahman is devoid of attributes.” That is not tenable, because it conflicts with scripture and reasoning.
tathāhi śrutiḥ-
For accordingly, the Śruti says: …
“satyaṁ jñānamanantaṁ brahma” - taittirīyōpaniṣat 2/1
“Brahman is reality, knowledge, and infinite.” — Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2/1
“vijñānamānandaṁ brahma” - br̥hadāraṇyakōpaniṣat 5/9/34
“Brahman is knowledge and bliss.” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 5/9/34
“yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavid yasya jñānamayaṁ tapaḥ। tasmādētad brahma nāma rūpamannaṁ ca jāyatē॥” - ātharvaṇōpaniṣat 1/1/9
“From him who is omniscient, who knows all, and whose austerity consists of knowledge, arise this Brahman, name, form, and food.” — आथर्वणोपनिषत् १/१/९
“divyō hyamūrtaḥ puruṣaḥ sa bāhyābhyantarō hyajaḥ। aprāṇō hyamanāḥ śubhrō hyakṣarāt parataḥ paraḥ॥”- ātharvaṇōpaniṣat 2/1/2
“For the Person is radiant and formless; he is indeed outside and inside, unborn, without vital breath, without mind, and pure—supreme beyond the Imperishable.” — आथर्वणोपनिषत् २/१/२
“ētāvānasya mahimā atō jyāyāṁśca puruṣaḥ” - r̥gvēdasaṁhitā 10/90/2
“Such is his greatness, and the Puruṣa is greater than this.” — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 10/90/2
“yō naḥ pitā janitā yō vidhātā dhāmāni vēda bhuvanāni viśvā” - r̥gvēdasaṁhitā 10/82
“He who is our father and begetter, who is the ordainer, knows the abodes and all the worlds.” — ऋग्वेदसंहिता १०/८२
“pūrṇamadaḥ pūrṇamidaṁ pūrṇāt pūrṇamudacyatē। pūrṇasya pūrṇamādāya pūrṇamēvāvaśiṣyatē॥” - br̥hadāraṇyakōpaniṣat 7/1/1
“That is complete; this is complete. From the complete, the complete arises. Having taken the complete from the complete, the complete alone remains.” — Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 7/1/1
“sarvakarmā sarvakāmaḥ sarvagandhaḥ sarvarasaḥ। sarvamidamabhyāttō’vākyanādaraḥ” - chāndōgyōpaniṣat 3/2/9
“Performing every action, possessing every object of desire, every fragrance, and every flavor, embracing all this, speechless and unconcerned.” — Chāndogya Upaniṣad 3/2/9
“viṣṇōrnu kaṁ vīryāṇi pra vōcaṁ yaḥ pārthivāni vimamē rajāṁsi” - r̥gvēdasaṁhitā 1/154/1
“Now indeed I shall proclaim the heroic deeds of Viṣṇu, who measured out the earthly regions.” — Ṛgveda Saṃhitā 1/154/1
“parō mātrayā tanvā vr̥dhāna na tē mahitvamanvaśnuvanti” - r̥gvēdasaṁhitā 7/99/1
“O you who grow beyond measure in your form, they do not attain your greatness.” — Ṛgvedasaṃhitā ७/९९/१
“na tē viṣṇō jāyamānō na jātō dēva mahimnaḥ paramantamāpa” - r̥gvēdasaṁhitā 7/99/2
“No one being born, nor anyone born, O Viṣṇu, O god, has reached the furthest limit of your greatness.” — Ṛgvedasaṃhitā 7/99/2
ityādikā।
Such passages and the like.
yuktiśca। buddhipūrvaṁ sarvakartr̥tvāt sarvajñatvādayō guṇā yuktāḥ।
And reasoning: Since being the agent of everything is preceded by cognition, qualities beginning with omniscience are logically warranted.
“kartr̥tvāt saguṇaṁ brahma puruṣaṁ puruṣarṣabham” - bhāgavatam 3/33/12
“Because of agency, Brahman is possessed of qualities—the Person, the foremost among persons.” — Bhāgavatam 3/33/12
iti ca bhāgavatē।
Thus also in the Bhāgavata.
naca,
Nor, …
“ēkō dēvaḥ sarvabhūtēṣu gūḍhaḥ sarvavyāpī sarvabhūtāntarātmā। karmādhyakṣaḥ sarvabhūtādhivāsaḥ sākṣī cētā kēvalō nirguṇaśca॥” - śvētāśvatarōpaniṣat 6/11
“The one God, hidden in all beings, is all-pervading, the inner Self of all beings, the overseer of actions, the abode of all beings, the witness, the cognizer, the sole one, and devoid of qualities.” — श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषत् ६/११
ityādivirōdhaḥ। sattvādiguṇābhāvōktēstatra। anyathā “ēkō dēvaḥ sarvabhūtēṣu gūḍhaḥ” ityādīnāmapi guṇatvāt svōktivirōdhaḥ।
There is contradiction with statements such as these. For the absence of qualities such as sattva is stated there. Otherwise, since even expressions such as “one God, hidden in all beings” are qualities, there would be a contradiction with its own statement.
