Kathālakṣaṇam - Definition of discourse (कथालक्षणम्)
kathālakṣaṇam
Definition of discourse
narasiṁhamakhilājñānatimirāśiśiradyutim । sampraṇamya pravakṣyāmi kathālakṣaṇamañjasā ॥1॥
Having reverentially bowed to Narasiṃha, whose radiance is not cool toward the darkness of all ignorance, I shall clearly set forth the defining characteristics of philosophical discussion. (1)
vādō jalpō vitaṇḍēti trividhā viduṣāṁ kathā । tattvanirṇayamuddiśya kēvalaṁ guruśiṣyayōḥ ॥2॥
Discussion among learned persons is threefold: debate, wrangling, and destructive criticism. A discussion exclusively between teacher and pupil, aimed at ascertaining the truth… (2)
kathā’nyēṣāmapi satāṁ vādō vā samitēḥ śubhā । khyātyādyarthaṁ spardhayā vā satāṁ jalpa itīryatē ॥3॥
A discussion among other learned persons too is vāda, or a wholesome discussion of an assembly. A discussion among learned persons for the sake of fame and the like, or from rivalry, is called jalpa. (3)
vitaṇḍā tu satāmanyaistattvamēṣu nigūhitam । svayaṁ vā prāśnikairvādē cintayēt tattvanirṇayam ॥4॥
Vitaṇḍā, however, is discussion of virtuous persons with others. The truth is concealed in these. In debate, one should deliberate upon the ascertainment of truth, either by oneself or with adjudicators. (4)
rāgadvēṣavihīnāstu sarvavidyāviśāradāḥ । prāśnikā iti samprōktā viṣamā ēka ēva vā ॥5॥
But the arbiters are declared to be free from attachment and aversion and proficient in all branches of learning; they are odd in number, or there is only one. (5)
aśēṣasaṁśayacchēttā niḥsaṁśaya udāradhīḥ । ēkaścēt prāśnikō jñēyaḥ sarvadōṣavivarjitaḥ ॥6॥
If there is a single adjudicator, he is to be recognized as one who removes every doubt, is himself free from doubt, noble-minded, and devoid of every fault. (6)
ēkō vā bahavō vā syurviṣṇubhaktiparāssadā । viṣṇubhaktirhi sarvēṣāṁ sadguṇānāṁ svalakṣaṇam ॥7॥
There may be either one questioner or many, always intent on devotion to Viṣṇu; for devotion to Viṣṇu is indeed the intrinsic defining characteristic of all good qualities. (7)
pr̥ṣṭēnāgama ēvādau vaktavyaḥ sādhyasiddhayē । naiṣā tarkēṇāpanēyā matirityāha hi śrutiḥ । anyārtha ēvāgamasya vaktavyaḥ prativādinā ॥8॥
At the outset, the person questioned must state the Āgama alone in order to establish the proposition to be proved. For Śruti says, “This understanding is not to be attained through reasoning.” The opponent must state only a different interpretation of the Āgama. (8)
r̥gyajuḥsāmātharvāśca bhārataṁ pañcarātrakam । mūlarāmāyaṇaṁ caiva samprōcyantē sadāgamāḥ ॥9॥
The Ṛg, Yajus, Sāman, and Atharvan Vedas, the Bhārata, the Pañcarātra, and also the original Rāmāyaṇa are declared to be authoritative scriptures. (9)
anukūlā ya ētēṣāṁ tē ca prōktāssadāgamāḥ । anyē durāgamā nāma tairna sādhyaṁ hi sādhyatē ॥10॥
Those that accord with these are also declared to be valid scriptures. The others are called invalid scriptures, for what is to be established is not established by them. (10)
svapakṣa āgamaścaiva vaktavyaḥ prativādinā । tasyāpyanyārthatā sādhyā vādinā svārthasiddhayē ॥11॥
The respondent must also state the authoritative text supporting his own position. The proponent must establish that it too has a different purport, in order to establish his own purport. (11)
anyārthatā nirākāryā svāgamasya viniścayam । upapattyavakāśō’tra hyāgamārthavinirṇayē ॥12॥
The alternative interpretation of one’s own āgama must be decisively refuted. For here, in determining the meaning of the āgama, there is indeed scope for rational argument. (12)
vādyāgamārthē nirṇīta āgamārthaḥ parasya tu । nirṇēyaḥ sahitaiḥ paścāttatō niśśēṣanirṇayaḥ ॥13॥
Once the meaning of the disputant’s authoritative text has been ascertained, however, the meaning of the other party’s authoritative text is afterward to be ascertained by the parties jointly; from that comes complete determination. (13)
pratyakṣasiddhēṣvarthēṣu praśnē mānamakṣajaṁ vadēt। jñānaṁ vā jñānasiddhēṣu nānumāṁ prathamaṁ vadēt ॥14॥
When questioned about objects established by perception, one should state the sense-born means of valid knowledge, or cognition in matters established by cognition; one should not state inference first. (14)
paratuṣṭikaraṁ vākyaṁ vadētāṁ yadi vādinau। sa ēvātrāgamō jñēyaḥ paratuṣṭirhi tatphalam ॥15॥
If the two disputants state a proposition that produces satisfaction in the opponent, that alone is to be understood here as authoritative verbal testimony, for the opponent’s satisfaction is its result. (15)
ēvaṁ nirṇayaparyantaṁ vādē subahavō’pi hi । ghaṭēyuścirakālaṁ ca jalpē yāvatparō jitaḥ ॥16॥
In this way, even very many may indeed engage in debate until a determination is reached; and also for a long time in wrangling, until the opponent is defeated. (16)
tattvanirṇayavailōmyaṁ vādē sākṣātparājayaḥ । saṁvādē ślāghyataiva syād gurutvamitarasya ca ॥17॥
In debate, reversal of the determination of truth is outright defeat; in dialogue, it would indeed be praiseworthy, and the other party would have the status of teacher. (17)
tattvanirṇayavailōmyē nindyō daṇḍyō’thavā bhavēt । virōdhāsaṅgatinyūnatūṣṇīmbhāvādikairjitaḥ ॥18॥
When there is opposition to the ascertainment of truth, one who has been defeated through contradiction, lack of coherence, incompleteness, silence, and the like may become censurable or punishable. (18)
bhavējjalpē vitaṇḍāyāṁ nyāyō jalpavadīritaḥ । saṁvādē daṇḍyatāṁ na syād vitaṇḍājalpayōrapi ॥19॥
This would apply in jalpa; for vitaṇḍā, the rule is stated to be as in jalpa. In dialogue, there should be no liability to punishment; in vitaṇḍā and jalpa also… (19)
parājitatvamātraṁ syānnindyō daṇḍyō’pi vā’nyathā । anuvādādirāhityaṁ naiva jalpē’pi dūṣaṇam ॥20॥
There should be merely the status of having been defeated; otherwise, one is censurable or even punishable. Even in disputation, the absence of restatement and the like is certainly not a fault. (20)
vidyāhīnatvaliṅgē’pi vādinōḥ syāt parājayaḥ । tadabhāvānnaiva ṣaṭkādanyō nigraha iṣyatē ॥21॥
Even upon an indication of lack of learning, one of the two disputants would be defeated. Since no such indication is present, no ground of defeat other than the set of six is accepted. (21)
antarbhāvādihānyēṣāṁ nigrahāṇāmiti sma ha । vidyāparīkṣāpūrvaiva vr̥ttirjalpavitaṇḍayōḥ ॥22॥
Because the other grounds of defeat are included here—so indeed it is traditionally stated. The practice of jalpa and vitaṇḍā is necessarily preceded by an examination of learning. (22)
skhalitatvādimātrēṇa na tatrāpi parājayaḥ । vādajalpavitaṇḍānāmiti śuddhaṁ svalakṣaṇam ॥23॥
Even there, there is no defeat merely on account of a lapse and the like. Thus is the precise intrinsic definition of vāda, jalpa, and vitaṇḍā. (23)
ānandatīrthamuninā brahmatarkānusārataḥ । kathālakṣaṇamityuktaṁ prītyarthaṁ śārṅgadhanvanaḥ ॥24॥
The definition of disputation was thus stated by the sage Ānandatīrtha, in accordance with the Brahmatarka, for the pleasure of the wielder of Śārṅga. (24)
sadōditāmitajñānapūravāritahr̥ttamāḥ । narasiṁhaḥ priyatamaḥ prīyatāṁ puruṣōttamaḥ ॥25॥
May Narasimha, the most beloved Supreme Person, whose ever-manifest, limitless flood of knowledge dispels the darkness of the heart, be pleased. (25)
iti śrīmadānandatīrthabhagavatpādācāryaviracitaṁ kathālakṣaṇam ॥
Thus ends Kathālakṣaṇa, composed by the illustrious Ānandatīrtha Bhagavatpādācārya.