2.2.1. nirviśēṣatvanirāsaḥ
2.2.1. Refutation of being without distinctions.
naca nirviśēṣaṁ nāma kiñcidasti। nirviśēṣatvōktērēva vyāhatatvāt। nirviśēṣatvēna viśiṣṭaṁ na vētyuktē yadyaviśiṣṭaṁ tarhi na viśēṣanirākaraṇam। viśēṣavattvamēva bhavati। yadi tēna viśiṣṭaṁ sa ēva viśēṣa iti vyāhatiḥ।
Nor does anything called “distinctionless” exist, because the very assertion of distinctionlessness is self-contradictory. When it is stated whether it is qualified by distinctionlessness or not, if it is unqualified, then distinction has not been negated; rather, possession of distinction results. If it is qualified by that, that itself is a distinction, and thus there is a contradiction.
naca nirviśēṣatvē kiñcinmānam। aśēṣaviśēṣavacanānubhavayuktivirōdhaśca। naca mithyāviśēṣavat। vyāhatēḥ। mithyāviśēṣa ityuktē hyasadviśēṣa ityēva bhavati। tathācāviśēṣaviśiṣṭapakṣōktadōṣa ēva।
There is no valid means of knowledge whatsoever for distinctionlessness; moreover, it conflicts with all assertions of distinction, experience, and reasoning. Nor is it as in the case of a false distinction, because of contradiction. For when “false distinction” is stated, it amounts only to “nonexistent distinction.” Thus precisely the defect already stated for the position of being qualified by absence of distinction applies.
2.2.2. anirvacanīyatvanirāsaḥ
Refutation of indefinability.
nacānirvacanīyaviśēṣa iti bhavati। anirvacanīyāsiddhēḥ। nahi tatra pratyakṣamasti। mithyāśabdastvabhāvavācyēva। tadanyatra pramāṇābhāvāt। nacānyat pramāṇam। pratijñāvyāhatēḥ। nahi sadantarādasataścānyat sadasadvilakṣaṇaṁ prasiddham। ‘asanna bhavati’ ityuktē
Nor is it the case that there is an indefinable particular entity, because no indefinable entity is established. Indeed, there is no perception of it. The word “false,” however, denotes absence alone, because there is no means of knowledge regarding anything other than that. Nor is there another means of knowledge, because it would contradict the thesis. Indeed, nothing distinct from the existent and the nonexistent is established as something other than another existent or the nonexistent. When it is said, “It is not nonexistent,” …
“dvau nañau prakr̥tamarthaṁ sātiśayaṁ gamayataḥ”
“Two negative particles convey the meaning under discussion with added emphasis.”
iti sadēva bhavati। asadantaraṁ vā viśēṣavivakṣāyām।
Thus it becomes indeed existent—or, when a distinction is intended, other than the nonexistent.
kiñcaitadvailakṣaṇyaṁ bhēdō’bhēdō bhēdābhēdō vā। na tāvad bhēdaḥ, anaṅgīkārāt। vyāvahārikabhēdaścānirvācyasiddhau vaktavyaḥ। nacāvyāvahārikaṁ kiñcit। nacāśēṣavyavahāranivr̥ttau kiñcinmānam। naca mithyātathyayōḥ sāmānyaṁ vyāvahārikatvaṁ dhūmabāṣpayōrdhūmatvavat। nacābhēdaḥ, anaṅgīkārādēva। tathaivōbhayam। abhēdē cānirvācyabrahmaṇōstacchabdayōḥ paryāyatvam। naca vyāvartyaviśēṣēṇāparyāyatvaṁ kvacit। vyāvartyaviśēṣastadvyāvr̥ttē brahmaṇi viśēṣamāpādayati cēt, viśiṣṭavākyārthatā। na cēt, na brahmajñānārthinē padāntaraṁ vācyam। asaṅgatatvāt। mithyāviśēṣasya cāsiddhiruktā। atō’nyōnyāśrayatā’navasthitiścakrakaṁ vā। bhēdābhēdavilakṣaṇamapyuktarītyaivāpākr̥tam।
Moreover, is this distinctness difference, non-difference, or difference and non-difference? To begin with, it is not difference, because that is not accepted. And empirical difference must be asserted in establishing the indeterminable. Nor is anything non-empirical. Nor is there any valid means of knowledge for the cessation of all practical dealings. Nor is empirical status common to the false and the real, just as smokiness is not common to smoke and vapor. Nor is it non-difference, for the very reason that this is not accepted. The same applies to both together. And if there is non-difference, the two words for the indeterminable and Brahman are synonymous. Nor is there anywhere non-synonymity owing to a distinction in what is excluded. If the distinction in what is excluded entails a distinction in Brahman as differentiated from that, the sentence meaning is qualified. If it does not, no other word should be uttered to one seeking knowledge of Brahman, because it would be irrelevant. The non-establishment of an unreal distinction has also been stated. Thus there is mutual dependence, infinite regress, or circularity. What is distinct from both difference and non-difference has also been refuted precisely in the manner already stated.
kiñca, ‘asadvilakṣaṇam’ ityatrābhāvānyavirōdhānāṁ madhyē nañaḥ kō’rthaḥ? yadyabhāvaḥ, na। asadvilakṣaṇatvaṁ bhāvatvamēva jagataḥ syāt। naca satō’nyasmādasatō vilakṣaṇaṁ jagat। asatō’nyatvādidharmānaṅgīkārāt। brahmaṇaśca। asatō’nirvacanīyatvāṅgīkārācca na vailakṣaṇyaṁ tatō’nirvācyasya। tathāpi cēd vailakṣaṇyaṁ nānirvācanīyatvaṁ[5] jagataḥ। naca virōdhaḥ। virōdhinōranyataraniṣēdhē’nyataravyāptatvānubhavāt। ‘avidyamānaṁ na bhavati’ ityuktē vidyamānamityēva hi sarvalōkānubhavaḥ।
Moreover, in the expression “different from the unreal,” which—absence, otherness, or opposition—is the meaning of the negative prefix? If it is absence, that is not tenable: the world’s being different from the unreal would be nothing but its being existent. Nor is the world different from an unreal entity other than the existent, since otherness and similar attributes are not admitted for the unreal. Nor is it different from Brahman. And since the unreal is admitted to be indefinable, what is indefinable is not different from it. If, nevertheless, there is a difference, the world would not be indefinable. Nor can the meaning be opposition, because experience shows that, when either of two opposites is negated, the other invariably obtains. For when “It is not nonexistent” is said, everyone’s experience is precisely “It is existent.”
atō’nantaguṇō bhagavān nārāyaṇa iti siddham।
Therefore, it is established that the Lord Nārāyaṇa possesses infinite attributes.
2.3. śrutīnāṁ siddhabōdhakatvasamarthanam
2.3. Vindication of the Śrutis’ capacity to convey an established reality
naca siddhē’rthē vākyasya prāmāṇyābhāvādīśvarādyasiddhiḥ। siddhātiriktakāryābhāvāt। liṅādyarthastviṣṭasādhanatvamēva। nahi kartavyatvaṁ nāmēṣṭasādhanatvādanyat kiñcit। tanmānābhāvāt। śabdastu na tad vaktītyuktam। liṅādēriṣṭasādhanārthatvēnaiva kr̥tārthatvē tadanyakāryakalpanē kalpanāgauravaṁ ca।
Nor does the alleged absence of a sentence’s authoritativeness concerning an already established object entail the failure to establish Īśvara and the like, since there is nothing to be accomplished beyond what is already established. The meaning of the optative affix and the like, however, is solely being a means to a desired end. For there is no so-called being-required-to-be-done distinct from being a means to a desired end, since there is no means of knowing it. It has been stated, moreover, that a word does not express it. When the optative affix and the like already fulfill their function by having “a means to a desired end” as their meaning, postulating something-to-be-done distinct from that also entails a burdensome multiplication of postulates.
naca tatkalpakaṁ kiñcit। vipratipattau cānyanmānaṁ vaktavyaṁ tadbhāvē। nacānumā। aprasiddhaviśēṣaṇatvāt। nacārthāpattiḥ। anupapattyabhāvāt।
And there is nothing that provides a basis for postulating that. When there is disagreement, another means of knowledge must be stated to establish its existence. Nor can it be inference, because its qualifier is unestablished; nor presumption, because there is no inexplicability.
kāryābhāvādēva kāryānvayini vyutpattirityādi dūratō nirastam। kāryānvitē vyutpattiriti vadatō’kāryānvitē vyutpattirityuktē kimuttaram? adhyāhāra ityuktē lōpa ityuttaram। aśēṣasiddhapadānāmarthalōpālliṅādyarthamātralōpa ēva garīyān।
Precisely because what is to be done is absent, claims beginning with “word-meaning acquisition concerns what is connected with what is to be done” are refuted out of hand. What answer does one who says, “Word-meaning acquisition occurs with respect to what is connected with what is to be done,” have when told, “Word-meaning acquisition occurs with respect to what is connected with what is not to be done”? If “supplementation” is proposed, the answer is “ellipsis.” Ellipsis only of the meaning of the optative ending and the like is indeed preferable to the loss of the meanings of all words denoting established entities.
‘hasasi’ ‘hasāmi’ ityādisiddhārtha ēva bālānāṁ vyutpattēḥ। prathamaprāptatvānna tattyāgē kāraṇam। tathaiva vyutpattidarśanācca।
For children acquire linguistic understanding precisely with respect to already-established meanings, such as “you are laughing” and “I am laughing.” Since that is apprehended first, there is no reason to abandon it, and linguistic understanding is observed to arise in precisely that way.
ataḥ siddhārthē prāmāṇyasiddhēśca siddhaṁ mahāguṇavattvaṁ viṣṇōḥ।
Thus, since validity concerning an established fact is also established, Viṣṇu’s possession of great attributes is established.
